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Preface
These writings constitute my PhD dissertation in ﬁnancial economics. The dissertation consists of three
chapters. Each chapter can be read independently of the others, but all three chapters share the dissertation’s
overall topic: Measuring and pricing the risk of corporate failures.
The ability to adequately measure and price the risk of corporate failures is vital for creditors, sharehold-
ers, and regulators of ﬁnancial institutions. Whenever a ﬁrm uses debt instruments such as loans or bonds to
ﬁnance its operations, the ﬁrm may fail to meet the debt’s contractual obligations. Typically, a failure is in
the form of a default on a payment of interest or principle, but can also be a violation of a covenant attached
to the debt or a bankruptcy ﬁling by the ﬁrm or by the creditors on behalf of the ﬁrm. If a ﬁrm fails, it may
be forced to temporarily or permanently halt its operations, which can entail losses: Creditors may realize a
loss on their promised payments, while shareholders may see their entire equity stake wiped out. Therefore,
creditors and shareholders need to adequately measure the risk of a failure, so that this risk can be reﬂected
in the prices they are willing to pay—and the returns they require—for holding a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial securities.
At the same time, regulators must be able to verify that a ﬁnancial institution is adequately cushioned against
this risk, so that losses do not destabilize an important institution or even the ﬁnancial system itself.
The overall questions addressed in this dissertation are, then, how should we adequately measure the
risk of corporate failures, and, is the risk of corporate failures adequately reﬂected in the market prices of
ﬁnancial securities? As a testimony to the importance of these questions, they have been at the center of
much academic and regulation-oriented research since the late 1960s. The chapters of this dissertation thus
constitute three contributions to this still highly active ﬁeld of research within ﬁnancial economics: Chapters
1 and 2 contribute to the literature on the measurement and prediction of the risk of corporate failures, while
Chapter 3 contributes to the literature on the pricing of ﬁnancial securities exposed to the risk of corporate
failures. A review of the historic developments in the literature is given after this preface.
Chapter 1 is titled “Additive Intensity Regression Models in Corporate Default Analysis” and was pub-
lished in Journal of Financial Econometrics in 2013. It presents an additive survival regression framework
that allows the estimation and analysis of time-varying eﬀects on default probabilities. The chapter uses
data on ﬁrm characteristics and default histories for rated public US ﬁrms during the 1982-2006 period. The
main result is that the ‘distance-to-default’ (an equity-market based measure of volatility-adjusted lever-
age) and the ratio of short-to-long term debt have signiﬁcantly time-varying eﬀects on default probabilities.
The time-variation in these eﬀects is related to business cycle ﬂuctuations. The chapter also shows that
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the inclusion of time-varying eﬀects subsumes the eﬀects of macroeconomics explanatory variables. These
ﬁndings suggest that time-varying eﬀects can help us understand which risk-factors that are the most impor-
tant at certain points in a business cycle, and they indicate that at least part of the eﬀects of macroeconomic
ﬂuctuations is captured through their inﬂuence on ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics.
Chapter 2 is titled “Cyclicality and Firm-size in Private Firm Defaults.” It analyses the validity of an
assumption in the Basel II/III and CRD IV accords allowing banks to considerably reduce their risk-weights
on loans to small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs)—namely, an assumption that the default probabil-
ities of small ﬁrms are less cyclical than the default probabilities of large ﬁrms. The chapter uses a large
dataset on loan and default histories for private Danish ﬁrms during the 2003-2012 period. The main result
is that discriminating solely on ﬁrm-size, the default probabilities of small ﬁrms do exhibit less cyclicality
than the default probabilities of large ﬁrms, but that accounting for ﬁrm characteristics other than size, the
average small ﬁrm’s default probability is equally cyclical or even more cyclical than the default probability
of the average large ﬁrm. These ﬁndings suggest that preferential treatment of capital charges solely based
on ﬁrm-size is too simplistic and may in fact entail adverse eﬀects on the stability of European banks with a
high exposure to the SME-segment.
The third and ﬁnal chapter is titled “Liquidity Risk and Distressed Equity” and is my job market paper
for the 2015 academic job market. It shows theoretically and empirically that ﬁrms’ cash holdings can
help rationalize the ‘distress puzzle’, i.e. the counterintuitive empirical ﬁnding that higher probability of
default predicts lower, not higher, future equity returns. The chapter presents a structural model in which a
levered ﬁrm with ﬁnancing constraints can default because of either insolvency (insuﬃcient market value of
assets relative to total liabilities) or illiquidity (insuﬃcient cash holdings relative to short-term liabilities).
The ﬁrm chooses its cash holdings so as to maximize equity value. The model implies that as long as the
ﬁrm is solvent, it should optimally hold a level of cash that allows it to avoid illiquidity. Hence, when the
ﬁrm follows the optimal cash-policy but is in high risk of insolvency, it will have a large fraction of its
assets in cash. This implies that the ﬁrm’s equity will have low conditional beta (i.e. a low exposure to
priced systematic risk), which helps rationalize the equity’s low expected returns. The chapter uses data on
liquidity, solvency, and equity returns for rated public US corporations during the 1970-2013 period. Its
main result is that the model’s theoretical predictions are empirically conﬁrmed. In particular: (1) In all
solvency levels, the average ﬁrm holds enough liquid assets to cover its short-term liabilities; less solvent
ﬁrms have (2) a higher fraction of their total assets in liquid assets and therefore (3) lower conditional
betas and (4) lower returns. These ﬁndings suggest that corporate cash holdings are key to rationalizing the
distress puzzle.
My intended audience is academics within the ﬁeld of ﬁnancial economics, ﬁnancial engineers working
with models that measure or price the risk of corporate failures, and regulators of ﬁnancial institutions with
an exposure to the public or private corporate sector. The intended reader will hold at least a Master’s degree
or similar in economics or mathematics-economics, and have some experience with capital structure theory,
asset pricing theory, and survival analysis. Some familiarity with survival analysis and stochastic processes
in continuous time is preferred for chapter 1; some familiarity with the Basel accords of recommendations
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on banking laws and regulations is preferred for chapter 2; and some familiarity with structural models of
default and empirical asset pricing anomalies is preferred for chapter 3.
I owe thanks to many people, without whom this dissertation would not be a reality. I ﬁrst became
interested in ﬁnancial economics during my Bachelor’s studies at University of Copenhagen while attending
a course on mathematical ﬁnance taught by Rolf Poulsen. My ﬁrst attempt to write about continuous time
ﬁnance was my Bachelor’s thesis, which was supervised by Ernst Hansen. Ernst encouraged me to further
pursue the topic and advised me to read David Lando’s work. During my Master’s studies, I learned about
stochastic processes from Martin Jacobsen, about survival analysis from Søren Feodor Nielsen, and about
credit risk models from David Lando. David, along with Søren Feodor Nielsen and Rolf Poulsen, supervised
work that became my Master’s thesis. This would later lay the groundwork for the ﬁrst chapter of this
dissertation. The data that I used for my Master’s thesis and the ﬁrst chapter of this dissertation was provided
by Mads Stenbo Nielsen, who also taught me about collecting data from CRSP and CompuStat, and who
has been an endless source of support throughout my PhD studies.
During my PhD studies at Copenhagen Business School, I was advised by David Lando and Søren
Feodor Nielsen, to whom I am extremely grateful. I learned about corporate ﬁnance from Ken Bechmann,
about asset pricing theory from Kristian Miltersen, about econometrics from Bent Jesper Christensen, and
about survival analysis from Thomas Scheike. I was fortunate to co-author with Thais Lærkholm Jensen,
David Lando, Søren Feodor Nielsen, and Mads Stenbo Nielsen. I also received much feedback and sup-
port from many colleagues at Copenhagen Business School, especially Peter Dalgaard, Søren Hvidkjær,
Cathrine Jessen, Michael Reimer Jensen, Mads Vestergaard Jensen, Agatha Murgoci, Jens Dick Nielsen,
Lasse Pedersen, Gyuri Venter, Desi Volcker, Christian Wagner, Ramona Westermann, Ida Willumsen, and
Davide Tomio.
During my stay at Stanford University, I received much help and advice from Kay Giesecke, and I was
extremely fortunate to learn about dynamic asset pricing theory from Darrell Duﬃe. Darrell has ever since
been a great source of inspiration and support.
A special word of thanks goes to Darrell Duﬃe, Søren Hvidkjær, David Lando, and Lasse Pedersen for
their advise and feedback regarding my job market paper (the third chapter of this dissertation).
Lastly, I would like to thank my family, my friends (some long-term and some more recent), and my
girlfriend for their unconditional and unwavering support. I dedicate this dissertation to them.
Mamdouh Medhat
Copenhagen, November, 2014
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Literature review
The three chapters of this dissertations are contributions to large and still active research areas within ﬁ-
nancial economics. Although each chapter includes a short review of the most directly related literature, I
believe it is instructive with a broader historic review of some of the research milestones that predated the
chapters of this dissertation—at least for readers who are not particularly familiar with the literature. Re-
gardless of the reader’s familiarity with the literature, my hope is that the following review will help clarify
where the contribution of each chapter ﬁt in the broader literature. In the following, I divide the review into
two parts: The ﬁrst part, which relates to chapters 1 and 2, is dedicated to the literature on measuring the
risk of corporate failures, while the second part, which relates to chapter 3, is dedicated to the literature on
pricing this risk.
Literature related to chapters 1 and 2:
Measuring the risk of corporate failures
Chapters 1 and 2 provide contributions to the literature on the statistical measurement of the risk of corporate
failures. This literature is concerned with risk-factors and statistical models that can help us explain or
predict corporate failures. The important risk-factors are usually identiﬁed through a data-driven approach
using accounting statements and macroeconomics time-series. However, in some cases, the risk-factors
are inferred from ‘structural’ models of default, which are economic models of the ﬁrm’s fundamentals
that directly determine the incentives or ability of the ﬁrm to honor its debt. A famous example of such a
risk-factor is the ‘distance-to-default’ implied by the models of, for instance, Black and Scholes (1973) and
Merton (1974). I give an overview of structural models in the review of the literature related to chapter 3.
The ﬁrst published application of a statistical method to measure the risk of corporate failures is the
paper titled “Financial ratios as predictors of failure” by Beaver (1966). The paper features a pair-matched
sample of diﬀerent accounting ratios for 79 failed and 79 surviving public US ﬁrms, and uses simple paired
t-tests to identify which accounting ratios that can, in a univariate manner, distinguish between failed and
surviving ﬁrms. As an important extension of this univariate methodology, Altman (1968) applied multi-
variate discriminant analysis to the accounting ratios of a pair-matched sample of 33 failed and 33 surviving
public US ﬁrms. The resulting ‘Z-score’ is a linear combination of accounting ratios with estimated coeﬃ-
cients, which, given cutoﬀs, can be used to discriminate between high and low risk ﬁrms. It is shown to have
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a 70% success rate in predicting failures two years before the event. Since it’s proposal, the Z-score and it’s
variants have become a commercial success and are still widely applied by investors and in research.
Modern statistical measures of failure risk are typically based on some form of regression analysis.
Ohlsen (1980) was one of the ﬁrst to apply logistic regression to the accounting ratios of a non-matched
sample of 2,058 public US ﬁrms, of which 105 are failures. The resulting ‘O-score’ is, like the Z-score,
a linear combination of accounting ratios with estimated coeﬃcients, which is transformed into a failure
probability using the logistic function, eO/(1 + eO). The O-score is about as accurate or slightly more
accurate than the Z-score in predicting failures over horizons of one and two years. In a related study,
Zmijewski (1984) argues that prior studies suﬀer from selection bias because they oversampled failures and
ﬁrms with complete data. He uses probit regression to estimate the probability of failure as a function of
accounting ratios for a sample of 40 failed and 800 surviving public US ﬁrms.
The models reviewed up to this point are now known as ‘static’ models, because they are estimated using
statistical methods where each ﬁrm is represented by a single set of accounting ratios measured at a single
point in time. Shumway (2001), however, argues that static models overestimate the eﬀects of accounting
ratios and produce failure probabilities that are biased and inconsistent. This is mainly because they ignore
that a ﬁrm’s accounting ratios change from year to year. Instead, he proposes estimating failure probabilities
using ‘hazard’ (or ‘duration’) regression models known from survival analysis. A hazard regression model
relates the conditional probability of failure at a speciﬁc time point, given survival up to that time point, to
the values of time-varying explanatory variables. Shumway (2001) argues that hazard regression models are
superior to the static ones because they 1) automatically correct for the amount of time that each ﬁrm is at
risk of failure, 2) take as input the entire observed history of a ﬁrm’s accounting ratios and can incorporate
macroeconomic variables as predictors, and 3) can utilize much more data than static models.
The theoretical contribution of Shumway (2001) is that a discrete time hazard regression model can be
estimated as a ‘dynamic logistic regression model’—that is, a model similar to the one applied by Ohlsen
(1980), but estimated using data on each ﬁrm in each year as if each ﬁrm-year is an independent observation.
To account for the dependence between ﬁrm-year observations for the same ﬁrm, standard errors are clus-
tered at the ﬁrm-level. The empirical contributions are that 1) hazard regression models outperform static
models in predicting future failures, 2) several of the accounting ratios applied in static models become in-
signiﬁcant predictors of failure in a hazard regression model, and 3) explanatory variables based on market
equity data (such as equity market capitalization, past equity return, and equity return volatility) are strong
predictors of failure. In a related study, Chava and Jarrow (2004) show that the predictive power of hazard
regression models is further improved by using a monthly instead of yearly observation frequency for equity
market-based variables and by including industry dummies as explanatory variables.
Hazard regression models are now the state-of-the-art in measuring and predicting the risk of corporate
failures, and have been applied to estimate, study, and explain the failure probabilities of both public and
private ﬁrms. For public ﬁrms, Hillegeist, Keating, Cram, and Lundstedt (2004) ﬁnd that the ‘distance-to-
default’ variable implied by the structural models of, for instance, Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton
(1974), cannot entirely explain variations in default probabilities across ﬁrms. The distance-to-default is a
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market-equity based measure of volatility-adjusted leverage and is the basis of the commercial ‘Estimated
Default Frequency’ (EDF) measure provided by Moody’s KMV (see Crosbie and Bohn (2002)). Duﬃe,
Saita, and Wang (2007) estimate conditional default probabilities over several future time periods using a
hazard regression model augmented with a time-series model for the stochastic development of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
and macroeconomic explanatory variables. They ﬁnd that the level and shape of the term structure of future
default probabilities depend, among other variables, on the distance-to-default, and that variations in the
distance-to-default have the greatest eﬀect on the term structure of future default probabilities. Moreover,
the model’s out-of-sample predictive performance over diﬀerent prediction horizons is an improvement
over prior models. Bharath and Shumway (2008) show that the performance of distance-to-default in hazard
regression models is relatively robust to alternative empirical approximations used to construct the measure.
An important assumption underlying most hazard regression models is that failures are conditionally
independent given the paths of the explanatory variables—that is, conditional on the paths of the explana-
tory variables, failures occur at independent Poisson arrival times with conditionally deterministic intensity
paths. Das, Duﬃe, Kapadia, and Saita (2007) use the data and model of Duﬃe et al. (2007) to test the joint
hypothesis of 1) a well-speciﬁed model for conditional default probabilities and 2) conditionally indepen-
dent defaults given the paths of the explanatory variables. They ﬁnd no support in the data for the joint
hypothesis and conclude that the failures in the data cluster more over time than is predicted by the model
of Duﬃe et al. (2007). Building on these results, Duﬃe, Eckner, Horel, and Saita (2009) ﬁnd evidence that
ﬁrms are exposed to a common dynamic latent risk factor (or ‘frailty’, to borrow a term from survival anal-
ysis) that drives failures, even after controlling for observable ﬁrm-speciﬁc and macroeconomic explanatory
variables like distance-to-default and aggregate stock market performance. Using almost the same data as
Das et al. (2007), Lando and Nielsen (2010) ﬁnd that it is possible to specify a model of conditional default
probabilities such that the tests conducted by Das et al. (2007) (as well as additional tests) do not lead to
a rejection of the hypothesis of conditionally independent failures. Speciﬁcally, they make the following
changes to the list of explanatory variables used by Duﬃe et al. (2007): They add the quick ratio (a conser-
vative measure of corporate liquidity), the ratio of short-to-long term debt, the book value of assets, and an
indicator of aggregate industrial production, and replace a measure of short-term interest rate with a measure
of the steepness of the term structure.
Chapter 1 of this dissertation (that is, Lando, Medhat, Nielsen, and Nielsen (2013)) uses the same data
as Lando and Nielsen (2010) and provides evidence of signiﬁcant time-variation in the eﬀects of distance-
to-default and the ratio of short-to-long term debt on conditional default probabilities. The chapter also
shows that allowing for time-varying eﬀects for ﬁrm-speciﬁc explanatory variables subsumes the eﬀects
of macroeconomic explanatory variables. Finally, the chapter shows that, after applying model-checking
techniques to remove outliers, the quick ratio is a strong predictor of defaults and that there is a signiﬁcant
and economically interpretable interaction-eﬀect between distance-to-default and quick ratio.
The studies mentioned until this point focus on public US ﬁrms. However, hazard regression models
have also more recently been applied studies of private ﬁrms and ﬁrms outside the US. One topic that has
received much interest in the literature is how the conditional default probabilities of private ﬁrms depend
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on macroeconomic explanatory variables. One of the reasons is that since we do not have equity-market
based explanatory variables like distance-to-default and past equity returns for private ﬁrms, macroeconomic
explanatory variables should, a priori, have a larger role to play in default prediction for private ﬁrms than
they do for public ﬁrms. Carling, Jacobson, Linde´, and Roszbach (2007) use data on private Swedish ﬁrms
and ﬁnd that a model employing both ﬁrm-speciﬁc and macroeconomic explanatory variables is superior to
a model that only includes ﬁrm-speciﬁc explanatory variables—speciﬁcally, the model including both types
of explanatory variables can both accurately rank ﬁrms with respect to default likelihood as well as capture
the aggregate default rate over time. The latter property is important for, for instance, managing the risk of
failures for a portfolio of ﬁrms. Bonﬁm (2009) ﬁnds similar results using data on private Portugese ﬁrms.
Chapter 2 of this dissertation uses data on private Danish ﬁrms to study an assumption in the Basel
II/III and CRD IV accords stating that the default probabilities of small private ﬁrms are less sensitive to
macroeconomic cyclicality than are the default probabilities of large private ﬁrms. This assumption allows
banks a considerable reduction in the capital they are required to hold when lending to small private ﬁrms.
The main ﬁnding is that solely discriminating with respect to ﬁrm-size, the conditional default probabilities
of small private ﬁrms do in fact exhibit less sensitivity to macroeconomic explanatory variables than do
the conditional default probabilities of large private ﬁrms. However, when correcting for the eﬀects of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc explanatory variables other than size, the conditional default probabilities of the average small
private ﬁrm is as cyclical or even more cyclical than the conditional default probability of the average large
private ﬁrm. The results are robust to correcting for time-varying eﬀects, as in Chapter 1, as well as diﬀerent
deﬁnitions of ‘small’ and ‘large’ ﬁrms.
Literature related to chapter 3:
Pricing the risk of corporate failures
Chapter 3 provides a contribution to each of the theoretical and empirical strands of the literature on pricing
the risk of corporate failures. The theoretical strand of this literature deals with pricing models that relate
the prices of corporate liabilities (i.e. equity and debt) to risk factors that drive the risk of failures. The
empirical strand deals with identifying systematic variations related to the risk of failures in the observed
market prices of corporate liabilities, as well as testing the predictions of theoretical pricing models. The
following gives a review of both strands of the literature, including the contributions of chapter 3.
The theoretical strand
Theoretical pricing models are typically divided into two main classes: ‘Structural’ models, which explicitly
determine the event that triggers a default, and ‘reduced form’ models, which do not. Structural models date
back to the seminal option pricing models of Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974). Reduced form
models were developed as an alternative, mainly due the complexity of most ﬁrms’ capital structure and
of the mechanisms behind a failure. The by far most tractable and popular reduced form pricing models
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are the ones based on ‘Cox processes’ or ‘doubly stochastic Poisson processes’, which were introduced by
Jarrow and Turnbull (1995), Madan and Unal (1998), Jarrow, Lando, and Turnbull (1997), Lando (1998),
and Duﬃe and Singleton (1999). This approach builds on continuous-time survival analysis techniques and
assumes that a ﬁrm’s default time is the ﬁrst jump time of a Poisson process whose intensity is conditionally
deterministic given the paths of state variables. Because Cox process-based pricing models can be linked to
term structure models (which are used to price default-free bonds and bond-derivatives), they are natural in
the pricing of corporate and sovereign bonds, and, of course, credit derivatives—see, for instance, Duﬀee
(1999), Duﬃe (1999), and Duﬃe, Pedersen, and Singleton (2003). However, since chapter 3 is concerned
with the pricing of the risk of failures in equities, and since equity pricing has historically been based on
structural models, I focus in the following on reviewing the literature on structural models.
The original Black-Scholes-Merton model considers a single representative ﬁrm in a continuous time,
perfect market setting. The ﬁrm’s assets have a market value which is assumed to follow a geometric Brow-
nian motion (i.e. a log-normal stochastic process in continuous time) with predetermined dynamics. The
ﬁrm’s liabilities consist of common equity stock and a single zero-coupon bond with predetermined face
value and maturity date. Default can only occur at the bond’s maturity date: If, at the maturity date, the
market value of the ﬁrm’s assets is below the face value of the ﬁrm’s debt, the ﬁrm defaults. In case of a
default, equity holders exercise their limit liability option and abandon the ﬁrm’s assets, which are trans-
ferred in full to the debt holders as a recovery. Since the payoﬀ to equity and debt holders can be determined
at the bond’s maturity date, option pricing techniques can be used to derive the market prices of the ﬁrm’s
equity and debt at any date prior to maturity as functions of the ﬁrm’s fundamentals (i.e. the market value
of the assets and the parameters governing the dynamics of the asset value process). Given these theoretical
pricing functions, observable market prices can be used to back-out the ﬁrm’s fundamentals, which can then
by used to calculate the model’s implied probability of default.1 Conversely, given (estimates of) the ﬁrm’s
fundamentals, the pricing functions can be used to derive theoretical prices of corporate liabilities. Finally,
the theoretical pricing functions can be used to derive predictions regarding how market prices and expected
returns are related to ﬁrm fundamentals.
There are countless extensions of the Black-Scholes-Merton model that attempt to capture the complex-
ity of most ﬁrms’ capital structure and of the mechanisms behind a failure. In the following, I focus on
extensions related to optimal capital structure and endogenous default decisions, as these are the ones most
closely related to the theoretical contribution of chapter 3. In one of the models studied by Black and Cox
(1976), the ﬁrm is ﬁnanced through common equity stock and a perpetual (inﬁnite maturity) bond which
pays a constant, predetermined coupon rate continuously in time. If the ﬁrm is allowed to sell assets to
ﬁnance coupon payments, default occurs only when the value of assets falls to zero. If, however, asset
sales are not permitted, the ﬁrm is assumed to issue additional equity in order to ﬁnance coupon payments,
1In the Black-Scholes-Merton model, the ﬁrm’s conditional probability of default is completely determined by the so-called
‘distance-to-default’, which is the number of standard deviations of asset drift by which the current asset level (or expected asset
level at a future time) exceeds the face value of the ﬁrm’s outstanding zero coupon bond. As mentioned in the review of the literature
on statistical measurement of the risk of corporate failures, the empirical approximations of distance-to-default can be viewed as
market-equity based measures of volatility-adjusted leverage.
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and default thus occurs whenever equity holders no longer ﬁnd it optimal to continue ﬁnancing coupon
payments—that is, default is endogenously triggered at an asset level that is optimally chosen by equity
holders in order to maximize the value of their claim. In the model of Leland (1994) (which extends the
ideas of Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989)), corporate taxes and bankruptcy costs are added to the above
mentioned model of Black and Cox (1976), and the coupon rate, which speciﬁes the ﬁrm’s capital structure,
is also determined optimally by maximizing the total ﬁrm value. Fan and Sundaresan (2000) use the model
of Leland (1994) to study strategic renegotiation of debt, where equity and debt holders use their relative
bargaining power to bargain over the ﬁrm value when the ﬁrm’s asset value reaches an endogenously de-
termined reorganization boundary. Duﬃe and Lando (2001) show, in the context of structural models like
the one due to Leland (1994), that if the ﬁrm’s asset value is only imperfectly observed, the ﬁrm’s default
time has a stochastic default intensity that depends on the ﬁrm’s distance-to-default in addition to other
risk-factors that may reveal additional information regarding the ﬁrm’s health. The existence of a default
arrival intensity produces credit spreads (the diﬀerence between the promised yield on a corporate bond and
a corresponding treasury security) that are substantially larger in the short end of bond maturities than the
ones implied by standard structural models with perfect information.
Parallel to the development of the above mentioned structural models that followed the Black-Scholes-
Merton model, another part of the literature developed models of optimal dividend and liquidity manage-
ment, i.e.models of how a ﬁrm should optimally distribute its earnings between dividends to equity holders
and an internal cash reserve. The models of Jeanblanc-Picque´ and Shiryaev (1995) and Radner and Shepp
(1996) feature a ﬁrm whose productive assets generate uncertain earnings continuously through time. The
ﬁrm’s cumulative net earnings are assumed to follow an arithmetic Brownian motion (i.e. a Gaussian stochas-
tic process in continuous time). This implies that the ﬁrm’s net earnings may be either positive or negative. If
net earnings are positive, they can either be distributed to equity holders as a dividend or retained inside the
ﬁrm as a liquidity reserve, i.e. ‘cash holdings’. If net earnings are negative, then existing cash holdings may
be used to pay out dividends to equity holders. Negative dividends, which correspond to equity issuances
by the ﬁrm, are not allowed, and so the ﬁrm is ﬁnancially constrained. The ﬁrm must have a positive cash
reserve to remain operational—that is, default occurs due to ‘illiquidity’ whenever the ﬁrm’s cash holdings
hit zero. This is in contrast to the above mentioned structural models, including the Black-Scholes-Merton
model, where default occurs due to ‘insolvency’ whenever the ﬁrm has insuﬃcient asset value. The optimal
strategy for paying out dividends and holding cash is the strategy that maximizes the market value of the
ﬁrm’s equity. The solutions of Jeanblanc-Picque´ and Shiryaev (1995) and Radner and Shepp (1996) show
that it is optimal for the ﬁrm to retain all net earnings as cash whenever cash is below a certain time-constant
threshold, and, subsequently, to distribute all net earnings as dividends whenever cash is above the thresh-
old. Therefore, these models predict a role for ‘precautionary’ cash holdings used by the ﬁrm as a cushion
against liquidity risk that otherwise might drive it into default.
Following the development of the ﬁrst liquidity management models, several extensions appeared that
linked corporate liquidity, or cash holdings, to the prices of corporate liabilities. Here, I focus on the ex-
tensions related to the pricing of the risk of corporate failures. Gryglewicz (2011) extends the classical
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liquidity management models by considering a ﬁrm that faces both solvency and liquidity concerns. Specif-
ically, he randomizes the drift-component of the ﬁrm’s cumulative earnings-process and explicitly models
the ﬁrm’s debt as a perpetual coupon-paying bond, as in, for instance, Leland (1994). The added uncertainty
in the drift of cumulative earnings means that expected earnings are not time-constant and therefore that
the value of the ﬁrm’s productive assets is also not time-constant. This model setup means that the ﬁrm
can default due to illiquidity, as in the classical liquidity management models, but also due to insolvency,
which is endogenously triggered at an asset level that is optimally chosen by equity holders. Given the ﬁrm’s
optimal cash-dividend policy as well as the optimal coupon and the optimal asset level that triggers insol-
vency, Gryglewicz (2011) studies how solvency and liquidity concerns interact to aﬀect the ﬁrm’s choice
of capital structure and shows that the presence of cash in ﬁrms’ capital structure reduces the dispersion of
credit spreads. Acharya, Davydenko, and Strebulaev (2012) use a pure liquidity model to rationalize why
higher cash holdings empirically predicts higher, not lower, credit spreads. Their argument is based on the
precautionary motive for holding cash, which causes ﬁrms with a higher risk of failure to accumulate higher
cash reserves. Also using a pure liquidity model, Bolton, Chen, and Wang (2013) argue, among other things,
that the endogenous nature of cash holdings is key to understanding the relation between cash holdings and
expected equity returns.
Chapter 3 of this dissertation builds an equity pricing model that relates the expected return on a ﬁrm’s
equity to the ﬁrm’s solvency and liquidity—that is, the model determines the return that an investor requires
for holding a ﬁrm’s equity as a function of the ﬁrm’s solvency and liquidity. I argue that this model can help
rationalize the so-called ‘distress puzzle’, i.e. why higher probability of default predicts lower, not higher,
average equity returns. The model builds on the setup of Gryglewicz (2011), but deviates by assuming
that the ﬁrm’s cumulative earnings-process follows a geometric Brownian motion instead of an arithmetic
Brownian motion with a randomized drift. While a relatively small technical change in the setup, it has the
implication that the value of the ﬁrm’s productive assets also follows a geometric Brownian motion, thereby
making the model setup consistent with the classical structural models of Black and Scholes (1973), Merton
(1974), Black and Cox (1976), Leland (1994), and others mentioned above. Similar to the classical liquidity
management models and the model of Gryglewicz (2011), the optimal policy for holding cash dictates that
while the ﬁrm is solvent, it will hold a level of cash that allows it to avoid illiquidity. I show that when a ﬁrm
that follows the optimal cash-policy is in high risk of insolvency, it will have a large fraction of its assets in
cash. This, in turn, implies that the ﬁrm’s equity is relatively insensitive to priced systematic risk (i.e. has a
low ‘conditional beta’) and therefore requires low returns, thereby helping to rationalize the distress puzzle.
The empirical strand
The empirical contribution of chapter 3 concerns the question of whether the risk of corporate failures is
correctly reﬂected in the observed market prices of equities. I therefore focus on the empirical literature
related to the pricing of equities.
The empirical literature on the pricing of equities dates back to the ﬁrst tests of the Capital Asset Pricing
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Model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Black (1972). The classical CAPM is a single period
model of ﬁnancial markets assuming that 1) investors are risk averse and only care about the expectation
and variance of an asset’s return, 2) that all investors agree perfectly on the true joint distribution of asset
returns, and 3) that there is unrestricted borrowing and lending at a risk-free rate. Under these assumptions,
an asset’s expected return is, in equilibrium, equal to the risk-free rate plus a risk premium. The risk premium
is given by the asset’s ‘beta’ times the excess return on the market above the risk-free rate, where the beta
is the slope-coeﬃcient form a linear regression of the asset’s return on the return of the market portfolio.
The beta is thus the sensitivity of the asset’s returns to changes in the excess return of the market portfolio,
i.e. to systematic or undiversiﬁable risk. The model therefore predicts 1) a positive linear relation between
expected returns and betas, 2) that the risk premium associated with higher beta is the excess return on the
market, and 3) that variations in expected are completely explained by variations in betas. The restricted-
borrowing or ‘zero-beta’ CAPM due to Black (1972) relaxes the assumption of unrestricted borrowing or
lending at the risk-free rate and replaces it with an assumption of unrestricted shortselling of assets. The
change relative to the classic CAPM is that the risk-free rate is replaced by the expected return on some
asset that has zero covariance with the market portfolio.
The early cross-sectional tests of the CAPM ﬁnd that while there is a positive and roughly linear relation
between average equity returns and equity betas, this empirical ‘security market line’ is too ﬂat (too high
intercept and too low slope) compared to what is predicted by the CAPM (see, for instance, Black, Jensen,
and Scholes (1972) and Fama and MacBeth (1973)). Similar results are found using time-series regressions
of excess returns on excess market returns, where the intercept in such a regression, i.e. Jensen’s ‘alpha’,
is signiﬁcant and positive for low-beta equities and signiﬁcant and negative for high-beta equities (see, for
instance, Black et al. (1972) and Stambaugh (1982)). While these ﬁndings are a rejection of the classical
CAPM, they are a priori not a rejection of the Black-version of the CAPM, which merely predicts a positive
linear relation between expected returns and beta, without specifying the risk premium associated with
higher beta. Moreover, the initial cross-sectional tests of Fama and MacBeth (1973) ﬁnd that beta seems to
suﬃce in explaining variations in average returns, which further strengthened the belief in the Black-version
of the CAPM.
However, following the initial tests, several ﬁndings indicate that ﬁrm characteristics other than equity
beta can help explain and predict variations in average equity returns, thereby also rejecting the Black-
version of the CAPM. Basu (1977) ﬁnds that equities with high earnings-to-price ratio have higher average
future returns than is predicted by the CAPM, i.e. too high average future returns relative to their equity beta.
Banz (1981) ﬁnds that equities with a small (big) market value have higher (lower) future average returns
than is predicted by the CAPM. Stattman (1980) and Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein (1985) report similar
ﬁndings for equities with a high ratio of book equity to market equity, while Bhandari (1988) ﬁnds the same
for equities with a high debt-to-equity (i.e. leverage) ratio. These ﬁndings are now commonly referred to
as the original ‘asset pricing anomalies’, where ‘anomaly’ is to be understood relative to the CAPM. The
seminal work of Fama and French (1992) combines and reinforces the mentioned evidence on the existence
of asset pricing anomalies. They show, using cross-sectional tests, that while the univariate relation between
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equity beta and average equity returns is statistically insigniﬁcant, the univariate relations between average
equity returns and the ﬁrm characteristics mentioned above are statistically signiﬁcant. Furthermore, in
multivariate tests, they ﬁnd that size (i.e. the market value of equity) and the ratio of book-to-market equity
combine to subsume the eﬀects of beta, earnings-to-price, leverage, and other variables.
The evidence pointing towards the existence of asset pricing anomalies lead to the three-factor asset
pricing model of Fama and French (1993, 1996). In this model, the expected excess return on a ﬁrm’s equity
is given by a linear combination of three risk-factors with estimated coeﬃcients. The ﬁrst risk-factor is
the excess return on the market portfolio or ‘market risk preimum’, as implied by the CAPM. The second
risk-factor, called the ‘size-factor’ or ‘size-premium’, is the return on a diversiﬁed equity portfolio which is
long small ﬁrms (i.e. ﬁrms with low market equity value) and short big ﬁrms (i.e. ﬁrms with high market
equity value). The third and ﬁnal risk-factor, called the ‘value-factor’ or ‘value-premium’, is the return on
a diversiﬁed equity portfolio which is long ﬁrms with high book-to-market equity and short ﬁrms with low
book-to-market equity. Fama and French (1993, 1996) show, using time-series regressions, that the three-
factor model can capture much of the variation in average returns for equity portfolios formed on ﬁrm size,
book-to-market equity, as well as other ﬁrm characteristics. They argue that the size- and value-factors are
consistent with the intertemporal (continuous time) CAPM due to Merton (1973) and are merely proxies for
state variables that imply undiversiﬁable risks which are not captured by the market risk premium.
Several strands of the literature were concerned with explanations of asset pricing anomalies like the
size and the value premia. Chan and Chen (1991) were among the ﬁrst to suggest that the size premium
is due to investors requiring higher returns as compensation for holding the equities of ﬁrms with a higher
risk of failure or ‘distress’. They argue that small ﬁrms (i.e. ﬁrms with low market equity value) require
high equity returns because (1) they are likely to have high leverage and low earnings, which makes them
less likely to survive aggregate downturns, and (2) their equity returns tend to be highly correlated, which
makes their risks diﬃcult to diversify away. Similarly, Fama and French (1995, 1996) suggest that the value
premium is due to the fact that ﬁrms with a high risk of distress also have high book-to-market equity.
Dichev (1998) was among the ﬁrst to refute the idea that the size and value premia are compensation for
distress risk. Using the failure prediction models of Altman (1968) and Ohlsen (1980), he shows that higher
risk of failure predicts lower, not higher, average future equity returns. Furthermore, he ﬁnds that (1) while
higher risk of failure is generally associated with higher book-to-market equity, the ﬁrms with the highest
risk of failure actually have relatively low book-to-market equity, and (2) that there is no statistically signiﬁ-
cant relation between the risk of failure and ﬁrm size (market value of equity). These ﬁndings are now what
is commonly known as the ‘distress puzzle’. In a related study, Griﬀen and Lemmon (2002) use the failure
prediction model of Ohlsen (1980) to show that ﬁrms with a high risk of failure and low book-to-market
equity have particularly low average future equity returns. Vassalou and Xing (2004) use the distance-to-
default measure as a proxy for failure risk and ﬁnd some evidence that lower distance-to-default predicts
higher average future equity returns, but their results are entirely driven by small and high book-to-market
ﬁrms. Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) estimate a dynamic logistic regression model to predict fail-
ures and use it to conﬁrm and reinforce previous evidence that higher probability of failure persistently and
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robustly predicts lower average future returns. Avramov, Chordia, Jostova, and Philipov (2009) ﬁnd similar
results using credit ratings, which can be viewed as the rating agency’s subjective measure of failure risk.
Chapter 3 of this dissertation ﬁts into a recent strand of the literature which attempts to rationalize the
distress puzzle using arguments based on the capital structure of ﬁrms with a high risk of failure. In general,
this strand of the literature proposes structural models of default which predict that the equity of a ﬁrm
in distress has a low exposure to systematic risk and therefore requires low expected returns. The models
diﬀer, however, in the mechanisms behind this low exposure to systematic risk. Garlappi, Shu, and Yan
(2008) use the Estimated Default Frequency (EDF) measure by Moody’s to show that the empirical relation
between average future returns and default risk is not monotonically decreasing but rather hump-shaped.
They rationalize this ﬁnding using the structural model of Fan and Sundaresan (2000), in which shareholders
can use their bargaining power to recover part of the ﬁrm’s value upon resolution of distress. Extending this
analysis, Garlappi and Yan (2011) show theoretically that shareholder recovery upon resolution of distress
implies a hump-shaped relation between expected returns and probability of default, and they ﬁnd empirical
support for the model’s predictions using conditional (time-varying) equity betas estimated at the ﬁrm-
level. The structural model of Opp (2013) rationalizes the empirical relation between expected returns and
probability of default by means of increased learning about ﬁrm-solvency in aggregate downturns, which,
he argues, implies low exposure to systematic risk and therefore low expected returns. McQuade (2013)
proposes a structural model in which the equity of a ﬁrm with a high risk of failure is negatively exposed to
persistent volatility risk, and therefore commands lower expected returns.
Chapter 3 of this dissertation argues that corporate cash holdings can help rationalize the distress puzzle.
The chapter contributes to the above mentioned literature by proposing a model which separates the liquidity
and solvency components of distress. The model considers a levered ﬁrm with ﬁnancing constraints that
can default because of either insolvency or illiquidity, but the ﬁrm is allowed to choose its cash holdings
optimally. I show that an equity-maximizing ﬁrm will, as long as it is solvent, optimally hold a level of
cash that allows it avoid illiquidity. When the ﬁrm follows the optimal cash-policy and is in high risk
insolvency, it will have a large fraction of its assets in cash. I show that this implies that the ﬁrm’s equity
will have low exposure to systematic risk and therefore command low expected returns. The model’s central
predictions are that, for ﬁrms that hold enough cash to avoid illiquidity, higher probability of insolvency is
generally associated with lower expected returns, and the relation between expected returns and probability
of insolvency is, in fact, hump-shaped. Using data on solvency, liquidity, and equity returns for rated
US ﬁrms, I ﬁnd evidence consistent with these central prediction, and I show that my empirical results hold
using either conditional (time-varying) ﬁrm-speciﬁc equity betas; cross-sectional regressions of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
returns on measures of solvency; or the realized returns and alphas of value-weighted portfolios formed on
measures of solvency. Other predictions derived from the model, for instance regarding the relation between
expected returns and liquidity, are also conﬁrmed in the data.
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Chapter summaries in English and Danish
The following are summaries of the dissertation’s chapters in both English and Danish.
Chapter 1
English summary. We consider additive intensity (Aalen) models as an alternative to the multiplicative intensity
(Cox) models for analyzing the default risk of a sample of rated, non-ﬁnancial U.S. ﬁrms. The setting allows for
estimating and testing the signiﬁcance of time-varying eﬀects. We use a variety of model checking techniques to
identify misspeciﬁcations. In our ﬁnal model we ﬁnd evidence of time-variation in the eﬀects of distance-to-default
and short-to-long term debt, we identify interactions between distance-to-default and other covariates, and the quick
ratio covariate is signiﬁcant. None of our macroeconomic covariates are signiﬁcant.
Dansk resume´. Vi betragter additive (Aalen) intensitetsmodeller som et alternativ til multiplikative (Cox) inten-
sitetsmodeller i analysen af fallitrisikoen af ikke-ﬁnansielle amerikanske virksomheder. Vores setup tillader estimation
og test af tidsvarierende eﬀekter. Vi bruger en række modeltjek til at identiﬁcere misspeciﬁkationer. I vores endelige
model ﬁnder vi evidens for tidsvariation i eﬀekten af distance-to-default og kort-til-langfristet gæld, vi identiﬁcerer
vekselvirkninger mellem distance-to-default og andre kovariater, og quick ratio-kovariaten har en signﬁkant eﬀekt.
Ingen af vores makroøkonomiske kovariater er signiﬁkante.
Chapter 2
English summary. The Basel II/III and CRD IV Accords treat the default probabilities of small ﬁrms as less sensitive
to macroeconomic cyclicality than the default probabilities of large ﬁrms. We investigate whether this is an appropriate
assumption in a default intensity regression framework using a large sample of loans to private ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that
discriminating solely on ﬁrm-size, the default probabilities of small ﬁrms do exhibit less cyclicality than the default
probabilities of large ﬁrms. However, accounting for ﬁrm characteristics other than size, we ﬁnd that the average small
ﬁrm’s default probability is equally cyclical or even more cyclical than the default probability of the average large
ﬁrm. Our results hold using both a multiplicative Cox model and an additive Aalen model.
Dansk resume´. Basel II/III og CRD IV antager, at små virksomheders fallitsandsynligheder er mindre konjunk-
turfølsomme end store virksomheders fallitsandsynligheder. Vi undersøger validiteten af denne antagelse ved hjælp
af intensitetsregressionser og et stort datasæt af lån til private virksomheder. Vi ﬁnder, at skelner man udelukkende
på størrelse, udviser små virksomheders fallitsandsynligheder mindre konjunkturfølsomhed end store virksomheders
fallitsandsynligheder. Vi ﬁnder dog, at tager man højde for andre virksomhedskarakteristika end størrelse, er fal-
litsandsynligheden for den gennemsnitlige lille virksomhed lige så konjunkturfølsom eller mere konjunkturfølsom
end fallitsandsynligheden for den gennemsnitlige store virksomhed. Vores resultater holder både i en multiplikativ
Cox-model og en additiv Aalen-model.
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Chapter 3
English summary. I show theoretically and empirically that cash holdings can help rationalize the low returns to dis-
tressed equity. In my model, levered ﬁrms with ﬁnancing constraints optimally choose their cash holdings to manage
liquidity risk and optimally default when insolvent. Using data on solvency, liquidity, and returns for US ﬁrms, I ﬁnd
evidence consistent with the model’s predictions: (1) In all solvency levels, the average ﬁrm holds enough liquid assets
to cover its short-term liabilities; less solvent ﬁrms have (2) a higher fraction of their total assets in liquid assets and
therefore (3) lower conditional betas and (4) lower returns; (5) the proﬁts of long-short solvency strategies are highest
among ﬁrms with low liquidity; and (6) the proﬁts of long-short liquidity strategies are highest among ﬁrms with low
solvency.
Dansk resume´. Jeg viser teoretisk og empirisk at likvide beholdninger kan hjælpe med at rationalisere de lave afkast til
nødstedte aktier. Jeg modellerer gearede virksomheder uden adgang til ekstern ﬁnansiering. Virksomhederne vælger
deres likvide beholdninger for at styre likviditetsrisiko og vælger optimalt at gå fallit når de er insolvent. Ved brug af
data om solvens, likviditet og aktieafkast for amerikanske virksomheder, ﬁnder jeg evidens i overensstemmelse med
modellens resultater: (1) I alle solvensniveauer har den gennemsnitlige virksomhed nok likvide aktiver til at dække
sine kortfristede forpligtelser; mindre solvente virksomheder har (2) en større andel af deres samlede aktiver i likvide
aktiver, og derfor (3) lavere betaer og (4) lavere afkast; (5) afkastet fra lang/kort-handelstrategier baseret på solvens
er højest blandt virksomheder med lav likviditet; og (6) afkastet fra lang/kort-handelstrategier baseret på likviditet er
højest blandt virksomheder med lav solvens.
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1.1 Introduction
Intensity regression models provide ﬂexible and powerful tools for studying one of the most basic questions of credit
risk modeling: Which observable variables inﬂuence the default risk of corporations? Consequently, the models are
useful for risk management of loan portfolios by providing a strong statistical basis for credit scoring. They also play
an important role in academic studies investigating risk premia on corporate bonds or credit default swaps. There,
the purpose of the hazard regressions is to provide estimates of the “physical” or “real-world” default probabilities.
Combining these with “implied” or “risk-neutral” default probabilities obtained from prices of ﬁnancial instruments,
we can measure the risk premium required by investors for assuming default risk.
The statistical analysis of default data dates back at least to Beaver (1966) and Altman (1968), but the use of
survival analysis techniques (parametric and semiparametric Cox regressions and non-parametric methods) is more
recent. Examples of this literature includes Shumway (2001), Lando and Skødeberg (2002), Fledelius, Lando, and
Nielsen (2004), Couderc and Renault (2004), Das et al. (2007), Duﬃe et al. (2007), Chava, Stefanescu, and Turnbull
(2011), Duﬃe et al. (2009), Lando and Nielsen (2010), Figlewski, Frydman, and Liang (2012).
The studies that employ regression models typically look at Cox models. Some of these studies use a non-
parametric baseline intensity – others used a constant baseline. But all other parameters remain ﬁxed over time.
Furthermore, for reasons discussed later in the paper, there is often very little model checking after the insigniﬁcant
explanatory variables have been eliminated.
In this paper, we use additive Aalen models as an alternative to the Cox model. Using both non-parametric and
semi-parametric versions we are able to study not only whether explanatory variables are signiﬁcant, but also whether
their eﬀects vary with time. Both graphical techniques and formal tests are employed. To allow for a comparison with
a Cox regression study by Lando and Nielsen (2010), we use the exact same data set.
We ﬁnd that both the additive structure and the use of time varying coeﬃcients change the conclusions of Lando
and Nielsen (2010) somewhat. Model checking leads us to identify outliers from the data and helps us resolve problems
with model misspeciﬁcation. We ﬁnd evidence of time-variation in the eﬀects of distance-to-default and short-to-long
25
term debt, and we identify the eﬀect of interactions between distance-to-default and two other covariates: the quick
ratio and (log) pledgable assets. Before removing outlier, the quick ratio covariate is insigniﬁcant – this, however,
changes after the removal of outliers. None of our macroeconomic covariates are signiﬁcant which may indicate that
their eﬀects are captured through their inﬂuence on ﬁrm-speciﬁc covariates.
The ﬂow of the paper is as follows: We ﬁrst recall the speciﬁcation of non-parametric and semi-parametric Aalen
models. We then summarize the estimation and testing procedures used, and after a data review we set up a model
using a time-varying baseline intensity and ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables only. This leads us to conclude that the eﬀects
of certain ﬁrm-speciﬁc covariates are time-varying and that apparent model misspeciﬁcations may be resolved by
including two interaction terms. We then replace the time varying baseline intensity by a constant baseline and global
covariates (including a trailing monthly default rate), and replace regression functions by constant parameters for those
ﬁrm-speciﬁc covariates which did not have signiﬁcantly time-varying eﬀects. After describing and implementing our
model checking procedure, we discover that we need to remove several outliers from the data. We ﬁnish up by testing
the revised model and looking at the model check once more, before we conclude.
1.2 General model setup
Intensity models of default focus on describing the default time(s) of a debt-issuing ﬁrm through a stochastic intensity
process. Fix a probability space (Ω,F , P) and a ﬁnite time horizon [0,T ]. For a cohort of n ﬁrms, the default-history of
ﬁrm i is summarized by a piecewise-constant, right-continuous counting process (Nit)t∈[0,T ] with jumps of size 1 at the
ﬁrm’s default times. The counting processes are assumed adapted to a common ﬁltration (Ft)t∈[0,T ], corresponding to
the ﬂow of information. In the absolute continuous case, the default intensity of ﬁrm i is the non-negative, integrable,
(Ft)-predictable process (λit)t∈[0,T ] such that
Mit = Nit −
∫ t
0
λis ds
is an (Ft)-local martingale. Intuitively,
λit = lim
h→0
1
h
E
(
Ni(t+h) − Nit
∣∣∣Ft) = lim
h→0
1
h
P
(
Ni(t+h) − Nit = 1
∣∣∣Ft) , (1.1)
so λit is the Ft-conditional mean arrival rate of default: Given Ft and survival up to time t, ﬁrm i’s probability of
default within [t, t + h) is λith + o(h).
Usually, (Nit)t∈[0,T ] is a one-jump process, corresponding to a single default. In this case, Nit = 1(τi≤t), where τi is
the single stochastic default-time for ﬁrm i. However, ambiguous deﬁnitions of real-world defaults and the possibility
of restructuring will cause some ﬁrms to have several registered defaults over time. We therefore allow the counting
processes in this paper to take any nonnegative integer value.
In the following, we will write the intensity as
λit = Yitαi(t), (1.2)
where (Yit)t∈[0,T ] is a left-continuous, (Ft)-predictable “at-risk indicator process,” taking the value 1 if ﬁrm i is at risk
of defaulting just before time t, and 0 otherwise. Here, αi(t) is the (Ft)-predictable “pre-default” intensity that may
depend on covariates and past events. With a slight abuse of language we will also refer to αi(t) as the intensity of
default of ﬁrm i.
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In regression models, the variation in the intensities across ﬁrms is solely due to covariates. This means that
αi(t) = α(t | xit) for a common function α, specifying the functional form of dependency on a p-dimensional, locally
bounded vector xit = (xi1,t, . . . , xip,t)T of covariate values at time t for ﬁrm i. The covariates might be constant (industry
classiﬁcation, for example), but will in this paper always be time-varying. Some covariates will be speciﬁc to ﬁrm
i, and some will be macroeconomic variables shared by all ﬁrms. The predictability condition on the intensity then
boils down to predictability of covariates. In practice, this means that covariate values entering the models at time t
are required to be known just before time t.
The focus of this paper is the speciﬁcation of α(t | xit), i.e. determining which ﬁrm-speciﬁc and macroeconomic
variables are signiﬁcant explanatory variables, and how well α describes the data.
1.2.1 Relative and excess survival regression: The Cox and Aalen models
The Cox model was introduced by Cox (1972) in a survival data setting and extended to the general counting process
framework by Andersen and Gill (1982). In this model, the intensity for ﬁrm i as
α(t | xit) = α0(t) exp(βTxit),
where α0(t) is a locally integrable baseline intensity, which is left unspeciﬁed, while the vector β = (β1, . . . , βp)T
of regression coeﬃcients gives the time-constant eﬀects of the covariates. The baseline intensity α0(t) corresponds
to the default intensity at time t when all covariates are identically equal to zero. The model thus assumes that all
ﬁrm-speciﬁc intensities are proportional to the same baseline intensity.
Consider two time-t covariate vectors x1t and x2t, and assume that these are identical except for the jth coordinate,
where x2 j,t = x1 j,t + 1. Forming the ratio of the intensities then gives
α(t | x2t)
α(t | x1t) = exp
(
βT (x2t − x1t)
)
= eβ j ,
so the eﬀect at time t of a one-unit increase in the jth covariate, when all other covariates are kept ﬁxed, is to multiply
the intensity by the “relative risk” eβ j . Note that eβ j is constant over time – the Cox model thus assumes that covariate
eﬀects are time-invariant and proportional to a baseline intensity.
In the models due to Aalen (1980, 1989), covariate eﬀects act in an additive way on a baseline intensity. In the
nonparametric case, the additive model speciﬁes the intensity for ﬁrm i as
α(t | xit) = β0(t) + β(t)Txit, (1.3)
where β0(t) is a locally integrable baseline intensity, left unspeciﬁed, and β(t) = (β1(t), . . . , βp(t))T is a vector of
locally integrable regression coeﬃcient functions, also left unspeciﬁed. The vector β(t) gives the time-varying eﬀects
of the covariates. The baseline β0(t) again corresponds to the intensity at time t when all covariates are identically
equal to zero. We will also consider semiparametric versions of the additive model, where some covariate eﬀects are
time-constant parameters.
As for the Cox model, consider two time-t covariate vectors x1t and x2t that are identical except for the jth
coordinate, where x2 j,t = x1 j,t + 1. Subtracting the intensities then gives
α(t | x2t) − α(t | x1t) = β(t)T (x2t − x1t) = β j(t),
so the eﬀect at time t of a one-unit increase in the jth covariate, when all other covariate are kept ﬁxed, is to add the
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“excess-” or “absolute risk” β j(t) to the intensity.
In classical survival applications, the time-scale is usually duration-time, where t is measured as age or time from
entry to exit for each subject at risk. In historical default studies, however, the natural time-scale is calender-time.
The fact that this does not vary across ﬁrms makes it impossible to simultaneously identify a time-dependent baseline
intensity and the eﬀects of global time-dependent covariates. In the Cox model, this is handled by using a constant
baseline, and similarly in the additive models, one sets β0(t) = θ0 for all t and some real parameter θ0, which leads to
a semiparametric additive model.
1.2.2 Contrasting the Cox and the Aalen models
Using additive models for default intensities is unconventional, since one would a priori prefer models where intensities
are forced to stay positive. In fact, an advantage of the Cox model is that intensities are born strictly positive. In additive
models, we always run the risk of negative intensities, either as a result of estimation, or when extrapolating to more
extreme covariate values.
Why, then, do we propose applying additive models in default studies? A main reason is the ﬂexibility gained by
relaxing the assumption of time-constant covariate eﬀects. The additive models allow for simple estimation of time-
varying eﬀects using least-squares methods known from ordinary linear regression, and the resulting estimators are
on a closed form that is easy to interpret and study. No smoothing is needed during estimation. There are extensions
of the Cox model that incorporate time-varying eﬀects, they require an iterative estimation procedure with smoothing
in each iteration, which does not produce closed-form estimators and may blur the time-variation of eﬀects due to
repeated smoothing (see Zucker and Karr (1990) or Martinussen and Scheike (2006) and references therein).
The additive structure of the Aalen model is more robust towards model misspeciﬁcation than the multiplicative
structure of the Cox model. When we talk about model misspeciﬁcation in this paper, it is in the sense of misspec-
iﬁcation of the intensity. This may be a question of omitting relevant covariates or including them in an incorrect
functional form (e.g. specifying a linear eﬀect of a covariate when the true eﬀect is nonlinear).
If a covariate is omitted, this corresponds to conditioning on a smaller ﬁltration in the conditional expectation
in (1.1). With an additive structure on this conditional mean and time varying parameters, the intensity will still be
additive, though the remaining covariates may need to be transformed. In a Cox model, the proportionality is ruined
when covariates are omitted, and the relative risk estimates will be biased, as shown by Struthers and Kalbﬂeisch
(1986).
Including covariates in the wrong functional form in an additive model is a true misspeciﬁcation, but the parameter
estimates will still be interpretable as e.g. linear eﬀects (“how much does the intensity change per change in the
covariate overall?”). In a Cox model, the relative risk estimates are not interpretable as relative risks when the model
is not correctly speciﬁed.
In the case of a wrong functional form for covariates, (Mit)t∈[0,T ] is no longer a martingale. This means that tra-
ditional variance estimates, which are based on martingale theory, will be biased. We will therefore use alternative
variance estimators that are robust towards this type of misspeciﬁcation. Having robust variance estimates and martin-
gale based variance estimates allows us to detect model misspeciﬁcation by comparing the two. Any large diﬀerences
may suggest that the martingale based variance estimator is biased and this will be due to model misspeciﬁcation. This
idea is quite similar to the “Information Matrix Test” of White (1982).
The additive structure also permits methods from ordinary linear regression to carry over to the additive models.
We will, for instance, in our data analysis in Section 1.4, include linear interaction terms as a supplement to the
marginal eﬀects of covariates and use a method known from ordinary linear regression to identify potential outliers
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that may be a source of model misspeciﬁcation.
Studying excess- or absolute risks may give a more nuanced picture of risk-factor importance than solely relying
on relative risks. Relative risks may be misleading and overstate the actual importance of risk-factors, especially if the
event is relatively rare, as has historically been the case with defaults. If a one unit increase in a covariate raises annual
default probabilities from, say, 1 bps to 2 bps, the covariate’s relative risk increase is 100% per year (a relative risk of
2), while its absolute risk increase is only 0.01% per year (an excess risk of 1bps). In this example, the relative risk
may indicate an economically important default-predictor, while the excess risk may indicate that the same covariate
is only moderately important or perhaps even economically insigniﬁcant.
As a ﬁnal note, it is straightforward to obtain a non-negative estimate of the (past) intensity of a speciﬁc ﬁrm:
Estimate the integrated intensity based on the parameter estimates obtained from the Aalen model and modify this
estimate to be non-decreasing (by pooling adjacent violators – see Robertson, Wright, and Dykstra (1988)). Smoothing
this modiﬁed integrated estimate will produce a non-negative estimate of the intensity.
1.2.3 Frailty and dynamic eﬀects
Unobserved or latent eﬀects are receiving increased attention in empirical default studies. Such eﬀects may be due
to omitted covariates or covariates subject to measurement error, but they may also correspond to eﬀects which are
actually unobservable.
There are two dominating approaches for correcting for unobserved eﬀects in survival models. First, one may
include “frailty” eﬀects, where latent risk factors proxy unobserved eﬀects – frailty is thus the survival analog of
random eﬀects and is often used to model dependence between event times. For instance, Duﬃe, Eckner, Horel, and
Saita (2009) found evidence of a frailty process inﬂuencing historic U.S. corporate default probabilities by including a
latent Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process alongside observable risk factors in a Cox model. A key purpose of this paper is to
conduct a thorough check of time-varying eﬀects, functional form, and interactions, hoping to detect possible sources
of misspeciﬁcation that might otherwise show up as frailty eﬀects. We therefore do not include frailty eﬀects in our
paper but focus on means of teasing out more information on the eﬀects of observable variables.
Second, one may use the internal history of the observed counting processes as a correction for missing eﬀects.
This is done by including time-dependent covariates directly linked to the observed history of the counting processes
in the regression models. We follow Aalen, Fekjær, Borgan, and Husebye (2004), who included such covariates in an
additive setting similar to ours, and call such covariates “dynamic.” In our data analysis in Section 1.4, we will include
a global dynamic covariate in the form of the trailing monthly default rate for the previous month as a correction for
unobserved eﬀects in an additive regression. This dynamic covariate may at a given time be viewed as reﬂecting the
instantaneous default risk in the cohort. A signiﬁcant eﬀect may thus suggest that the additive model at hand is missing
global eﬀects that drive default intensities upwards.
1.3 Additive regression models
In this section, we describe how the nonparametric and semiparametric additive models are estimated, and how we
test the relevant hypotheses of signiﬁcance and possible time-variation of regression coeﬃcients.
The focus is on two main model structures. First, the nonparametric additive model (1.3) with all covariate eﬀects
as unspeciﬁed functions of time, restated here for convenience
α(t | xit) = β0(t) + β1(t)xi1,t + · · · + βp(t)xip,t. (1.4)
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Second, the semiparametric sub-model ﬁrst introduced by MacKeague and Sasieni (1994), where more structure is
put on some of the regression coeﬃcients. This is of interest when some eﬀects are believed to be time-invariant,
but also when including global time-dependent covariates of both the macroeconomic or dynamic type. Covariates
with time-varying eﬀects are collected in the p-dimensional covariate vector xit, whereas the q-dimensional vector
zit = (zi1,t, . . . , ziq,t)T captures the time-invariant eﬀects. Both are assumed to be predictable and locally bounded. The
semiparametric additive model then speciﬁes the intensity as
α(t | xit, zit) = β0(t) + β1(t)xi1,t + · · · + βp(t)xip,t + θ1zi1,t + · · · + θqziq,t, (1.5)
where β0(t), . . . , βp(t) are as before while θ1, . . . , θq are real-valued parameters giving the time-invariant eﬀects of a
one-unit increase in each component of zit. Note that, as discussed in Section 1.2.1, β0(t) = θ0 when we include global
time-dependent covariates in the regressions, in order to make all parameters identiﬁable. Martinussen and Scheike
(2006) propose a resampling-based inference procedure that allows the time-invariance of eﬀects to be tested, so that
an initial nonparametric additive model may be reduced to a semiparametric. This is implemented in the aalen-
function as a part of their timereg package in R (R Development Core Team (2011)) which will be used in the data
analyses of Sections 1.4 and 1.6.
1.3.1 The nonparametric additive regression model
In the general model (1.4), the regression functions β j(t) for j = 0, 1, . . . , p are unrestricted and consequently diﬃcult
to estimate nonparametrically. However, similar to estimating a cumulative distribution function rather than a density
or a cumulative hazard instead of the hazard itself, it turns out that the cumulative regression functions,
Bj(t) =
∫ t
0
β j(s) ds, j = 1, . . . , p,
are easier to estimate than the regression functions themselves. As in the case with the density or hazard, estimators
of the regression functions may be obtained by smoothing the cumulative estimates.
Estimation
The basic idea is to estimate the cumulative regression coeﬃcients by step functions. We can write the increment of
(Nit)t∈[0,T ] over the small time interval [t, t + dt) as
dNit = YitdB0(t) +
p∑
j=1
Yit xi j,t dBj(t) + dMit, (1.6)
where
Mit = Nit −
∫ t
0
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝Yisβ0(s) +
p∑
j=1
Yisxi j,sβ j(s)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ ds
deﬁnes a local martingale (Mit)t∈[0,T ] due to the assumed local boundedness of xi j,t and local integrability of β j(t) for
all i and j. At each time t, the model (1.6) has the form of an ordinary linear regression with dNit as the response,
Yit xi j,t as the predictors, dBj(t) = β j(t) dt as the parameters of interest, and dMit as the noise. For the cohort of n ﬁrms,
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the full model may thus be written as
dNt = Xt dB(t) + dMt, (1.7)
where Nt = (N1t, . . . ,Nnt)T , B(t) = (B0(t), . . . , Bp(t))T , and Mt = (M1t, . . . ,Mnt)T , while Xt is the n × (1 + p)-
dimensional, locally bounded matrix with ith row (Yit,Yit xi1,t, . . . ,Yit xip,t). When Xt has full rank, the ordinary least
squares estimator of the increment of B(t) is given by
dB̂(t) = X−t dNt,
where X−t = (XTt Xt)−1XTt is the usual least squares generalized inverse of Xt. When Xt has less than full rank, dB(t) is
not identiﬁable from the data, and we put dB̂(t) = 0. Also, note that dB̂(t) = 0 when dNt = 0, so that all the increments
are at default times.
To obtain an estimator for the vector B(t) of cumulative regression functions, we let J(t) be the indicator of X(t)
having full rank and aggregate dB̂(t) over the ordered default-times τ1 < τ2 < · · · to obtain
B̂(t) =
∫ t
0
J(s)X−s dNs =
∑
τk≤t
J(τk)X−τk Nτk , (1.8)
where Nτk is a vector of zeros except for a one at the component corresponding to the ﬁrm with a default at τk.
Note that when there are no covariates in the model (i.e. p = 0), the estimator (1.8) is just the usual Nelson-Aalen
estimator of the cumulative hazard – in this sense, the nonparametric additive model is the natural generalization of
nonparametric hazard estimation to the situation with covariates.
Using (1.7), we obtain
B̂(t) − B(t) =
∫ t
0
J(s)X−s dMs +
∫ t
0
(J(s) − 1) dB(s)
=
∫ t
0
J(s)X−s dMs + oP
(
1√
n
)
,
where the last equality holds under reasonable regularity assumptions (Martinussen and Scheike, 2006). Hence, the
deviation B̂(t)−B(t) is a vector-valued local martingale except for a negligible remainder term. The asymptotic proper-
ties of the estimator (1.8) may be obtained by the martingale central limit theorem. In case of model misspeciﬁcations,
the process (Mt)t∈[0,T ] is no longer a local martingale, and care must be taken when deriving the asymptotic properties
of the estimator B̂(t). Both cases will be treated below.
When the model is well-speciﬁed, we can estimate the covariance function of B̂(t) by the optional variation process
of the martingale part of the deviation B̂(t) − B(t) :
Σ̂mar(t) =
∑
τk≤t
J(τk)X−τk diag(Nτk )X−τk T . (1.9)
If the model is misspeciﬁed, Σ̂mar(t) will be biased. In this case Martinussen and Scheike (2006) show that
√
n(B̂(t) − B(t)) = 1√
n
n∑
i=1
Qi(t) + oP(1), (1.10)
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with
Qi(t) =
∫ t
0
J(s)
(
n−1XTs Xs
)−1 XTis (dNis − Xis dB(s)),
and where Xit is the ith row of Xt. When n→ ∞, J(t)
(
n−1XTt Xt
)−1
converges in probability, and (1.10) is a normalized
sum of independent and identically distributed processes. The covariance function of B̂(t) is consistently estimated by
Σ̂rob(t) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Q̂i(t)Q̂i(t)T , (1.11)
where Q̂i(t) is obtained by replacing B(t) with its estimator in Qi(t). Since Σ̂rob(t) is derived without use of the local
martingale property of (Mt)t∈[0,T ], it is robust to model misspeciﬁcations of the intensity, and is therefore a robust
covariance function estimator.
Large sample properties
When the model is correctly speciﬁed and regularity conditions are fulﬁlled, it follows from the martingale central
limit theorem that the normalized deviation
√
n(B̂(t) − B(t)) converges (for n → ∞ and ﬁxed T ) in distribution
to a mean-zero multivariate Gaussian martingale with a covariance function that may be estimated consistently by
the martingale-based estimator Σ̂mar(t). In case of misspeciﬁcations, when (Mit)t∈[0,T ] is not a martingale, the main
asymptotic result is instead that
√
n(B̂(t) − B(t)), using (1.10), converges in distribution to a mean-zero Gaussian
process (but not a martingale) with a covariance function which may be estimated consistently by the robust estimator
Σ̂rob(t). Martinussen and Scheike (2006) give the details and proofs.
The asymptotic results imply that an approximate 100(1 − α)% martingale-based pointwise conﬁdence band for
the jth cumulative regression coeﬃcient is given by
B̂ j(t) ± z1−α/2
√
σ̂2mar, j j(t),
where z1−α/2 is the (1 − α/2)-quantile of the standard normal distribution and σ̂2mar, j j(t) is the jth diagonal element of
Σ̂mar(t). Alternatively, an approximate 100(1−α)% robust conﬁdence band for the jth cumulative regression coeﬃcient
may be obtained as
B̂ j(t) ± z1−α/2
√
σ̂2rob, j j(t),
where σ̂2rob, j j(t) is the jth diagonal element of Σ̂rob(t).
In large samples, if the two types of variance estimates (i.e. the martingale-based and the robust) are markedly
diﬀerent, it is an indication of model misspeciﬁcation.
Kernel smoothing
B̂ j(t) estimates the cumulated regression function
∫ t
0 β j(s)ds. However, we are really interested in its slope – i.e. the
regression function β j(t) itself. As assessing the slope of a step function graphically may be diﬃcult, we smooth the
estimators of the cumulative regression functions to obtain estimators of the regression functions themselves.
We will use kernel function smoothing, as ﬁrst proposed in a survival model setting by Ramlau-Hansen (1983).
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Then β(t) = (β0(t), . . . , βp(t)) is estimated at time t as a weighted sum of the increments of B̂(t) over the interval
[t − b, t + b],
β̂(t) =
1
b
∑
τk
K
( t − τk
b
)
B̂(τk), (1.12)
where b > 0 is a bandwidth, determining the size of the interval [t − b, t + b], while K(x) is a bounded kernel-function
vanishing outside [−1, 1] and integrating to 1, determining the weights. A typical choice is the Epanechnikov kernel,
where K(x) = 34 (1 − x2) for |x| ≤ 1, and zero otherwise, but Aalen, Borgan, and Gjessing (2008) discuss other kernels.
Like other kernel estimators, (1.12) suﬀers from boundary eﬀects: For small values of t (i.e. when t − b < 0) the
estimator is severely biased towards zero. We handle this problem by using a boundary kernel, as also discussed by
Aalen et al. (2008).
When the model is correctly speciﬁed and (Mt)t∈[0,T ] is a vector-valued local martingale, an estimator of the
covariance function of β̂(t) is simply obtained as
Ĉov β̂(t) =
1
b2
∑
τk
K
( t − τk
b
)2
Σ̂mar(τk),
where Σ̂mar(τk) = J(τk)X−τk diag(Nτk )X−τk T is the increment of the martingale-based covariance function estimator
(1.9). If the model is misspeciﬁed, the covariance function of the function β̂(t) has the same form as above, but with
Σ̂mar(τk) replaced by Σ̂rob(τk), i.e, the increment of the robust covariance function estimator (1.11). These covariance
function estimators may be combined with the large sample properties of B̂(t) to construct approximate conﬁdence
bands for β̂(t) in the usual way.
There exist techniques (such as cross-validation) for objectively choosing the bandwidth with an optimal (in some
sense) trade-oﬀ between bias and variances, but these will not be considered in this paper. We simply rely on a
subjective assessment of what is a reasonable degree of smoothing.
Resampling-based inference
The tests we use will be based on a resampling procedure presented and implemented by Martinussen and Scheike
(2006) – however, Aalen et al. (2008) give a more traditional martingale-based approach.
We are primarily interested in testing two hypotheses: The hypothesis of no eﬀect of the jth covariate,
Heﬀect0 : β j(t) = 0 for all t ∈ [0,T ].
and the hypothesis of a time-invariant eﬀect of the jth covariate,
Htime0 : β j(t) = θ j for all t ∈ [0,T ].
The null of Htime0 is the semi-parametric additive model with a parametric coeﬃcient for the eﬀect of the jth covariate.
Both hypotheses may be of interest over a shorter time-interval than the entire study time, but this is usually not the
case, and will not be considered here. Since the estimated cumulative regression coeﬃcients have nicer distributional
properties than their smoothed counterparts, the hypotheses are usually formulated in the equivalent forms
Heﬀect0 : Bj(t) = 0 and H
time
0 : Bj(t) = θ jt,
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both for all t ∈ [0,T ].
Martinussen and Scheike (2006) propose testing the hypothesis of no inﬂuence, Heﬀect0 , by the supremum test
statistic
Tsup = sup
t∈[0,T ]
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
√
n B̂ j(t)√
σ̂2rob, j j(t)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ , (1.13)
where, again, σ̂2rob, j j(t) is the jth diagonal element of Σ̂rob(t) given in (1.11). This evaluates the maximal deviation of
the estimated cumulative regression coeﬃcient B̂ j(t) from the zero function, relative to its variation.
With regards to testing the hypothesis of time-invariance, Htime0 , Martinussen and Scheike (2006) propose the
process
√
n
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝B̂ j(t) − B̂ j(T )T t
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ for t ∈ [0,T ] (1.14)
as a basic starting point for evaluating the time-invariance of the jth regression coeﬃcient – the idea is that B̂ j(T )/T is
an estimator of the time-constant coeﬃcient θ j under the null. This process may then be turned into the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test statistic
TKS = sup
t∈[0,T ]
√
n
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣B̂ j(t) − B̂ j(T )T t
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ , (1.15)
or the Cramer-von Mises test statistic
TCvM = n
∫ T
0
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝B̂ j(t) − B̂ j(T )T t
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
2
dt. (1.16)
The former is a maximal deviations test statistic, sensitive to single large deviations from the null, while the latter is a
sum of squared deviations type statistic, sensitive to small but persistent deviations from the null.
To test the hypotheses, Martinussen and Scheike (2006) propose evaluating the variability of test statistics through
a resampling-scheme that approximates the distribution of the estimated vector of cumulative regression coeﬃcients
B̂(t). Based on the iid. representation (1.10), their main result is that, conditional on the data (Nit,Yit, xit) for i =
1, . . . , n, the normalized deviation
√
n(B̂(t) − B(t)) has the same limiting distribution as
R(t) =
1√
n
n∑
i=1
uiQ̂i(t),
where u1, . . . , un are iid. standard normally distributed stochastic variables, and Q̂i(t) is as in (1.11). The result utilizes
the “conditional multiplier central limit theorem” (van der Vaart and Wellner, 1996). Note that R(t) a weighted sum of
the observable Q̂i(t)/
√
n with standard normally distributed weights. In fact, any normalized distribution could have
been used for the weights, but the choice of a normal distribution ﬁts well with the limiting distribution.
Obtaining P-values for the tests may be done through replication of R(t). The idea is to hold the observed data ﬁxed
whilst repeatedly generating series of iid. standard normal variables u(r)1 , . . . , u
(r)
n , and approximating the distribution
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of Tsup by the empirical distribution of the processes
sup
t∈[0,T ]
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
√
nR(r)j (t)√
σ̂2rob, j j(t)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ; r = 1, 2, . . . ,
where R(r)j (t) denotes the rth resample of the jth element of R(t). Similarly, approximations of the distributions of
TKS and TCvM are obtained by approximating the distribution of the process (1.14) by the empirical distribution of the
processes
√
n
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝R(r)j (t) − R
(r)
j (T )
T
t
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ ; r = 1, 2, . . . .
Finally, the deviation of the estimated regression coeﬃcient from the null of time-invariance may be assessed by
plotting the observed process (1.14) as a function of study time along with a number of the resampled processes under
the null. A similar behavioral pattern in the observed and resampled processes would suggest consistency with the
null of time-invariance. The advantage of this graphical method is that it pinpoints where in time deviations from the
null might occur.
1.3.2 The semiparametric additive regression model
The methods used to estimate and conduct inference in the semiparametric Aalen model (1.5) are to a large extent
similar to the ones presented in the previous sections for the nonparametric model. We will therefore only brieﬂy
outline the procedure of ﬁnding estimators and the resampling-based method of inference. Martinussen and Scheike
(2006) give a detailed account.
Estimation
For the semiparametric Aalen model, the increments of the counting processes are given as
dNt = Xt dB(t) + Zt θdt + dMt, (1.17)
where Nt, Xt, B(t), and Mt are as in (1.7), while θ = (θ1, . . . , θq)T and Zt is the n × q-dimensional, locally bounded
matrix with ith row (Yitzi1,t, . . . ,Yitziq,t).
We estimate the unknown regression functions and parameters by minimizing the integrated sum of squares,
∫ T
0
J(t)
(
dNt − Xt dB(t) − Zt θdt)T (dNt − Xt dB(t) − Zt θdt), (1.18)
where, again, J(t) is the indicator of Xt having full rank. Re-writing dNs−Xs dB(s)−Zs θdt as the sum of its projections
on spanXt and its orthogonal complement, we obtain, when J(t) = 1,
Xt
(
X−t dNt − dB(t) − X−t Zt θ dt
)
+
(
I − Xt X−t
)(
dNt − Zt θ dt),
where I is the n × n identity matrix, while, as usual, X−t is the least squares generalized inverse of Xt. Hence, (1.18)
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splits into a sum of two terms,
∫ T
0
J(t)
(
X−t dNt − dB(t) − X−t Zt θ dt
)TXTt Xt (X−t dNt − dB(t) − X−t Zt θ dt)
+
∫ T
0
J(t)
(
dNt − Zt θ dt)T (I − Xt X−t )(dNt − Zt θ dt),
as
(
I−Xt X−t
)T (I−Xt X−t ) = (I−Xt X−t ) and (I−Xt X−t )TXt = 0. Minimizing the latter term ﬁrst and the former second
yields the estimators
θ̂ =
(∫ T
0
J(t)ZTt
(
I − XtX−t
)
Zt dt
)−1 ∫ T
0
J(t)ZTt
(
I − XtX−t
)
dNt, (1.19)
B̂(t) =
∫ t
0
J(s)X−s
(
dNs − Zs θ̂ ds). (1.20)
In the non-parametric case, the minimizer of the integrated sum of squares and the pointwise sums of squares is the
same. Thus, the present estimator (1.20) generalizes the one given for the nonparametric case in (1.8).
Combining (1.19) and (1.20) with (1.17) gives the normalized deviations
√
n(̂θ − θ) = U−1 M(1)T , (1.21)√
n(B̂(t) − B(t)) = M(2)t − V(t)U−1 M(1)T + oP(1), (1.22)
where
U =
1
n
∫ T
0
J(t)ZTt
(
I − XtX−t
)
Zt dt, V(t) =
1
n
∫ t
0
J(s)X−s Zs ds,
M(1)t =
1√
n
∫ t
0
J(s)Zs
(
I − XsX−s
)
dMs, M(2)t =
1√
n
∫ t
0
J(s)X−s dMs.
When the model is correctly speciﬁed, (M(1)t )t∈[0,T ] and (M
(2)
t )t∈[0,T ] are vector-valued, local martingales (due to
the assumed local boundedness of Xt and Zt), thus showing that θ̂ is an unbiased estimator of θ, while B̂(t) is an
approximately unbiased estimator of B(t). In case of a misspeciﬁed model, the process (Mt)t∈[0,T ] is no longer a local
martingale. In the following, we handle the two cases separately when deriving variance-estimates and asymptotic
properties for the estimators (1.19) and (1.20).
When the model ﬁt is reasonable, the deviations (1.21) and (1.22) imply that a martingale-based estimator of the
covariance matrix of θ̂ is given by
Ψ̂mar = U−1 [M(1)](T )U−1,
while a martingale-based estimator of the covariance function of B̂(t) is given by
Υ̂mar(t) = [M(2)](t) + V(t) Ψ̂mar V(t)T
−[M(1),M(2)](t)U−1 V(t)T − V(t)U−1 [M(1),M(2)](t),
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where the optional variation and covariation processes of (M(1)t )t∈[0,T ] and (M
(2)
t )t∈[0,T ] are
[M(1)](t) =
1
n
∫ t
0
J(s)ZTs
(
I − XsX−s
)
diag(dNs)
(
I − XsX−s
)
Zs,
[M(2)](t) = n
∫ t
0
J(s)X−s diag(dNs)X
−
s ,
[M(1),M(2)](t) =
∫ t
0
J(s)ZTs
(
I − XsX−s
)
diag(dNs)X−s
T
.
If the semiparametric additive model is misspeciﬁed, Ψ̂mar and Υ̂mar(t) will be biased. To address this, Martinussen
and Scheike (2006) show that
√
n(̂θ − θ) = 1√
n
U−1
n∑
i=1
Ki,
where
Ki =
∫ T
0
J(t)
(
ZTit − ZTt Xt
(
XTt Xt
)−1 XTit ) (dNit − Xit dB(t) − Zit θ dt),
with Xit as the ith row of Xt and Zit as the ith row of Zt. When n is large, this represents the deviation
√
n(̂θ − θ)
as a normalized sum of iid. terms, showing that the covariance function of θ̂ may be estimated by the sandwich-type
estimator
Ψ̂rob = U−1
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝1n
n∑
i=1
K̂i K̂Ti
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ U−1,
where K̂i is obtained by replacing θ and B(t) with their estimators in Ki. As Ψ̂rob was derived without relying on the
martingale property, it is robust to model misspeciﬁcations. Similarly,
√
n(B̂(t) − B(t)) = 1√
n
n∑
i=1
Oi(t) + op(1),
where
Oi(t) =
∫ t
0
J(s)
(
n−1 XTs Xs
)−1 XTis (dNis − Xis dB(s) − Zis θ ds) − V(t)U−1 Ki.
Hence, copying the above argument, this suggests that the covariance function of B̂(t) may be estimated by the robust
estimator
Υ̂rob(t) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Ôi(t) Ôi(t)T . (1.23)
Large sample properties
The asymptotic properties of θ̂ are in case of a well-speciﬁed model obtained through a standard application of the
martingale central limit theorem, which under suitable regularity assumptions implies that
√
n(̂θ − θ) converges (for
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n→ ∞ and ﬁxed T ) in distribution to a mean-zero, multivariate normal variable with a covariance which is consistently
estimated by Ψ̂mar. If the model is not well speciﬁed, the same convergence result holds, but Ψ̂mar has to be replaced
by Ψ̂rob, which may also be shown to be a consistent estimator of the asymptotic covariance. The details are given by
Martinussen and Scheike (2006).
The situation is slightly more complicated for B̂(t) due to the more involved nature of the corresponding devia-
tion (1.22), which depends on
√
n(̂θ − θ). When the model is well-speciﬁed and the necessary regularity conditions
are fulﬁlled, Martinussen and Scheike (2006) show that combining the martingale central limit theorem and the con-
tinuous mapping theorem gives that
√
n(B̂(t) − B(t)) converges in distribution to a mean-zero, multivariate Gaussian
process (i.e. not a martingale). Its asymptotic covariance function is estimated consistently by Υ̂mar(t). If the model is
misspeciﬁed, the same result holds, but Υ̂mar(t) has to be replaced by Υ̂rob(t). Note that the asymptotic distribution of√
n(B̂(t)−B(t)) is not a martingale in either case. These results may in large samples be used to construct approximate
pointwise conﬁdence bands for B̂(t) in the usual way.
Resampling-based inference
Three hypotheses arise naturally when conducting inference in the semiparametric additive model. The ﬁrst two are the
null hypotheses of no inﬂuence and time-invariance of the time-varying regression coeﬃcients that we also considered
for the nonparametric model. The third is the simple null hypothesis θl = θ˜, where the lth time-constant regression
coeﬃcient is tested against the null of some known, real-valued parameter θ˜. Usually, θ˜ = 0, in which case we are
testing the inﬂuence of the lth time-constant covariate eﬀect. This hypothesis is tested in the usual manner using e.g.
the Wald test statistic, which in case of a well-speciﬁed model is given by
TWald =
θ̂l − θ˜√
ψ2mar,ll
,
where ψ2mar,ll is the lth diagonal element of Ψ̂mar. Alternatively, in case of a misspeciﬁed model, we instead use ψ
2
rob,ll,
the lth diagonal element of Ψ̂rob. In either case, the asymptotic properties of θ̂ imply that TWald will under the null be
approximately standard normally distributed in large samples.
With regards to the hypotheses of no inﬂuence and time-invariance for the a priori time-varying regression co-
eﬃcients, Martinussen and Scheike (2006) propose a resampling-based method analogous to what was done for the
nonparametric additive model. As for the nonparametric additive model, we can assess the deviation of an estimated,
time-varying regression coeﬃcient from the null of time-invariance by plotting the observed process (1.14), as a func-
tion of study time, along with a number of the resampled processes under the null.
1.4 Data and model speciﬁcation
Our empirical results are based on an analysis of U.S. industrial corporate defaults occurring between 1982 and 2006.
In this period, the U.S. economy suﬀered three major economic recessions between ‘81-‘82, ‘91-‘92, and ‘01-‘02. We
use the exact same data set as Lando and Nielsen (2010), but, for convenience, we repeat the description of the data
below. Other default studies have used the same data supplemented with additional defaults from other sources – e.g.
Li and Zhao (2006), Das et al. (2007), Davydenko (2007), and Le (2007). Our main purpose here is to investigate the
role of time-varying coeﬃcients and the importance of model checking in an additive intensity regression setting.
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1.4.1 Data
The sample includes all U.S. industrial ﬁrms with a debt issue registered in Moody’s Default Risk Service Database,
or DRSD (Moody’s Investor’s Service c©, 2010), which essentially covers the period since 1970, including universal
identiﬁers facilitating the combination with other data sources. However, due to sparseness of data, the study time was
chosen as the period between January 1st 1982 and January 1st 2006, giving a total of 289 observation months. The
sample was restricted to ﬁrms for which accompanying stock market data from CRSP (Center for Research in Security
Prices c©, 2010) and accounting data from CompuStat (Standard & Poor’s c©, 2010) could be obtained, and for which
there were at least 6 months of available data. All consecutive default events occurring within a 1-month horizon of
any previously registered default ascribed to the same parent company were excluded from the data in order to correct
for observations of multiple defaults caused by parent-subsidiary relations within the same corporate family. The ﬁnal
result is a study cohort of 2,557 ﬁrms comprising a total of 370 defaults.
The database classiﬁes any of the following 9 events as constituting a default: Chapter 7, chapter 11, distressed
exchange, grace period default, missed interest payment, missed principle payment, missed principal and interest
payment, prepackaged chapter 11, and suspension of payments. In particular, we do not correct the timing of a
“Distressed exchange,” which in the DRSD is registered as the time of completion of the exchange, although as
suggested by Davydenko (2007), it would probably be more appropriate to instead collect separate information on the
announcement date of the exchange.
Of the 370 realized defaults in the cohort, 25 defaults happened to ﬁrms which had already defaulted earlier. To
be precise, 22 ﬁrms experienced 2 defaults and a single ﬁrm defaulted 4 times.
Covariate speciﬁcation
The idiosyncratic covariate speciﬁcation to be employed in the regressions consists of the following 5 balance sheet
variables obtained from CRSP and CompuStat:
– Quick ratio for the previous month, calculated as the book value of cash and short-term investments added the
book value of total receivables, all relative to the book value of total current liabilities. This measures the ﬁrm’s
ability to use its near cash assets to immediately extinguish current liabilities.
– Pledgeable assets for the previous month, calculated as the book value of total current assets plus the book value
of net property, plant, and equipment. This measures the ﬁrm’s ability to convert liquid assets to collateral that
may be transferred to a lender to secure debt.
– Trailing 1-year equity return for the previous month. This measures the ﬁrm’s eﬃciency at generating proﬁts
from shareholders’ equity (or assets less liabilities) and is thus a reﬂection of how well the ﬁrm uses investment
funds to generate growth on earnings.
– Trailing 1-year distance-to-default for the previous month and estimated over a one-year rolling window. Our
distance measure is the option-implied measure as used for example in Duﬃe et al. (2007) (see page 660 of that
paper). This measures roughly how far - measured in standard deviations of log returns - assets are from hitting
a default triggering boundary. The default triggering level is the sum of the notional of short-term debt and half
of the notional of long-term debt.
– Percentage short-term debt for the previous month calculated as the book value of debt in current liabilities
divided by the sum of the book value of debt in current liabilities and the book value of total long-term debt.
This is a measure of the ﬁrm’s vulnerability to a sudden funding shock.
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All the above are time-dependent covariates which are clearly predictable due to the 1-month lagging. In case of
missing monthly values, the latest quarterly observation was substituted as a proxy, and if also this was missing,
the latest yearly observation was used. In addition, we examined the inﬂuence of the ﬁrm’s book asset value, its
equity value, and the value of its ﬁxed assets. The book assets and the pledgeable assets were highly correlated, and
including both in the analysis would give problems with collinearity. A preliminary analysis showed that our estimates
are almost identical regardless of which one we choose. The equity return was preferred over the equity value since
the latter seemed to cause instabilities during estimation and unintuitive results due to excessively large values and
high correlation with other covariates. The ﬁxed assets also caused instabilities during estimation, and were dropped
altogether from the covariate speciﬁcation.
The macroeconomic covariate speciﬁcation consisted of the following 7 variables obtained from CRSP and the
U.S. Federal Reserve Board:
– Trailing 1-year return on the S&P 500-index for the previous month. The change on this index is considered
one of the major predictors for the future state of the U.S. economy.
– Spread between yields on Moody’s Baa- and AAA-rated corporate bonds for the previous month. This is a
measure of the credit risk that the market is factoring on lower grade bonds. A widening usually suggests that
the market is forecasting greater credit risk due to a slowing economy.
– Trailing 1-year percentage change in U.S. Consumer Price Index (CPI) for the previous month. The index
measures the average price of consumer goods and services purchased by households and its percentage change
thus measures the level of inﬂation.
– Trailing 1-year percentage change in average weekly earnings for the previous month. This is an indicator
of short-term earnings growth.
– Trailing 1-year percentage change in U.S. domestic crude oil First Purchase Price (FPP) for the previous
month. High oil prices might have a negative impact on U.S. economic growth.
– Spread between the 10- and 1-year U.S. Treasury yields for the previous month. This measures the extra
cost of holding long-term debt compared to the cost of holding short-term debt.
– Trailing 1-year percentage change in U.S. unemployment rate (UR) as percentage of civilian labor force
(seasonally adjusted) for the previous month. The rate itself is a major macroeconomic indicator, and its change
measures the diﬀerence between labour relationships newly broken and labour relationships newly initiated.
As for the idiosyncratic covariates, predictability is ensured through the 1-month lagging. Alternative versions of the
above macroeconomic variables were also considered along with the U.S. industrial production and several versions
of the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP), but only the above showed some signs of reasonable signiﬁcance or did not
cause instability during estimation.
Lastly, the following global dynamic covariate will be used:
– Trailing monthly default rate for the previous month. The trailing monthly default rate is calculated at each
month as the realized number of defaults during that month relative to the number of ﬁrms at risk at the begin-
ning of the month.
Including the lagged version, and not the monthly default rate itself, ensures predictability. This dynamic
covariate may at a given time be viewed as a reﬂection of the instantaneous default risk in the cohort – a
signiﬁcant eﬀect may thus suggest missing global eﬀects driving default intensities upwards.
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Figure 1.1. At-risk and empirical default patterns of the study cohort. Upper left panel: Number of ﬁrms at-risk at each time
point in the study time, with the time-average of 1,142 ﬁrms at-risk indicated by the horizontal line. Upper Right panel: Yearly
number of defaults. Lower right panel: Monthly default rate in % at each time point in the study time.
The at-risk and empirical default patterns of the study cohort are illustrated in Figure 1.1. The upper left panel
shows that the ﬁnal dataset contains a minimum of 1,005, an average of 1,142, and a maximum of 1,363 ﬁrms at-risk
at any given point in the study time. The upper and lower right panels show the eﬀect on the cohort of the recessions
in the U.S. economy. The monthly default rate reaches its maximum of 0.611% during the ‘01-‘02 recession. Note
that the lower right panel also depicts the path of the trailing monthly default rate used in the analysis in a 1-month
lagged version as a global dynamic covariate.
Figure 1.2 shows nonparametric Nelson-Aalen estimates of the default intensity in the cohort due to the passing
of time itself – i.e. without correcting for covariate eﬀects. The left panel shows the cumulative estimate, From this
graph, the slope seems fairly constant except for during the recessions of ‘91-‘92 and ‘01-‘02. The smoothed plot
in the right panel, obtained through kernel smoothing of the increments of the Nelson-Aalen estimator, is better at
showing the time-variation. It captures the same tendencies as the empirical default patterns in Figure 1.1 and clearly
shows that the default intensity is much larger during the recessions compared to periods of economic upturns. During
the ‘01-‘02 recession the smoothed monthly default intensity peaks at just over 3%.
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Figure 1.2. Nelson-Aalen estimates of the default intensity in the cohort. Left panel: Estimated cumulative default intensity due
to the passing of time itself with approximate 95% martingale-based pointwise conﬁdence bands. Right panel: Smoothed default
intensity due to the passing of time itself with approximate 95% martingale-based pointwise conﬁdence bands. Smoothing done
using the Epanechnikov kernel with bandwidth 1.1 years and boundary correction at the left endpoint of the study time.
Table 1.1 shows summary statistics for the covariates included in our analysis and we indicate the expected sign of
the eﬀects of each covariate on the default intensities of ﬁrms. The ﬁrm-speciﬁc covariates are grouped with respect to
defaults and non-defaults to give a rough idea of whether the values of covariates of defaulting ﬁrms diﬀer from those
of non-defaulted ﬁrms in a way consistent with the expected sign of the eﬀect of the covariate. This seems to be the
case, although the ratio of short-to-long term debt is seen to be of almost the same magnitude (or maybe even slightly
greater) for non-defaulting ﬁrms compared to defaulting ﬁrms across all statistics.
Note that the table shows extreme maximum values for both the quick ratio, the pledgeable assets, and the 1-
year equity return covariates when compared to their 75% quantiles. The inﬂuence of these potential outliers will be
examined during model check in Section 1.6.
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Figure 1.3. Missing interactions. Estimated cumulative regression coeﬃcients for the quick ratio and (log) pledgeable assets
covariates with martingale-based 95% conﬁdence bands (dotted lines) and robust 95% conﬁdence bands (dashed lines). Left
panels: Estimates from the model without interactions. Right panels: Estimates from extended model including interactions. Note
that the value axis’ are not the same for the two sets of plots.
1.4.2 Nonparametric Aalen analysis
Initially, a nonparametric additive model including time-varying eﬀects for all ﬁve idiosyncratic covariates was ﬁtted
using the aalen function from the timereg package in R (R Development Core Team (2011)) with robust standard
errors. Apart from the additive speciﬁcation replacing the Cox speciﬁcation used by e.g. Lando and Nielsen (2010),
our main departure in this initial ﬁt is the time-varying coeﬃcients on the idiosyncratic covariates and a general time-
varying baseline intensity.
As mentioned in Section 1.2.1, it is impossible to simultaneously identify a time-varying baseline and the time-
constant eﬀects of global (both macroeconomic and dynamic) covariates when the time-scale is calendar-time. We
therefore initially ﬁt the model with a time-varying baseline, which can be viewed as a time-varying proxy for all
global tendencies. Afterwards, in Section 1.4.3, we consider the semiparametric submodel where the time-varying
44
baseline is replaced by a constant term and where the 7 macroeconomic covariates and the global dynamic covariate
all have time-constant eﬀects.
Figure 1.3 illustrates the ﬁrst interesting observation of our study: The 1-year distance-to-default is, in the termi-
nology of Kalbﬂeisch and Prentice (2002, p. 199), “responsive,” in the sense that it alone weakened the eﬀect and
increased the misspeciﬁcation of both the quick ratio and the pledgeable assets. Such behavior is a sign of missing
interactions in the model.
Estimated cumulative regression coeﬃcients B̂ j(t) =
∫ t
0 β̂ j(s) ds for the quick ratio and the pledgeable assets from
the reference model without interactions are shown in Figure 1.3 with conﬁdence bands along with the corresponding
estimates from an extended model including interactions between the two and the 1-year distance-to-default. The esti-
mates from the model not including interactions are considerably smaller than the estimates from the extended model
and have robust conﬁdence bands which are much wider than the bands based on martingale theory. Including the in-
teraction terms corrects this behavior. In fact, the estimates from the extended model are almost identical to estimates
from a model not including the 1-year distance-to-default (not shown). Note that the interactions are economically
plausible, as it is reasonable to expect that the eﬀect of a ﬁrm’s distance-to-default on default risk depends on asset
level and short-term liquidity. However, even in the model including interactions, the robust conﬁdence bands for the
quick ratio coeﬃcient are still somewhat larger near the end of the study time than the ones based on martingale-theory,
suggesting that there is still some misspeciﬁcation with regards to this covariate. Inspired by this ﬁnding, we tried all
other possible combinations of two-way interactions, but none seemed to improve the overall ﬁt.
Estimated cumulative regression coeﬃcients from the extended model including the two interactions are shown
with conﬁdence bands in Figure 1.4 for all but the quick ratio and the pledgeable assets, which were given in the right
panels of Figure 1.3. The eﬀect of each of the ﬁrm speciﬁc covariates is as expected. The percentage short-term debt
is seen to increase default intensities, but the eﬀect seems to wear oﬀ near the end of the study time, from around 2004
and onwards. On the other hand, default intensities fall as we increase the 1-year equity return, the 1-year distance-to-
default, the quick ratio, or the book asset value. The pledgeable assets are unimportant until about 1987, or for nearly
the ﬁrst 5 years of the study time. The cumulative estimates for the interactions are both increasing, but have much
lower magnitude than the eﬀects of the 1-year distance-to-default, the quick ratio, and the (log) pledgeable assets, so
that they only dampen, or correct, but do not completely remove the marginal eﬀects of the covariates. The baseline is
increasing suggesting that, given the covariate speciﬁcation used here, it proxies for default increasing eﬀects.
Judging from the conﬁdence bands of the cumulative coeﬃcients, all eﬀects are signiﬁcant over most of the study
time. The robust bands for all but the quick ratio and its interaction with the 1-year distance-to-default are almost
identical to the martingale-based bands, suggesting limited model misspeciﬁcation with respect to the rest of the
covariates.
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Figure 1.4. Cumulative coeﬃcients from initial nonparametric Aalen analysis.Estimated cumulative regression coeﬃcients for
the baseline, the 1-year equity return, the 1-year distance-to-default, the short-to-long term debt ratio, and the interactions of the
extended nonparametric additive model including interactions with martingale-based 95% conﬁdence bands (dotted lines) and
robust 95% conﬁdence bands (dashed lines). The estimates form this model for the quick ratio and the (log) pledgeable assets are
shown in the right panels of Figure 1.3.
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Table 1.2. Initial nonparametric Aalen analysis.
Supremum test of signiﬁcance (1.13), Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of time-invariance (1.15) and Cramer-von Mises test of time-
invariance (1.16) for the cumulative coeﬃcients from the extended nonparametric Aalen model including interactions. Associated
P-values are based on 1,000 resampled test processes.
Eﬀect Supremum P-value Kolmogorov- P-value Cramer-von P-value
statistic Smirnov statistic Mises statistic
Baseline 12.10 0.00 0.42 0.01 1.69 0.00
Quick ratio 7.50 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.05
Pledgeable Assets (log) 8.54 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.01
1-year equity return 13.50 0.00 0.03 0.14 0.00 0.27
1-year distance-to-default 12.70 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.11 0.00
Short-to-long term debt 8.00 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.52 0.00
Distance-to-default × Quick 7.74 0.00 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.32
Distance-to-default × Assets 9.95 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
To determine if the changes in the slopes of the cumulative estimates are signiﬁcant, the observed test processes
(1.14) for the extended model including interactions are plotted in Figure 1.5 along with 50 resampled test processes
under the null of time-invariance. Only the observed test processes corresponding to the short-to-long term debt
ratio, the 1-year distance-to-default, and the interaction between the latter and the pledgeable assets truly exhibit
extreme behavior over longer periods of time compared to the resampled test processes. The rest are at best borderline
extreme, and only over limited periods of time. Hence, we only expect the three mentioned eﬀects to be signiﬁcantly
time-varying.
The graphical considerations are supported by test statistics and associated P-values based on 1,000 resamples
of each cumulative coeﬃcient in Table 1.2. All the estimated cumulative coeﬃcients are highly signiﬁcant. The
Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Cramer-von Mises tests of time-invariance agree fairly well for all cumulative coeﬃcients,
and the hypothesis of a time-constant eﬀect is only clearly rejected for the eﬀects of the short-to-long term debt ratio,
the 1-year distance-to-default, and the interaction between the latter and the (log) pledgeable assets. The test results
correspond well with the impressions from the plots.
Note that while the overall conclusions are comparable to ﬁndings by e.g. Lando and Nielsen (2010), we obtain a
description of how the eﬀects of covariates vary with time and how this may cause model misspeciﬁcation.
1.4.3 Semiparametric Aalen analysis
The next step is to introduce the macroeconomic covariates and the global dynamic covariate instead of the general
time-varying baseline intensity in a semiparametric Aalen model. As mentioned above, to identify the parameters, this
means that we have to use a constant baseline intensity. Based on the results from the nonparametric Aalen model,
the semiparametric model is ﬁtted allowing for time-varying eﬀects of the short-to-long term debt ratio, the 1-year
distance-to-default, and the interaction between the 1-year distance-to-default and the (log) pledgeable assets.
Table 1.3 shows the time-constant parameter estimates from this model, while estimated regression coeﬃcients
β̂ j(t) for the short-to-long term debt ratio, the 1-year-distance-to-default and the interaction between the latter and the
(log) pledgeable assets are shown as smoothed functions with conﬁdence bands in Figure 1.6.
Consider ﬁrst the time-constant eﬀects. The most pronounced time-constant default decreasing eﬀect is the 1-
year equity return, which when increased by 1% lowers intensities by 1.52 percentage points. Note, however, that
using robust standard errors, the eﬀects of the quick ratio and the interaction between the quick ratio and the 1-year
distance-to-default are insigniﬁcant. The robust standard errors for these two eﬀects are also seen to be somewhat
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Table 1.3. Initial semiparametric Aalen analysis.
Parameter estimates, regular (martingale-based) standard errors, robust standard errors, Wald test statistics, and associated P-values
for the time-constant eﬀects from the semiparametric Aalen model. Test statistics and P-values are based on robust standard errors.
Eﬀects are grouped according to covariate type: Idiosyncratic, macroeconomic, and dynamic.
Eﬀect Estimate Standard Robust SE Wald P-value
error statistic
Quick ratio −0.000590 0.000095 0.000468 −1.26 0.21
Pledgeable Assets (log) −0.009850 0.001250 0.001330 −7.41 1.30 × 10−13
1-year equity return −0.015200 0.000916 0.001000 −15.20 0.00
Distance-to-default × Quick 0.000235 0.000024 0.000114 2.02 0.04
Baseline 0.115000 0.018200 0.018500 6.21 5.09 × 10−10
1-year S&P 500 return −0.021200 0.019200 0.019100 −1.10 0.27
Baa-AAA yield spread −0.009660 0.006360 0.006220 -1.55 0.12
1- year CPI change −0.003790 0.002280 0.002220 -1.71 0.09
1-year earnings change 0.001540 0.003050 0.003080 0.5 0.61
1-year oil price change −0.004990 0.005910 0.005830 −0.86 0.39
Treasury yield spread 0.002290 0.003250 0.003170 0.72 0.47
1- year UR change 0.000343 0.000272 0.000274 1.25 0.21
Monthly default rate 0.069700 0.023800 0.023600 2.95 3.31 × 10−3
larger than the martingale-based standard errors. This shows that the misspeciﬁcations ﬁrst observed in Figures 1.3
and 1.4 are also present for the corresponding time-constant eﬀects. In fact, had the Wald test statistics for these
two eﬀects been calculated using the martingale-based standard errors, we would have mistakingly judged them as
being clearly signiﬁcant. The robust standard errors for the rest of the time-constant coeﬃcients, both idiosyncratic,
macroeconomic, and dynamic, are, however, almost identical to the standard errors based on martingale theory.
The table also shows that the global dynamic eﬀect is of large magnitude and highly signiﬁcant, suggesting a high
level of unobserved variation in the cohort: A 1% increase in the monthly default rate implies an excess risk of 6.97
percentage points, which is a large shift, but plausible given that the observed monthly default rate in the data has a
maximum of 0.611%. On the other hand, none of the macroeconomic eﬀects are signiﬁcant at conventional levels.
A slight indication of a default decreasing eﬀect is found for the 1-year CPI change, but only at the 10% level. In
contrast to what is expected from univariate economic reasoning, the Baa-AAA yield spread decreases intensities, but
the eﬀect is very small, and its sign is therefore not a big concern. Finally, note that the 1-year return on the S&P500
index has, as expected, a default decreasing eﬀect in the additive model, although not signiﬁcant at conventional levels.
This particular covariate has been reported in other studies to have the “wrong” sign in Cox models, see for example
Duﬃe et al. (2009) and Lando and Nielsen (2010).
Turning to the time-varying coeﬃcients β̂ j(t) in Figure 1.6, the variational pattern over time is in all three cases
closely connected to the recessions in the U.S. economy, with all three eﬀects being most pronounced during the
recessions as compared to in-between periods. The magnitude of the short-to-long term debt ratio eﬀect varies greatly
depending on the recession at hand: A 1% increase corresponds to an excess risk of around 7.00 percentage points
during the ‘91-‘92 recession, while the same increase implies an excess risk of almost 14.00 percentage points, or twice
as much, during the ‘01-‘02 recession. The eﬀect of the 1-year distance-to-default is, on the other hand, fairly much
the same during both mentioned recessions, where an increase of one standard deviation lowers intensities by about
3 percentage points. Comparing this with the time-constant estimates in Table 1.3, the 1-year distance-to-default has
the most inﬂuential default decreasing eﬀect of all included covariates. The eﬀect of the interaction is a time-varying
correction to the marginal eﬀects of the 1-year distance-to-default and the pledgeable assets.
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Figure 1.6. Smoothed regression coeﬃcients. Smoothed estimates (1.12) of regression coeﬃcients for the short-to-long term debt
ratio, the 1-year-distance-to-default, and the interaction between the latter and the (log) pledgeable assets from the semiparametric
model with martingale-based 95% conﬁdence bands (dotted lines) and robust 95% conﬁdence bands (dashed lines). Smoothing
done using the Epanechnikov kernel with bandwidth 1.3 years and boundary correction at the left endpoint of the study time.
1.5 Model check
Despite the existence of several goodness-of-ﬁt methods for survival models, actual model checking is still somewhat
overlooked in practice. The problem is that classical model check procedures looking at residuals all originate from
similar methods used in ordinary statistics, but the way in which they are to be interpreted in the survival data setup with
censoring is unclear. For instance, the usual martingale residuals ﬁrst considered by Barlow and Prentice (1988) are
not normally distributed – hence, the interpretation of such residuals is not as straightforward as in classical regression
analysis, and it may therefore be diﬃcult to judge the quality of a model-ﬁt from a plot of the residuals.
Nevertheless, model checking may actually lead us to alter the model speciﬁcation. In our case, it leads us to con-
clude that potential problems with the ﬁt of the additive model is due to over-inﬂuence of ﬁrms with extreme covariate
values. Before presenting these ﬁndings, we describe graphical model checking methods for the nonparametric Aalen
model.
An advantage of the nonparametric Aalen model is that its additive structure ﬁts well with martingale theory,
producing residual processes which are exact local martingales when the model is correct – this is neither the case
for the semiparametric additive model nor for the Cox model, for which the residual processes are only approximate
(asymptotic) local martingales. As the semiparametric Aalen model is a submodel of its nonparametric counterpart,
we will focus on model-check for the nonparametric model.
Aalen et al. (2008) discuss a graphical method based on so-called “martingale residual processes” – a method that
has also been applied to the Cox model. Using the nonparametric additive model form (1.7), deﬁne the martingale
residual process (Mres,t)t∈[0,T ] as the accumulated diﬀerence between the vector of counting processes and the vector
of estimated cumulative intensity processes at the time points where the model is estimable,
Mres,t =
∫ t
0
J(s) dNs −
∫ t
0
J(s)Xs dB̂(s). (1.24)
Inserting the expression (1.8) for the estimator B̂(t), applying the model form (1.7), and using the deﬁnition of the
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least squares generalized inverse X−t , we get
Mres,t =
∫ t
0
J(s)
(
I − XsX−s
)
dNs =
∫ t
0
J(s)
(
I − XsX−s
) (
Xs dB(s) + dMs
)
=
∫ t
0
J(s)
(
I − XsX−s
)
dMs.
Under the assumption that Xt is locally bounded, this proves that the process (Mres,t)t∈[0,T ] is a vector-valued local
martingale when the nonparametric additive model is true. As mentioned, this exact result does not carry over to
semi-parametric models – whether of the Aalen or the Cox type.
1.5.1 Covariate misspeciﬁcations: Grouped martingale residual processes
The ﬁrm speciﬁc martingale residual processes are typically not of much use on their own due to the relatively few
number of recurrent default events. It is more useful to aggregate over groups of ﬁrms with respect to covariate values
and conduct graphical model-check based on the grouped residual processes. Speciﬁcally, assume that a grouping of
the ﬁrms is given, and let G(t) denote the set of all ﬁrms belonging to group G at time t. The grouping is allowed to
depend on time, such that ﬁrms may move from one group to another during the study time, as would naturally be the
case when grouping is based on time-dependent covariates. It is, however, essential that the grouping is predictable,
such that information needed to group ﬁrms at time t is available just before time t. The martingale residual process
of group G at time t then takes the form
M(G)res,t =
∫ t
0
∑
i∈G(s)
dMres,it, (1.25)
where Mres,it is the ith element of the time-t vector Mres,t in (1.24). These grouped residual processes may then be
plotted as functions of study time in order to assess the model ﬁt with respect to covariates. If the model ﬁts well, the
resulting plots will ﬂuctuate around zero and show no overdispersion or particular trends.
1.5.2 The model ﬁt as a whole: Model-based covariance of residual processes
The martingale residual processes may also be of use in a diﬀerent manner, aimed at judging the model ﬁt as a whole.
The method is explained by Aalen et al. (2008), and involves estimating a model-based covariance function for the
martingale residual processes. The idea is that if we standardize martingale residual processes by dividing them with
their estimated standard deviation at each time t, then the time-varying mean and standard deviation of the standardized
processes should stay close to 0 and 1, respectively, if the model ﬁts well.
To elaborate, assume that the nonparametric additive model is true, so that the process (Mres,t)t∈[0,T ] is a vector-
valued local martingale. Its covariance function may then be estimated by its optional variation process
Σres(t) =
∑
τk≤t
J(τk)
(
I − XτkX−τk
)
diag(XτkX
−
τk
Nτk )
(
I − XτkX−τk
)T
. (1.26)
Standardized residual processes are then obtained at each time t by calculating
Mres,it√
σ2res,ii(t)
; i = 1, . . . , n,
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where σ2res,ii(t) is the ith diagonal element of Σres(t). A plot of the mean and standard deviation of the standardized
residual processes as a function of time will then give a graphical assessment of the model ﬁt as a whole: If the model
gives a reasonable ﬁt, the mean will stay close to 0, and the standard deviation to 1.
1.5.3 Outliers and over-inﬂuence: Diagonal cumulative hat processes
The leverages are a useful diagnostic for ﬁnding observations that may be overly inﬂuential in linear regression models.
The leverages are the diagonal elements of the so-called hat matrix, which is given by the product of the design matrix
and its least squares generalized inverse. For the additive model, we deﬁne a cumulative hat matrix as
Hcum(t) =
∑
τk≤t
XτkX
−
τk
. (1.27)
The idea is to look for observed ﬁrm processes with particularly high inﬂuence by plotting the diagonal elements
hcum,ii(t) of Hcum(t), called the diagonal cumulative hat processes, as functions of the successive default times in the
cohort.
In ordinary linear regression, the average value of the diagonal elements of the hat matrix is r/n, where r is the
rank of the hat matrix, which is the number of independent parameters of the model, and n is the number observations.
Diagonal elements well above r/n are said to have high leverage, and Aalen et al. (2008), amongst others, recommend
investigation of observations with diagonal hat matrix element above 2r/n.
With respect to the nonparametric additive model, this theory may be applied at each default time in the cohort.
Hence, the outlying process criterion is
hcum,ii(t) > 2r
∑
τk≤t
1
Y τk
, (1.28)
where Y τk is the number of ﬁrms at risk at default time τk.
1.6 Revising the model
The initial analyses of Section 1.4 using the Aalen models gave intuitive results about the inﬂuence of the included
risk factors that are largely consistent with results from Cox models found by e.g. Duﬃe et al. (2009) and Lando
and Nielsen (2010). There were, however, also signs of model misspeciﬁcations. First, robust standard errors were
considerably larger than regular standard errors for several covariates, even after correcting for interactions. Second,
several signiﬁcantly time-varying eﬀects where identiﬁed, indicating that the time-invariant proportionality assumption
of the Cox model applied elsewhere is a misspeciﬁcation for these covariates. Finally, the signiﬁcance of the global
dynamic eﬀect suggests that the covariate speciﬁcation applied here is missing essential elements. Hence, there is
good reason for a deeper analysis of the misspeciﬁcations and the data. All results presented in this section are based
on own implementations in R (R Development Core Team (2011)).
1.6.1 Martingale residual processes
Graphical assessment of martingale residual processes, suitably grouped with respect to the values of covariates, may
give a good indication of functional form misspeciﬁcations and outliers due to extreme covariate values. We study the
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Figure 1.7. Covariate misspeciﬁcations. Grouped martingale residual processes (1.25) for the nonparametric Aalen model includ-
ing all ﬁve idiosyncratic covariates and the two interactions. Grouping done at each default time according to the quantiles of each
idiosyncratic covariate, with 50 equidistant groups in each case: Group 1 corresponds to values between the 0% and 2% quantiles,
group 2 corresponds to values between the 2% and 4% quantiles, and so on. Groups with outlying residual processes are marked
by group number.
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martingale residual processes of the nonparametric additive model including all ﬁve idiosyncratic covariates and the
two interactions.
Figure 1.7 shows grouped martingale residual processes (1.25) for each of the ﬁve idiosyncratic covariates. Group-
ing is done at each default time according to the quantiles of each covariate, with 50 equidistant groups in each case:
Group 1 corresponds to values between the 0% and 2% quantiles, group 2 corresponds to values between the 2%
and 4% quantiles, and so on. This allowed for the isolation of the very extreme covariate values while maintaining a
reasonable amount of ﬁrms in each group at each default time.
If the model ﬁts well, all residual processes would stay close to zero and not show signs of over-dispersion
or trends. The impression from the ﬁgure is therefore that deviations from the model mostly occur in the extreme
(both low and high) quantiles of the covariates, with especially the high quantiles causing misspeciﬁcations. This is
expected, but the plots allow us to give a detailed account of the misspeciﬁcations. More defaults than expected occur
in the highest quantile groups of the quick ratio, the 1-year equity return, and the 1-year distance-to-default. There are
slightly more defaults than expected in the highest quantile group of the short-to-long term debt ratio, but the deviation
is limited to around the year 2001, which had a historically high default rate. On the other hand, fewer defaults than
expected occur in the lowest quantile groups of the 1-year-equity return and the 1-year distance-to-default, while it
is in the highest quantile groups of the (log) pledgeable assets that fewer defaults than expected occur. In the latter
case, the deviation is again limited to around the year 2001. Most of the non-extreme quantile groups show no truly
alarming signs.
The deviations in the high quantile groups of the quick ratio, the 1-year equity return, and the 1-year distance-
to-default are either due to outliers, or due to certain ﬁrms having excessively high values of these covariates, yet
still defaulting. Analogously, the deviations in the lowest quantile groups of the 1-year equity return and the 1-year
distance-to-default are due to certain ﬁrms having negative values for these covariates, yet still not defaulting. The
deviation in the highest quantile groups of the (log) pledgeable assets is somewhat unintuitive, but may be due to a
considerable amount of defaults amongst ﬁrms with relatively high values of pledgeable assets around the year 2001.
The deviations seen in the ﬁgure suggest that simple transformations or inclusion of, say, quadratic terms, would
not correct the misspeciﬁcations, since they are limited to the extreme quantile groups. Transformations yielding
reasonable residual processes would have to “squeeze” together the distribution of the covariates, so that outlying
values are neutralized, and such would tend to blur eﬀects. Transformations of the form x 	→ −e−ax for a > 0 were
used in a preliminary version of this paper. Hence, a detailed analysis of inﬂuential observations, particularly ones due
to extreme covariate values, is necessary.
1.6.2 Model-based covariance of residual processes
The grouped martingale residual processes revealed a considerable amount of model misspeciﬁcation at the extreme
quantiles of the covariates. However, looking back at the results from Section 1.4.2, robust standard errors were quite
close to martingale-based standard errors for most covariates, suggesting that the misspeciﬁcations might not be of
crucial overall importance for the ﬁnal results.
To get an idea if the model ﬁts as a whole, we standardize the martingale residual processes using the model-based
covariance function (1.26) and compare in Figure 1.8 their time-varying mean and standard deviation with what would
be the true values if the model ﬁt well: The mean should stay close to 0 while the standard deviation should stay close
to 1 if the model gives an adequate description of the data. The ﬁgure thus shows a misspeciﬁcation with respect to
the standard deviation of the standardized residual processes, which increases with time to a maximum value of just
over 2. Hence, the standard deviation of the calculated residual processes are greater than is expected under the model.
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Figure 1.8. The model ﬁt as a whole. Mean (lower curve) and standard deviation (upper curve) of standardized martingale
residual processes as functions of study time from the nonparametric Aalen model including all ﬁve idiosyncratic covariates and
the two interactions. The true values under the model, 0 and 1, respectively, are indicated by the dotted lines.
The plot therefore shows that while the additive model on average captures the patterns present in the data throughout
the study time, the magnitude of variation in the data which the model fails to explain is considerable. It thus seems
that while the model is not entirely wrong in its description of the defaults in the data, it apparently lacks essential
explanatory risk factors.
1.6.3 Diagonal cumulative hat processes
To check whether the deviations from martingale-behavior seen in Figures 1.7 and 1.8 are due to over-inﬂuence of
some ﬁrms in the cohort, we calculated the cumulative hat matrix (1.27) for the nonparametric additive model as a
function of the successive default times in the cohort.
The left panel of Figure 1.9 shows the 2,557 diagonal cumulative hat processes corresponding to each ﬁrm in
the cohort along with the expected hat matrix and the outlying process criterion (1.28). Several processes exceed
the outlying process criterion, meaning that these ﬁrms have the highest inﬂuence on the results of the analysis. In
total, 177 processes were identiﬁed as exceeding the outlying process criterion at some default time, and these are
emphasized in the right panel of the ﬁgure. These ﬁrms were the ones with the most extreme (both high and low)
values of the idiosyncratic covariates. Among those ﬁrms there were 19 defaults distributed across 16 ﬁrms, with 3
ﬁrms defaulting twice.
When examining the 177 ﬁrms more closely, it was clear that they all have some covariate values that are outliers
which, for example, were many magnitudes higher than the maximum in the rest of the cohort. This identiﬁcation of
over-inﬂuential ﬁrms conﬁrms the observations from the study of the grouped martingale residual processes, where it
was noted that deviations from the additive model were primarily limited to the extreme quantile groups.
1.6.4 Analysis based on clean data
Based on the results from the model check, we conduct an analysis of the data, omitting the 177 ﬁrms from the cohort
who were identiﬁed as over-inﬂuential. Omitting these ﬁrms resulted in a “clean” data set consisting of 2,380 ﬁrms,
comprising a total of 351 defaults. The 19 omitted defaults were fairly evenly distributed across study time, and an
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Figure 1.9. Outliers and over-inﬂuence. Analysis of over-inﬂuence through the cumulative hat matrix (1.27) of the nonparametric
additive model including all ﬁve idiosyncratic covariates and the two interactions. The plots show the 2,557 ﬁrm-speciﬁc hat
processes (thin grey lines) as functions of the default times in the cohort, along with the expected hat matrix (lower thick solid line)
and the outlying process criterion (upper thick solid line). In the right plot, the 177 processes which at some default time exceed
the outlying process criterion are emphasised (thin dotted lines).
analysis of the at-risk and default patterns in the clean data set showed no particular changes compared to the full data
set.
Model check for the cleaned data
Grouped martingale residual processes for a nonparametric additive model ﬁtted to the clean data, including the two
interactions, showed much less dispersion in the extreme quantile groups and generally a better ﬁt across all covariates.
As shown in Table 1.4, and detailed below, martingale-based and robust standard errors are also in close correspon-
dence. The standard deviation of the standardized residual processes did not change much compared to the analysis
on the full data set. There may therefore be room for additional covariates which we have not considered. Overall,
however, the model ﬁt was considerably improved by omitting outliers in the data. The trade-oﬀ is, of course, that the
model is then not ﬁtted to the full data set. On the other hand, we avoid ad-hoc transformations of the functional form
that are sensitive to a few extreme outliers.
Model ﬁts for the cleaned data
A nonparametric Aalen model was ﬁtted to the clean data including all ﬁve idiosyncratic covariates and the two
interactions. Only the eﬀects of the 1-year distance-to-default and the short-to-long term debt ratio had signiﬁcantly
time-varying eﬀects – the hypothesis of time-invariance was clearly not rejected for the rest of the eﬀects. Hence,
cleaning the data removed the time-variation of the eﬀect of the interaction between the 1-year distance-to-default and
the (log) pledgeable assets compared to the analysis on the full data set.
Based on these ﬁndings, a semiparametric additive model was ﬁtted to the clean data with time-varying eﬀects for
the 1-year distance-to-default and the short-to-long term debt ratio, while the rest of the idiosyncratic covariates had
time-constant eﬀects. The time-varying baseline was replaced by a constant term, the macroeconomic covariates, and
the global dynamic covariate. Table 1.4 gives the estimates for the time-constant eﬀects. The smoothed coeﬃcients for
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Table 1.4. Semiparametric Aalen analysis of cleaned data.
Parameter estimates, regular (martingale-based) standard errors, robust standard errors, Wald test statistics, and associated P-values
for the time-constant eﬀects from a semiparametric Aalen model ﬁtted to the clean data. Test statistics are based on robust standard
errors. Eﬀects are grouped with respect to covariate type: Idiosyncratic, macroeconomic, and dynamic.
Eﬀect Estimate Standard Robust SE Wald P-value
error statistic
Quick ratio −0.021800 0.002150 0.002580 −8.45 0.00
Pledgeable Assets (log) −0.012500 0.001810 0.001840 −6.79 1.10 × 10−11
1-year equity return −0.015600 0.000993 0.001060 −14.72 0.00
Distance-to-default × Quick 0.004860 0.000421 0.000520 9.34 0.00
Distance-to-default × Assets 0.003200 0.000371 0.000379 8.44 0.00
Baseline 0.157000 0.023200 0.023200 6.77 1.31 × 10−11
1-year S&P 500 return −0.020700 0.022000 0.021900 −0.95 0.34
Baa-AAA yield spread −0.009920 0.007620 0.007430 −1.34 0.18
1- year CPI change −0.003120 0.002650 0.002570 −1.21 0.22
1-year earnings change 0.001610 0.003580 0.003610 0.45 0.65
1-year oil price change −0.006590 0.006360 0.006260 -1.05 0.29
Treasury yield spread 0.003450 0.003670 0.003590 0.96 0.34
1- year UR change 0.000353 0.000304 0.000305 1.16 0.24
Monthly default rate 0.077200 0.026700 0.026600 2.90 3.70 × 10−3
the time-varying eﬀects of the 1-year distance-to-default and the short-to-long term debt ratio did not change compared
to what is given in Figure 1.6, and are not repeated here.
Consider ﬁrst the time-constant idiosyncratic eﬀects in Table 1.4. Comparing with the results in Table 1.3 for the
semiparametric model ﬁtted to the full data set, the eﬀects of the quick ratio and its interaction with the 1-year distance-
to-default are now of considerably larger magnitude, and their robust standard errors are in good correspondence with
the martingale-based standard errors. Both eﬀects are therefore signiﬁcant regardless of which standard errors we use
to construct test statistics. Thus, cleaning the data has corrected the misspeciﬁcation ﬁrst observed for these eﬀects. In
fact, the quick ratio now has the most pronounced default decreasing time-constant eﬀect, lowering default intensities
by 2.18 percentage points per unit increase.
Finally, with respect to the global eﬀects, the borderline signiﬁcant eﬀects of the 1-year CPI change found in
Table 1.3 is now clearly insigniﬁcant at conventional levels. On the other hand, the global dynamic eﬀect is still highly
signiﬁcant, and its magnitude has not changed much compared to the model ﬁtted to the full data set. In conclusion,
the signiﬁcance of the global dynamic eﬀect was not an artifact of over-inﬂuence of certain ﬁrms. It is conceivable,
that the dynamic covariate captures an eﬀect related to the business cycle which our macro variables do not capture
and which is not transmitted through the ﬁrm speciﬁc covariates. Note that this ﬁts well with the analysis of the
standardized martingale residual processes which indicated that the model is missing essential risk factors, even after
cleaning the data. This is a topic of future research.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper has studied additive models for stochastic default intensities. We model the mean arrival rate of default
events using nonparametric and semiparametric versions of Aalen’s additive regression model. Using both ﬁrm-
speciﬁc and global covariates, we ﬁt the models and conduct model check on a sample of rated, non-ﬁnancial U.S.
corporates, covering the period 1982 to 2005.
In additive models, covariates act in an additive way on a baseline intensity. The nonparametric model has time-
varying eﬀects for all covariates, while the semiparametric model allows for some parametric, time-constant eﬀects.
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This makes the additive models more ﬂexible than the often applied Cox model in describing covariate eﬀects and
how they may change over time.
An advantage of the Cox models is that their log-linear structure ensures that estimated intensities are positive.
The way we estimate the Aalen model does not rule out negative values of estimated intensities. Negative intensities
are inevitable for extrapolations using extreme values of covariates, but even for data with ﬁrms that have very small
default intensities, estimated intensities for observed covariates may be negative. The possibility of negative intensities
and the non-parametric nature of the intensity function imply that we should not think of Aalen models as a tool
for prediction. Its purpose is to analyze how macro-economic and ﬁrm-speciﬁc covariates have aﬀected the default
intensity in the past. The strength of the Aalen model is its ability to model time-varying eﬀects of covariates in a
ﬂexible, non-parametric manner.
We present the theory behind estimation and inference for both nonparametric and semiparametric additive mod-
els, including how to test whether a covariate eﬀect is time-varying. We use model checking techniques based on
visual inspection of martingale residual processes that help us identify model misspeciﬁcations, as well as a method
for identifying outliers that is very similar to what is known from ordinary linear regression. Our model checking
strongly inﬂuences the ﬁnal model speciﬁcation.
In our ﬁnal model we ﬁnd evidence of time-variation in the eﬀects of distance-to-default and short-to-long term
debt, and we identify the eﬀect of interactions between distance-to-default and two other covariates: the quick ratio
and (log) pledgable assets. In our ﬁnal speciﬁcation, which excludes outliers, the eﬀect of the interaction terms is
not time-dependent. Furthermore, the quick ratio covariate is signiﬁcant. None of our macroeconomic covariates are
signiﬁcant which may indicate that their eﬀects are captured through their inﬂuence on ﬁrm-speciﬁc covariates.
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Chapter 2
Cyclicality and Firm-size in Private Firm
Defaults
With David Lando and Thais Lærkholm Jensen.
Introduction
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) typically depend more heavily on funding from banks than do larger
ﬁrms. It is therefore conceivable that SMEs are hit harder during a ﬁnancial crisis in which banks’ capital constraints
are binding. Perhaps as a recognition of this dependence, the Basel II Accord awards preferential treatment of bank
loans to SMEs, eﬀectively and signiﬁcantly lowering capital charges for lending to the SME-segment. Technically,
the reduction follows by prescribing lower asset correlation with a common risk-driver when the calculating capital
charges. To the extent that asset correlation arises because of common dependence on macroeconomic shocks, the
reduction corresponds to assuming that the default probabilities of SMEs are less sensitive to macroeconomic cycli-
cality relative to larger ﬁrms. These deductions in capital charges were recently reaﬃrmed and extended in the Basel
III Accord and in the fourth Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV).
This paper investigates whether there is empirical support for the assumption that the default probabilities of
smaller ﬁrms are less sensitive to macroeconomic cyclicality. Using a default intensity regression framework, our
results indicate that solely discriminating with respect to ﬁrm-size, the default probabilities of small ﬁrms do in fact
exhibit less sensitivity to macroeconomic cyclicality compared to the default probabilities of large ﬁrms, in the sense
that the eﬀects of macroeconomic variables are of smaller magnitude for smaller ﬁrms. However, when we account for
diﬀerences in ﬁrm-characteristics other than size, our results indicate that the default probability of the average small
ﬁrm is as cyclical or even more cyclical than the default probability of the average large ﬁrm. The results are robust
to diﬀerent regression models and diﬀerent divisions of our sample into small and large ﬁrms. Our ﬁndings suggest
that preferential treatment of capital charges solely based on ﬁrm-size is too simplistic and may in fact entail adverse
eﬀects on the stability of European banks with a high exposure to the SME-segment.
Our data covers the period 2003-2012 and consists of obligor, loan, and default histories for a large sample of
private Danish ﬁrms. We use both the popular multiplicative Cox regression model and the more ﬂexible additive Aalen
regression model to estimate the eﬀects of ﬁrm-speciﬁc and macroeconomic variables on default intensities. Our main
goal is analyze whether the eﬀects of macroeconomic variables are of smaller magnitude for small ﬁrms compared
to large ﬁrms. The crux of our analysis is that our regression models also include accounting ratios that control for
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ﬁrm characteristics other than size. In this way, we rule out the possibility that our division into small and large
ﬁrms is merely capturing other characteristics that diﬀerentiate the two types of ﬁrms. Our regression models conﬁrm
previous ﬁndings that accounting ratios and macroeconomic variables play distinct roles in default prediction for
private ﬁrms: (1) Accounting ratios are necessary for accurately ranking private ﬁrms according to default likelihood,
but cannot by themselves capture the cyclicality of aggregate default rates, while (2) macroeconomic variables are
indispensable for capturing the cyclicality of aggregate default rates, but do not aid in the ranking of ﬁrms with respect
to default likelihood. These ﬁndings conﬁrm that our method of focusing on the eﬀects of macroeconomic variables is
adequate for our intended analysis, as it is these variables, and not ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics, that add the cyclicality
component to our regression models.
Using the Cox model, we ﬁnd that solely discriminating with respect to ﬁrm size, and keeping all other ﬁrm
characteristics equal, the default intensities for smaller ﬁrms do in fact exhibit less sensitivity to macroeconomic
cyclicality. However, when we account for the Cox model’s non-linear form and use averaging techniques adapted
from other non-linear regression models, our results indicate that the default intensity of the average small ﬁrm may
be as cyclical or even more cyclical than the default intensity of the average large ﬁrm. Because of this ambiguity in
the results from the Cox model, we also conduct the investigation using an additive Aalen model which, due to the
linearity of its eﬀects, allows us to directly compare the eﬀects of macroeconomic variables for small and large ﬁrms.
Using the additive model, we ﬁnd no evidence that there is diﬀerent sensitivity to macroeconomic variables for small
ﬁrms compared to large ﬁrms.
We ﬁnally conduct robustness and model checks for our results based on the Cox model. First, we show that the
signs, magnitudes, and signiﬁcance levels of the eﬀects of our variables (both ﬁrm-speciﬁc and macroeconomic) are
robust to the use of alternative size-criteria when splitting the full sample into the subsamples of small and large ﬁrms.
Second, we show that the eﬀects of our variables are robust to the exclusion of certain sample periods. Third, we
show that the eﬀects of our variables are robust to alternative choices of lag lengths. Finally, we show that the residual
processes from our preferred Cox model do not exhibit systematic trends when grouped according to sectors and size
quarterlies.
The ﬂow of the rest of the paper is as follows. Following this introduction is a brief review of the most related
literature. Section 1 details our data, variable selection, and estimation methodology. Section 2 presents our regression
results, where we conﬁrm previous ﬁnds that accounting ratios and macroeconomic variables play distinct roles in de-
fault prediction for private ﬁrms. Section 3 presents our results regarding the sensitivity to macroeconomic cyclicality
for small and large ﬁrms. Section 4 shows results related to robustness and model check. Section 5 concludes.
Related literature
Statistical models using accounting ratios to estimate default probabilities date back to at least Beaver (1966) and
Altman (1968), followed by Ohlsen (1980) and Zmijewski (1984)—we use many of the same accounting ratios as
in these studies. Shumway (2001) was among the ﬁrst to demonstrate the advantages of intensity models with time-
varying covariates compared to traditional discriminant analysis, and was also among the ﬁrst to include equity return
as a market-based predictor of default probabilities—we use a similar estimation setup, although we do not have
market-based variables for our private ﬁrms. Chava and Jarrow (2004) improved the setup of Shumway (2001) using
covariates measured at the monthly level and showed the importance of industry eﬀects—our data frequency is also at
the monthly level and we correct for industry eﬀects in all our regressions.
Structural models of credit risk, like the models of Black and Scholes (1973), Merton (1974), and Leland (1994),
usually assume that a ﬁrm defaults when its assets drop to a suﬃciently low level relative to its liabilities. The
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connection between structural models and intensity models was formally established by Duﬃe and Lando (2001),
who showed that when the ﬁrm’s asset value process is not perfectly observable, a ﬁrm’s default time has a default
intensity that depends on the ﬁrm’s observable characteristics as well as other covariates. Studies demonstrating the
importance of covariates implied from structural models, like distance-to-default or asset volatility, include Duﬃe
et al. (2007), Bharath and Shumway (2008), Lando and Nielsen (2010), and Chava et al. (2011) among many others.
Default studies using data on public ﬁrms and employing macroeconomic variables include McDonald and de Gucht
(1999), Peseran, Schuermann, Treutler, and Weiner (2006), Duﬃe et al. (2007), Lando and Nielsen (2010), Figlewski,
Frydman, and Liang (2012), among many others. Recent default studies of private ﬁrms that also employ macroeco-
nomic variables include Carling et al. (2007), who use Swedish data, and Bonﬁm (2009), who uses Portuguese data.
We employ many of the same macroeconomic variables as in these studies.
The provisions in the Basel II Accord permitting “[banks] to separately distinguish exposures to SME borrowers
(deﬁned as corporate exposures where the reported sales for the consolidated group of which the ﬁrm is a part is less
than 50 million euro) from those to large ﬁrms” and specifying the reduction for SMEs through the asset correlation
formula can be found in Articles 273 and 274 of The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s (2006) report. Lopez
(2004) examines the relationship between Basel II’s assumed asset correlation and ﬁrm size, and ﬁnds an increasing
relationship between the two using a sample of US, Japanese, and European ﬁrms. Using data on French and German
ﬁrms, Dietsch and Petey (2004) ﬁnd that SMEs are riskier than larger ﬁrms, and that the asset correlations for SMEs
are weak and decrease with ﬁrm size. Chionsini, Marcucci, and Quagliariello (2010) ﬁnd evidence in support of the
the size-sensitive treatment in the Basel II Accord for italian SMEs, though not during severe ﬁnancial crises like that
of 2008-09. The corresponding provisions in the Basel III Accord and the recently adopted CRD IV can be found
in Articles 153.4 and 501.1 of The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union’s (2013) report.
Discussions of the treatment of SMEs in the Basel III Accord and CRD IV prior to the adoption can, for instance, be
found in reports by The Association of Chartered Certiﬁed Accountants (ACCA) (2011a,b) and The European Banking
Authority (EBA) (2012)—see also the references therein.
In our analysis of the cyclicality of the default probabilities of small and large ﬁrms, we apply averaging tech-
niques to the Cox regression model resembling those commonly applied to generalized linear models—see, for in-
stance, Wooldridge (2009, p. 582-83) for an overview. The additive regression model due to Aalen (1980, 1989),
which we apply in our analysis, was ﬁrst applied in a default prediction setting by Lando et al. (2013)—they study the
time-variation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀects on the default probabilities of public US ﬁrms.
2.1 Data and methodology
This section presents our data, the variables that we employ as ﬁrm-speciﬁc and macroeconomic drivers of default
probabilities, and the methodology that we use to estimate the eﬀects of the variables on default probabilities.
Our raw data comprises 28,395 ﬁrms and 114,409 ﬁrm-year observations of obligor and loan histories, accounting
statements, and default indicators over the period 2003 to 2012. The data is obtained from a large Danish ﬁnancial
institution. A ﬁrm is included in this dataset if, in at least one of the years underlying the period of analysis, it
has an engagement over DKK 2 million, which is the largest segmentation category used by the ﬁnancial institution
for its corporate clients. An engagement is deﬁned in terms of loans or granted credit lines. After removing sole
proprietorships, government institutions, holding companies without consolidated ﬁnancial statements, ﬁrms that do
not have Denmark as their residency, and ﬁrms that do not fulﬁll balance sheet checks, we are left with 10,671 ﬁrms
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Figure 2.1. Entry and at-risk pattern in the sample. The left panel shows the yearly number of ﬁrms entering the sample (grey
mass) along with the yearly number of entries that do not default (black, solid line) or eventually do default (black, dashed line).
The right panel shows the quarterly number of ﬁrms at risk of defaulting (i.e. in the “risk set”; grey mass) along with the actual
number of defaulting ﬁrms in each quarter (black, solid line).
and 48,703 ﬁrm-year observations. In the cleaned dataset, a total of 633 ﬁrms experienced a default event, deﬁned by
the Basel II Accord as more than 60 days delinquency. Moreover, 54 of the 633 defaulting ﬁrms experience a second
default, in the sense that they became delinquent a second time during the sample period. Other default studies have
treated a ﬁrm that re-emerges from default as a new ﬁrm, as merited by bankruptcy protection laws. However, due to
the Basel II Accord’s deﬁnition of a default event as a period of delinquency, we choose to disregard multiple default
events, and our results should hence be interpreted as speciﬁc to a ﬁrm’s initial default.
Figure 2.1 shows the patterns with which ﬁrms enter and potentially leave our ﬁnal sample. The right panel shows
the number of ﬁrms that enter the sample at each year along with an indication of the number of entries eventually
corresponding to defaults and non-defaults. Despite discussions with the ﬁnancial institution providing the data, the
low number of ﬁrms entering the sample in 2005 remains a conundrum. It appears, however, that the ﬁrms that
eventually default do not seem to diﬀer systematically from the non-defaulting ﬁrms based on when they enter the
sample. The right panel shows the number of ﬁrms at risk of defaulting, i.e. ﬁrms in the “risk set,” at each quarter,
along with the quarterly number of defaults. The risk set is seen to contain at least 2,000 ﬁrms at each quarter, and the
2008-09 ﬁnancial crisis is readily visible from the sharp rise in the number of defaults.
In order to incorporate quarterly macroeconomic variables, we re-code the accounting variables for each ﬁrm
from annual to quarterly observations. This will naturally induce persistence in the accounting variables from quarter
to quarter, which we correct for by basing all inference on standard errors clustered at the ﬁrm-level. The ﬁnal dataset
thus consists of a total of 192,196 ﬁrm-quarter observations.
Figure 2.2 compares the observed default rate in our sample to the number of registered bankruptcies in Denmark.
The comparison is feasible because the total number of ﬁrms at risk of default in Denmark is relatively stable over time.
We see that, due to the relatively few incidences, the default rate in the sample ﬂuctuates while still co-moving with
the aggregate level in Denmark. This indicates that our results are not necessarily speciﬁc to the ﬁnancial institution
that provided us with data, but may be applied to Danish ﬁrms in general.
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Figure 2.2. Default rates in the sample and the general Danish economy. The left panel shows the quarterly default rate from
the sample along with the corresponding aggregate number of quarterly bankruptcies in the general Danish economy. The right
panel shows the yearly default rate from the sample along with the aggregate quarterly number of default in the general Danish
economy.
2.1.1 Firm-speciﬁc explanatory variables
Table 2.1 provides an overview of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc explanatory variables which we employ in our regression analysis.
Our ﬁrm-speciﬁc explanatory variables measure size, age, leverage, proﬁtability, asset liquidity, collateralization, and
equity-value. The table also gives the accounting ratios which we use to proxy for the ﬁrm-speciﬁc explanatory
variables along with the expected sign of each accounting-based variable’s eﬀect on default probabilities. All our
accounting-based variables have been applied in previous default studies—see, for instance, Ohlsen (1980), Shumway
(2001), Duﬃe et al. (2007), and Lando and Nielsen (2010). We also correct for industry eﬀects as in Chava and Jarrow
(2004). The main diﬀerence between our list of ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables and the ones used in default studies of public
ﬁrms is the lack of market-based measures like stock return and distance-to-default.
In order to avoid discriminating against smaller companies that report ﬁnancial statements in less detail, we use
high-level, aggregated data to construct the accounting-based variables. We also control for industry eﬀects since
certain industry characteristics may prescribe a certain leverage structure, particularly linked to the volatility of cash
ﬂows. We use the sector aﬃliation by Statistics Denmark to identify a ﬁrm’s primary industry as either “Construction,”
“Manufacturing,” or “Wholesale and Retail,” as these have above average default rates, but are at the same time coarse
enough to ensure a suﬃcient number of ﬁrms in each sector.
An analysis of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables revealed a few miscodings and extreme values. Due to the anonymized
nature of the data, we were not able to check the validity of these data points manually, and we therefore choose
to winsorize all the ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables at the 1st and 99th percentile—a practice also used by Chava and Jarrow
(2004), Shumway (2001), and Bonﬁm (2009), among others. The winsorized summary statistics are presented in
Table 2.2. The average ﬁrm has DKK 275 million assets, a ratio of 68% between total debt to total assets, and interest
payments corresponding to 3% of total assets. Further, the average ﬁrm had a relationship with the bank for 23 years
and remains in the sample for 7 out of the 9 years.
Due to Danish reporting standards, ﬁrms below a certain size may refrain from reporting revenue and employee
count, and hence these variables are zero for a large proportion of ﬁrms in the sample. We therefore choose not to use
these two variables in our further analysis in order not to discriminate against smaller ﬁrms. In the table, ﬁrm age is
taken to be time since the bank recorded the ﬁrst interaction with the client; entry year speciﬁes the year at which the
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Table 2.1. Firm-speciﬁc explanatory variables and corresponding, observable accounting-based variables. The left column
shows our list of ﬁrm-speciﬁc explanatory variables, the center column shows the observable accounting-based variables which we
use as proxies, and the right column shows the expected eﬀect of each accounting-based variables on default probabilities. Industry
Eﬀects are included in the list for completeness, although we only use this variable as a control (see details in the text).


	
	
 

 	 	

 
*+ 	 ,	
& -		 ,	

*							 	
						 	
)							 	
)		
					 	
		

,					 ,	
. )				 ,	
. )&				 ,	
%	
 /		 ,	
0	 ,	
/	+	 1(					 ,	
.				 ,	
,	%	
 
	%	
 	
)	
.	  23*		 /	
ﬁrm enters the sample; while duration is the number of years a ﬁrm is observed in the sample since its entry year.
2.1.2 Macroeconomic explanatory variables
Table 2.3 provides an overview of the macroeconomic explanatory variables which we employ in our regression anal-
ysis. Our macroeconomic explanatory variables cover the stock market, interest rates, GDP, credit supply, inﬂation,
industrial production, as well as demand of consumer goods. The table also gives the observable time-series which we
use to proxy for the macroeconomic explanatory variables along with the expected sign of each time-aerie’s eﬀect on
default probabilities. The macroeconomic time-series are primarily obtained from Ecowin, with additional data from
Statistics Denmark, OECD, and Stoxx.
The inclusion of lagged macroeconomic variables allows entering these variables as growth rates, diﬀerences, or
levels. We select the appropriate form by 1) computing the correlation between each form of the macroeconomic
variable and the observed default rate, and 2) visually inspecting the relationship of each form with the observed
default rate. Note, however, that some pairs of the macroeconomic variables exhibit collinearity—for example, the
Danish GDP growth and the European GDP growth rate, as well as the return on the OMX index and the Stoxx index,
have pair-wise correlations of 0,92 and 0,77, respectively. The high degree of collinearity should be kept in mind when
interpreting the estimated regression coeﬃcients in the following sections.
2.1.3 Estimation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc default intensities
We now present the methodology which we apply to estimate the eﬀects of our explanatory variables on ﬁrm-speciﬁc
default probabilities.
Suppose we have a sample of n levered ﬁrms observed over a time-horizon [0,T ], where ﬁrm i may default at a
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Table 2.2. Descriptive statistics for the ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables. The table shows descriptive statistics for the ﬁrm-speciﬁc
variables of the cleaned sample, winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. The total number of observations is 192,196 ﬁrm-
quaters. Age is time since the bank recorded the ﬁrst interaction with the client. Entry is the year where the ﬁrm entered the sample.
Duration is the number of years the ﬁrm remains in the sample. All other variable have standard interpretations.
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stochastic time τi. At each time t, the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial state is determined by a vector Xit of ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables,
with values speciﬁc to the ﬁrm, as well as a vector Zt of macroeconomic variables, with values common to all ﬁrms
in the sample. Default at time t occurs with intensity λit = λ(Xit,Zt), meaning that λit is the conditional mean arrival
rate of default for ﬁrm i, measured in events per time unit. Intuitively, this means that, given survival and the observed
covariate histories up to time t, ﬁrm i defaults in the short time-interval [t, t + dt) with probability λit dt.1 We assume
τi is doubly-stochastic driven by the combined history of the internal and external covariates (see for instance Duﬃe
et al., 2007).
In our analysis of which accounting ratios and macroeconomic variables that signiﬁcantly predict defaults below,
we specify the ﬁrm-speciﬁc default intensities using the “proportional hazards” regression model of Cox (1972). The
intensity of ﬁrm i at time t is thus modeled as
λ(Xit,Zt) = Yit exp
(
β
Xit + γ
Zt
)
,
where Yit is an at-risk-indicator for i, taking the value 1 if ﬁrm i has not defaulted “just before” time t and 0 otherwise,
while β and γ are vectors of regression coeﬃcients. The eﬀect of a one-unit increase in the jth internal covariate at
time t is to multiply the intensity by the “relative risk” e β j . The same interpretation applies to the external covariates.
We let the ﬁrst component of the vector Zt be a constant 1, so that the ﬁrst component of the vector γ is a baseline
intensity, corresponding to the (artiﬁcial) default intensity of ﬁrm i when all observable covariates are identically equal
1Precisely, a martingale is deﬁned by 1(τi≤t) −
∫ t
0
1(τi>s)λis ds with respect to the ﬁltration generated by the event (τi > t) and the
combined history of the internal and external covariates up to time t.
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Table 2.3. Macroeconomic explanatory variables and corresponding observable time-series. The left column shows our list
of macroeconomic explanatory variables, the center column shows the macroeconomic time-series which we use to measure each
macroeconomic explanatory variable, and the right column shows the expected eﬀect of each macroeconomic time-series on default
probabilities.
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to zero.2
Following, for instance, Andersen et. al (1993), and under the standard assumptions that late-entry, temporal
withdrawal, right-censoring, and covariate distributions are uninformative on regression coeﬃcients, the (partial) log-
likehood for estimation of the vectors β and γ based on a sample of n ﬁrms becomes
l(β,γ) =
n∑
i=1
∫ T
0
(
β
Xit + γ
Zt
)
dNit −
∫ T
0
n∑
i=1
Yit exp
(
β
Xit + γ
Zt
)
dt,
where Nit = 1(τi≤t) is the the one-jump default counting process for ﬁrm i. We investigate the assumption of independent
censoring and entry-pattern in Section 2.4, and ﬁnd that our parameter estimates are robust to the exclusion of ﬁrm-
years that could potentially induce bias.
Estimation, inference, and model selection for the Cox model may then be based on maximum likelihood tech-
niques. Given maximum likelihood estimators (MLEs) of β and γ, we can judge the inﬂuence of covariates on default
intensities by judging the signiﬁcance of the corresponding regression coeﬃcients, and we can predict ﬁrm-speciﬁc
and aggregate default intensities by plugging the MLEs back into intensity speciﬁcation of the Cox model. Model
check may be based on the so-called “martingale residual processes,”
Nit −
∫ t
0
Yis exp
(
β̂


Xis + γ̂

Zs
)
ds, i = 1, . . . , n, t ∈ [0,T ], (2.1)
which, when the model ﬁt is adequate and in large samples, are asymptotic mean-zero martingales. Hence, when
aggregated over covariate-quantiles or sectors, the grouped residuals processes should not exhibit any systematic
2Note that while the usual Cox model includes an (unspeciﬁed) time-varying baseline-intensity, thereby making it a semi-
parametric survival regression model, we cannot simultaneously identify the vector γ of macroeconomic regression coeﬃcients as
well as a time-varying baseline-intensity – we therefore restrict to a fully parametric model with a constant baseline intensity.
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trends when plotted as functions of time.
In addition to the Cox model, we will in our analysis of the cyclicality of default probabilities for small and
large ﬁrms in Section 2.3 also employ the additive regression model of Aalen (1980, 1989). This speciﬁes the default
intensity of ﬁrm i as a linear function of the covariates, allowing an easy comparison of regression coeﬃcients across
ﬁrm size-subsamples.
2.2 Default prediction for private ﬁrms
In this section, we provide and discuss the results of our empirical analysis of which accounting ratios and macroe-
conomic variables that signiﬁcantly predict defaults in our sample. First, we show the result from a model using only
ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables. We will see that this model cannot adequately predict the cyclical variation in the aggregate
default rate. We then add macroeconomic variables to the model and show that this addition allows the model to much
more accurately predict the aggregate default rate over time. However, when judging the diﬀerent models’ ability
to correctly rank ﬁrms with respect to default likelihood, we will see that macroeconomic variables only marginally
improve the ranking based on accounting ratios alone. In summary, to capture cyclicality of default rates, it is suﬃ-
cient to focus on macroeconomic variables—however, the accounting variables are necessary controls for variations
in ﬁrm-speciﬁc default risk not related to size.
2.2.1 Using accounting ratios alone
Initially, we ﬁt a model of ﬁrm-by-ﬁrm default intensities using only ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables. We will use this model to
examine to what extent macroeconomic variables add additional explanatory power to default prediction of non-listed
ﬁrms.
Estimation results for the intensity models using only ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables are provided in Table 2.4. Due to the
high degree of correlation among the measurements within the same categories, we perform a stepwise elimination of
variables in a given category, removing the least signiﬁcant variables in each step. The outcome is that interest bearing
debt to total assets, net income to total assets, quick ratio, and tangible assets (PPE) to total assets remain in the model,
along with age of banking relationship, log of total assets, and a negative equity dummy.
Interpreting the preferred model (Model 5 in Table 2.4) the eﬀect of age is negative, implying that the longer a
ﬁrm has had a relationship with the bank, the less likely it is that the ﬁrm will default. The eﬀect of size, as measured
by book assets, appears insigniﬁcant in the speciﬁcation. This might potentially be explained by the sample pertaining
to only the largest corporate clients, where size is less relevant as an explanation of default. The leverage ratio of
interest bearing debt to total assets is, as expected, positively related to default probability. Likewise, past proﬁtability
is negatively related to default probability. The quick ratio enters with a signiﬁcant negative sign conﬁrming the
hypothesis that the more liquidity a ﬁrm has, the higher its ability to service unexpected cash shortfalls which would
otherwise have resulted in a default. Tangible assets, or Plant Property and Equipments (PPE), to total assets does
not appear to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect, conﬁrming the ﬁndings of Bonﬁm (2009) that tangible assets to total assets
remain insigniﬁcant in explaining corporate defaults. The negative equity dummy enters with a positive sign in all
speciﬁcations, conﬁrming that a ﬁrm with negative equity is in fact a sign of a ﬁrm in trouble and at increased risk
of default. The sign of the sectoral dummies are all positive and signiﬁcant, conﬁrming that these sectors have above
average default rates.
Using the results of Table 2.4, we calculate a predicted quarterly default intensity for each ﬁrm in the sample, and
then aggregate these to get a predicted aggregate intensity for each quarter. Figure 2.3 shows the observed number of
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Table 2.4. Estimation results for Cox models including only accounting ratios. The table shows parameter estimates, standard
errors, and model summary statistics for Cox models of the quarterly default intensity of ﬁrms in the sample. All variables are lagged
one year to allow for one-year prediction. The full list of ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables are included in model (1). Models (2) through (4)
show the stepwise elimination, keeping only the most signiﬁcant measure within the groups of (1) leverage, (2) proﬁtability, (3)
liquidity, and (4) collateralization. Model (5) (shaded grey) is the preferred speciﬁcation when only ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables are used
as covariates. Signiﬁcance of parameters is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. Parameter signiﬁcance is based
on standard errors clustered at the ﬁrm-level.
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quarterly defaults in the sample along with the predicted number of defaults based on the preferred Cox model only
including accounting ratios. As evident in panel (a), the model based on accounting ratios alone is unable to explain the
cyclical nature of the observed defaults. However, acknowledging that the ﬁrm-speciﬁc data can only change yearly
through annual ﬁnancial statements, it may be more appropriate to aggregate the predicted and observed number of
defaults on a yearly basis. This is shown in panel (b), and the conclusion is the same: The model based solely on
ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables is not capable of capturing the cyclical variation in defaults.
2.2.2 Including macroeconomic variables
Given that ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables are unable to explain the cyclical nature of defaults in our sample, this section
attempts to incorporate macroeconomic eﬀects. In order to assess if macroeconomic variables add explanatory power
beyond what is implied by the ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables, the preferred model of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables is used as the
basis of the covariate speciﬁcation.
70
%9%
%
&%
%
-%
'%
>%
 










!



())	%	
	
)
	
%
%
%
'%
8%
9%%
9%
9%
9'%
98%
%%
 










"

 ())	

	
)
	
Figure 2.3. Default prediction based on the preferred Cox model only including accounting ratios. Panel (a) shows the
observed number of quarterly defaults in the sample along with the predicted number of defaults based on the preferred Cox model
only including accounting ratios (Model (5) in Table 2.4). Panel (b) is similar, except that the aggregation is done on a yearly basis.
Table 2.5 presents estimation results for the models incorporating macroeconomic variables. The selection pro-
cedure has been to perform a stepwise elimination of insigniﬁcant variables until only signiﬁcant macroeconomic
variables remain in the model. Model (7) is the preferred model including both ﬁrm-speciﬁc and microeconomic
variables, while Model (8) is this preferred model excluding the ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables.
The eﬀects of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables remain robust to the inclusion of the macroeconomic variables. In the
preferred model (Model (7) of Table 2.5), the signiﬁcant macroeconomic variables are as follows: The return of the
OMX stock market index, the volatility of OMX index, the diﬀerence between CIBOR and the policy rate, slope of
the yield curve, change in consumer conﬁdence, change in the capacity utilization, the return of the Stoxx 50 index,
and, ﬁnally, the European GDP growth rate. On the other hand, the aggregate number of defaults, the Danish real GDP
growth, exports as a fraction of GDP, inﬂation, changes in the cyclical indicator for construction, as well as the loan
growth to non-ﬁnancials are all insigniﬁcant in predicting default events.
When interpreting the coeﬃcients of the macroeconomic variables in multivariate intensity regression models,
one should bear in mind that it would be unrealistic to obtain a complete ceteris paribus eﬀect of one macroeconomic
variable, as this variable cannot be viewed in isolation from other macroeconomic variables. While not done here, an
appropriate interpretation would involve testing the model from the perspective of internally consistent scenarios of
macroeconomic variables. For instance, a further analysis shows that the volatility of the stock market, the slope of
the yield curve, the return of the Stoxx 50 index, and the European GDP growth rate appear with an opposite sign in
the preferred model compared to a model where they enter separately.
Nonetheless, a positive return of the OMX stock market would, controlling for other macroeconomic eﬀects,
imply a lower number of default occurrences one year after. An increased spread between CIBOR and the policy rate
would be associated with an increased number of default occurrences, thereby supporting the notion that the higher
funding costs of the banks would generally be passed through to clients. Both growth in house prices and changes
in the consumer conﬁdence index tend to be negatively linked to defaults, illustrating the importance of demand side
eﬀects. Capacity utilization is also negatively associated with default occurrences, meriting the interpretation that
higher level of idle capacity could result in price competition that would ultimately lead a number of ﬁrms to default.
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Table 2.5. Estimation results for Cox models with both accounting- and macroeconomic variables. The table shows parameter
estimates, standard errors, and model summary statistics for Cox models of the quarterly default intensity of ﬁrms in the sample.
All variables are lagged one year to allow for one-year prediction. The full list of ﬁrm-speciﬁc and macroeconomic variables are
included in model (6), and model (7) is the preferred speciﬁcation after stepwise elimination of variables. Model (8) is the preferred
speciﬁcation in Model (7) excluding the ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables. Signiﬁcance of parameters is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**),
and 1% (***) levels. Parameter signiﬁcance is based on standard errors clustered at the ﬁrm-level.
 


      
  !  !  ! 
# /$%,%$ &&& /',($ &&& /),*(+ &&&
, /(,($$ &&& /(,($$ &&&  

 (,(()  (,(()   
# $,*%* &&& $,*%$ &&&  
- /$,')) &&& /$,')) &&&  
./ /(,*(( && /(,*(( &&  
0 (,*'* & (,*'$ &  
1	
2	 (,3* &&& (,3$ &&&  
42	
1 (,((     
1/51" /(,(*)     
0651 3,+%% &    
#
, /(,$*     
789 /(,(* &&& /(,( &&& /(,(%' &&&
789	 /(,$$3 &&& /(,$($ &&& /(,(33 &&&
1

 #:7//	, $,'%) &&& *,((+ &&& *,$$) &&&
,$(	/%, (,3'+ &&& (,'' &&& (,+% &&&
5" /(,$$ &&& /(,$( &&& /(,$$ &&&
 
# /(,$$( &&& /(,(33 &&& /(,$$( &&&
 	, (,((*     
 	! /(,%%' &&& /(,%(( &&& /(,*3* &&&
"/
 (,(*% &&    
;( (,(%$ &&& (,(% &&& (,(*3 &&&
0<*)/51" (,*( &&& (,**) &&& (,*$% &&&
-
 $3*$3+  $3*$3+  $3*$3+ 
-

 $(+)$  $(+)$  $(+)$ 
-
 +%%  +%%  +%% 
;

 ,0;  ,0;  ,0; 
.#  )$%  )$%,+  '*+,( 
.#  )$'  )(',+  '*+,) 
72
 






















































































































































































































































































































































































%9%%&%%-%'%>%8%
	
(
)"




















#
	











	

%%
&/
%
%?

"









%9%%&%%-%'%>%8%
	
(
)"




















#
	











	

%%
&/
%
%8

"













	



"



	


"



	


%9%%&%%-%'%>%
	
(
)"




















#
	











	

%%
&/
%
99

"









%9%%&%%-%'%>%8%
	
(
)"




















#
	











	

%%
&/
%
9%

"













	



Fi
gu
re
2.
4.
D
ef
au
lt
pr
ed
ic
tio
n
ba
se
d
on
th
e
pr
ef
er
re
d
C
ox
m
od
el
w
ith
bo
th
ac
co
un
tin
g
ra
tio
s
an
d
m
ac
ro
ec
on
om
ic
va
ri
ab
le
s.
A
ll
pa
ne
ls
sh
ow
th
e
ob
se
rv
ed
qu
ar
te
rl
y
nu
m
be
ro
fd
ef
au
lts
in
th
e
sa
m
pl
e
al
on
g
w
ith
a
pr
ed
ic
te
d
nu
m
be
ro
fd
ef
au
lts
ba
se
d
on
th
e
pr
ef
er
re
d
C
ox
m
od
el
w
ith
bo
th
ﬁr
m
-s
pe
ci
ﬁc
an
d
m
ac
ro
ec
on
om
ic
co
va
ri
at
es
(M
od
el
(7
)
in
Ta
bl
e
2.
5)
.
In
Pa
ne
l(
a)
,t
he
m
od
el
is
es
tim
at
ed
us
in
g
th
e
fu
ll
sa
m
pl
e
fr
om
20
03
to
20
11
.
In
Pa
ne
ls
(b
),
(c
),
an
d
(d
),
th
e
m
od
el
is
es
tim
at
ed
on
sh
or
te
r
su
bs
am
pl
es
,
al
lo
w
in
g
in
ea
ch
ca
se
ou
t-
of
-s
am
pl
e
pr
ed
ic
tio
n
on
th
e
re
m
ai
ni
ng
pa
rt
of
th
e
fu
ll
sa
m
pl
e.











     




	






	

	




	

		

	


	


	

Figure 2.5. Comparison of ﬁrm-ranking accuracy for diﬀerent covariate-speciﬁcations. The ﬁgure shows receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) curves for Cox models with diﬀerent covariate-speciﬁcations ﬁtted to the sample. Each curve illustrates the
model’s ability to correctly discriminate between defaults and non-defaults, and plots the percentage correctly classiﬁed defaults
(true positives) against the percentage incorrectly classiﬁed non-defaults (false positives) at all possible cut-oﬀ points of default
intensity. The area under each curve serves as a goodness-of-ﬁt measure, where a value of 1 means a model with perfect discrimi-
natory ability, while a value of 0.5 means a model that discriminates based on a random guess.
Figure 2.4 illustrates the relationship between the observed and predicted number of defaults taking into account
both the ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables and the macroeconomic variables in Model (7) of Table 2.5. Adding macroeconomic
variables as explanatory factors improves the model’s ability to predict the cyclical variation in quarterly default
occurrences. While there is a potential that the good ﬁt of the preferred model may be a result of the numerical
optimization techniques deployed for estimating the parameters, the out of sample prediction obtained from estimating
the same model on only part of the data puts comfort in the chosen model. Panel (b) and (c) of the ﬁgure estimates the
model on the sample excluding observations from 2010 and both 2010 and 2011 respectively. The obtained coeﬃcients
from the models estimated on the reduced samples are then used to estimate the aggregate intensities for all 36 quarters,
thereby generating out of sample predictions. Hence, Panel (b) of the ﬁgure shows one and Panel (c) shows two years
of out of sample prediction. The out of sample prediction based on the reduced sample estimation adequately captures
both the level and cyclical variation in default rates.
Panel (d) of Figure 2.4 shows prediction based on excluding the years 2009, 2010 and 2011 from the estimation.
For the out of sample prediction in Panel (d), large deviations occur in 2009 (which pertains to 2008 covariates
observations because of the one year lag). However, it should be emphasized that the latter model has been ﬁtted
to a period of economic expansion, and therefore it is of little surprise that the model cannot be used to predict
future defaults in a period of economic contraction. This ﬁnding also highlights the importance of estimating default
predicting occurrences on a full business cycle.
2.2.3 Ranking ﬁrms with respect to default likelihood
The out of sample estimation results presented in Figure 2.4 showed that the preferred model including both ﬁrm-
speciﬁc and macroeconomic variables adequately captures the level and cyclicality of defaults. However, given the
74
stochastic nature of a default event, it will never be possible to completely predict which ﬁrms will default in a
given quarter. Nonetheless, by specifying a particular cut-oﬀ point for the intensities, the model’s ability to correctly
discriminate between defaults and non-defaults can be evaluated in terms of how many outcomes that are correctly
predicted and how many outcomes that are incorrectly predicted. This, however, necessitates arbitrarily specifying the
cut-oﬀ point.
A more general approach is to plot the Receiver Operating Curve (ROC), as shown in Figure 2.5. The curve
illustrates the percentage of defaults that are correctly classiﬁed as defaults on the vertical axis against the percentage
of non-defaults that are mistakenly classiﬁed as defaults on the horizontal axis for all possible cutoﬀ points. The area
under the curve (AUC) is then used as measure of the model goodness of ﬁt where a value of 1.0 implies a model with
perfect discriminatory ability and a value of 0.5 is a completely random model.
In terms of discriminatory power, the addition of macroeconomic variables does not improve the model’s ability
to eﬀectively determine which ﬁrms eventually default beyond what is implied by the accounting ratios. From the
ROC curves, it can be seen that the model with both external and ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables is only marginally better in
correctly determining defaults compared to the model with just ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables. This is consistent with the
notion that it is the ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics that provide the ordinal ranking of ﬁrms, and therefore also ultimately
determine which ﬁrms that actually default. Including the macroeconomic factors only improves the model’s ability
to capture the cyclicality in the aggregate default rate, which is related to when defaults occurs.
2.3 The macroeconomy’s impact on small and large ﬁrms’ default risk
The results of the previous section show that our ﬁnal model speciﬁcation including both ﬁrm-speciﬁc and macroe-
conomic variables is able to both accurately rank ﬁrms and predict the aggregate default rate over time. We now use
this model to investigate whether there is empirical support in our data for the provisions in the Basel II Accord that
implicitly assume that the default probabilities of smaller ﬁrms are less impacted by the macroeconomy compared to
larger ﬁrms (The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006, Articles 273-74). The same provisions are carried
forward and extended in the Basel III Accord and the recently adopted CRD VI (The European Parliament and the
Council of the European Union, 2013, Articles 153.4 and 501.1). Speciﬁcally, Basel II and III allow banks to estimate
capital requirements for small and medium-sized corporations (SMEs) using a risk weight formula that includes a
lower asset correlation with macroeconomic risk-drivers compared to larger corporations. This allows banks to have
eﬀectively smaller capital reserve for this particular segment than would have been the case if they were treated as
standard large corporations.
Precisely, the Basel II and III Accords specify the correlation between obligor i’s assets and a common (macroe-
conomic) risk-driver as
ρi = 0.12 × 1 − e
−50×PDi
1 − e−50 + 0.24 ×
(
1 − 1 − e
−50×PDi
1 − e−50
)
− 0.04 ×
(
1 − S i − 5
45
)
,
where PDi is the one-year probability of default while S i = min{50,max{5, S ∗i }} where S ∗i is total revenue in millions
of Euros. The last term is the deduction in asset correlation speciﬁc to SMEs, and equals zero for ﬁrms with annual
revenue above 50 million euros. To gauge the economic signiﬁcance of the reduction, note that with an annual default
probability of 1%, an SME with an annual revenue of 25 million Euro achieves a deduction in asset correlation of
around 11.5% relative to an equally risky non-SME.
Before moving forward, let us underline that the speciﬁc asset correlation formula from the Basel II and III
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Figure 2.6. Aggregate quarterly default rate in each of the subsamples of small and large ﬁrms. This ﬁgure shows the
aggregate quarterly default rate in each of the subsamples of small and large ﬁrms. Based on the year a ﬁrm enters the sample, it is
classiﬁed as “large” if its ﬁrst-year asset level is above the median asset level that year. Similarly, a ﬁrm is classiﬁed as “small” if
its asset value at the time of entry is below the median asset level that year.
Accords is not in itself the focus of our analysis, as the capital reduction for SMEs can be achieved in other ways—for
instance through the use of capital multipliers, as in CRD IV.3 Instead, we focus on testing the implicit assumption that
the default probabilities of smaller ﬁrms are less cyclical compared to the default probabilities of larger ﬁrms—that is,
whether the capital reduction for SMEs can be merited by the fact that their default probabilities are less cyclical, and
therefore should have lower correlation with the common risk-driver compared to larger ﬁrms.
Our tests examine the extent to which the default intensities of small and large ﬁrms are impacted diﬀerently by
macroeconomic variables. First, we split the sample into two subsamples corresponding to “small” and “large” ﬁrms.
Based on the year a ﬁrm enters the sample, it is classiﬁed as “large” if its ﬁrst-year asset level is above the median
asset level that year. Similarly, a ﬁrm is classiﬁed as “small” if its asset value at the time of entry is below the median
asset level that year. This particular division is done so as to ensure approximately equal sample sizes with a suﬃcient
amount of default events in each category and to allow for the classiﬁcation of ﬁrms in a predicable manner. However,
we will later show (in the section on robustness and model checks) that our results are robust to a division into four
subsamples based on the quartiles of the asset value at the year of entry.
Figure 2.6 shows the aggregate quarterly default rate in each of the subsamples of small and large ﬁrms. The two
default rates are seen to exhibit a high degree of comovement throughout our entire sample period. In the beginning
of our sample period, the two default rates are seen to be virtually indistinguishable except for the spike in the default
of large ﬁrms around 2005. However, near the end of our sample period, the default rate of small ﬁrms tends to be
systematically higher than the default rate of large ﬁrms, indicating that small ﬁrms were hit the hardest by the ﬁnancial
crises of 2008-10.
3Comment (44) on p.6 of The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union’s (2013) report states the following:
“Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are one of the pillars of the European economy given their fundamental role in
creating economic growth and providing employment. [...] The limited amount of alternative sources of funding has made EU
SMEs even more sensitive to the impact of the banking crisis. It is therefore important to ﬁll the existing funding gap for SMEs and
ensure an appropriate ﬂow of bank credit to SMEs in the current context. Capital charges for exposures to SMEs should be reduced
through the application of a supporting factor equal to 0.7619 to allow credit institutions increase lending to SMEs.”
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2.3.1 Macro-sensitivity analysis based on the Cox model
Table 2.6 shows estimation results for the ﬁnal model speciﬁcation including both ﬁrm-speciﬁc and macroeconomic
variables ﬁtted to each of the two subsamples. With the exception of OMX stock market volatility, the magnitude of
all macroeconomic eﬀects are larger for large ﬁrms compared to small ﬁrms. The diﬀerence between the coeﬃcients
of macroeconomic factors for the two subsamples is signiﬁcant for the slope of the yield curve, growth in house prices,
and European GDP growth, and all are larger in magnitude in the subsample of large ﬁrms.4 Hence, if we suppose
there exists a large and a small ﬁrm whose only diﬀerence is their size (which is reasonable since all accounting ratios
in our models are relative to total assets), the apparent interpretation of these results might be that the small ﬁrm’s
default intensity is less exposed to macroeconomic ﬂuctuations.
On the other hand, the estimation results for the two subsamples also show substantial diﬀerences with regards
to the coeﬃcients of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables: Firm size appears with a signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcient for small
ﬁrms, but an insigniﬁcant (yet negative) coeﬃcient for large ﬁrms; neither quick ratio nor the ratio of tangible assets
to total assets have signiﬁcant eﬀects for small ﬁrms, whereas they have signiﬁcant eﬀects for large ﬁrms; and, ﬁnally,
negative equity has a signiﬁcant eﬀect for small ﬁrms, but not for large.
While the results for the macroeconomic variables may corroborate the lower asset correlation adopted in Basel
II for SMEs, the direct comparison of coeﬃcients in the two subsamples is arguably naı¨ve, because it ignores that a
covariate’s marginal eﬀect in a non-linear model, like Cox regression, actually depends on the values of all the other
covariates. This implies that comparing the coeﬃcients for the macroeconomic variables in the two subsamples is
potentially problematic, because such a comparison fails to take into account that the ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristic for
the small and large ﬁrms are generally diﬀerent and have diﬀerent eﬀects on default intensity.
4In an unreported analysis, we ﬁnd that the importance of the European GDP growth for the large ﬁrms is merited by the
tendency of large ﬁrms in the sample to engage more actively in exports.
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To elaborate, note that the marginal eﬀect in a Cox regression of a change in the jth macroeconomic variable on
the default intensity of ﬁrm i is given by
∂λ(Xit,Zt)
∂Zjt
= γ j Yit exp
(
β
Xit + γ
Zt
)
= γ j λ(Xit,Zt),
which depends on all the characteristics of ﬁrm i through Xit, as well as all other macroeconomic variables through
the dependence on Zt.
A somewhat crude way to facilitate comparison between subsamples in non-linear models, like Cox regression,
is to compute the marginal eﬀect of a covariate at “average levels” in each of the subsamples. This gives rise to the
partial eﬀect at the average (PEA) and the average partial eﬀect (APE)—see, for instance, Wooldridge (2009, p. 582-
83). In the setting of an intensity model, the PEA plugs a subsample’s average covariate values into the subsample’s
estimated intensity, while the APE takes the average across the estimated intensity values for each subsample. Due
to the non-linearity of the intensity, Jensen’s inequality implies that the two ways of averaging will generally produce
diﬀerent results.
In our analysis, the PEA is a measure of a covariate’s marginal eﬀect for the “average ﬁrm” and at “average
macroeconomic levels” in each of the two subsamples of small and large ﬁrms. We thus compute the PEA for the jth
macroeconomic variable in subsample k as
PEAk j = γk j exp
(
β̂kXk + γ̂


k Zk
)
︸︷︷︸
=sPEAk
,
where k ∈ {small, large}, Xk is the average ﬁrm-speciﬁc covariate vector for ﬁrms in subsample k, Zk is the average
macroeconomic covariate vector in subsample k, β̂k and γ̂k are the estimated regression coeﬃcients in subsample
k, while sPEAk is a subsample-speciﬁc scaling factor for each PEA. On the other hand, the APE is a measure of a
covariate’s marginal eﬀect at the “average intensity level” across ﬁrms and time in each of the two subsamples. The
APE for the jth macroeconomic variable in subsample k is thus computed as
APEk j = γk j
1
T
∫ T
0
1
|k(t)|
∑
i∈k(t)
exp
(
β̂


k Xit + γ̂


k Zt
)
dt
︸︷︷︸
=sAPEk
,
where k(t) denotes the ﬁrms belonging to subsample k ∈ {small, large} at time t, and sAPEk is again a subsample-speciﬁc
scaling factor for each APE.
The two right-most columns of Table 2.6 show the PEAs and APEs for each covariate in each of the two sub-
samples. Focusing on the eﬀects of the macroeconomic variables, the PEA seems to suggest that most macro eﬀects
are, on average, strongest in the sample of small ﬁrms. On the other hand, the APEs for the macroeconomic variables
suggest that it is entirely dependent on the macro variable at hand whether its average eﬀect is strongest for the smaller
or the larger ﬁrms.
In sum, while the naı¨ve comparison of regression coeﬃcients seems to indicate that there is merit to the assumption
that smaller ﬁrms are less cyclical than larger ﬁrms, the more reﬁned analysis based on the PEA and APE, which takes
the non-linearity of the Cox model into account, indicates that smaller ﬁrms may “on average” be as cyclical, or
perhaps even more cyclical, than larger ﬁrms. We are thus reluctant to draw any conclusions from a comparison of
the subsamples based on the Cox regression model. We, therefore, in the following section, perform an additional
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macro-sensitivity analysis based on a model that allows for an easier comparison of coeﬃcients across subsamples.
2.3.2 Macro-sensitivity analysis based on the additive Aalen model
A direct comparison of coeﬃcients in subsamples is possible using the additive intensity regression model. This model
was ﬁrst proposed by Aalen (1980, 1989) and has recently been applied in a default study of public US corporations
by Lando et al. (2013). The Aalen model speciﬁes the default intensity for ﬁrm i as
λ(Xit,Zt) = β(t)
Xit + γ
Zt,
where β(t) is a vector of unspeciﬁed regression functions, giving the linear eﬀects of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc covariates at
time t, while γ is a (constant) vector of regression coeﬃcients for the macroeconomic variables. In contrast to the
multiplicative eﬀects in the Cox model, covariate eﬀects in the additive model are easy to interpret and compare across
subsamples. We will therefore use the additive model to check the assumption that the default probabilities of smaller
ﬁrms are less sensitive to macroeconomic cyclicality. Note, however, that the Cox model still has the advantage that it
automatically produces nonnegative intensities and its constant regression coeﬃcients allow out of sample prediction.
The linearity of the additive model allows for estimation of both time-varying and constant parameters using or-
dinary least squares-methods. For the time-varying coeﬃcients, the focus is on the cumulative regression coeﬃcients,
Bj(t) =
∫ t
0 β0(s) ds, which are easy to estimate non-parametrically. Further, formal tests of the signiﬁcance and time-
variation of regression functions is possible through resampling schemes. We refer to Aalen et al. (2008), Martinussen
and Scheike (2006), and Lando et al. (2013) for a detailed presentation of estimation and inference procedures for the
additive model.
Initially, we ﬁt an additive model for our entire sample of ﬁrms, including the same covariate speciﬁcation as our
ﬁnal Cox model (Model (7) of Table 2.5), and with time-varying coeﬃcients for the ﬁrm-speciﬁc covariate. The hy-
pothesis of a time-constant eﬀect could not be rejected for all ﬁrm-speciﬁc covariates but the following four: The (log
of) total assets, interest bearing debt to total assets, quick ratio, and the construction sector indicator. The time-varying
eﬀects of these four ﬁrm-speciﬁc covariates are shown as cumulative regression coeﬃcients with 95% pointwise conﬁ-
dence bands in Figure 2.7. When interpreting these eﬀects, one should focus on the slope of the cumulative coeﬃcients,
which estimates the regression coeﬃcients themselves. We see, for instance, that interest bearing debt to total assets
has a negligible eﬀect up to around the year 2009, before the eﬀect becomes quite strong and associated with higher
default intensity for the rest of the sample period. All four covariate eﬀects have the expected signs in periods where
they have a non-negligible inﬂuence on default intensities.
The estimation results for the time-constant regression coeﬃcients from the additive model ﬁtted to the entire
sample are given in Table 2.7. We see that all coeﬃcients corresponding to ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables have the same sign
as in our ﬁnal Cox model (Model (7) of Table 2.5) and roughly the same signiﬁcance level. The macroeconomic
variables, however, appear to have lost much of their importance compared to the analysis based on the Cox models.
In the additive setting, only OMX stock market return, change in consumer conﬁdence indicator, and Stoxx50 stock
market return have signiﬁcant eﬀects. The latter is of the reversed sign compared to intuition, but is nonetheless
consistent with results for public-ﬁrms found by Duﬃe et al. (2007, 2009), Lando and Nielsen (2010), and Figlewski
et al. (2012), amongst others.5 The general lack of importance of macroeconomic eﬀects is a consequence of the
5Recent work by Giesecke, Lando, and Medhat (2013) shows that univariately signiﬁcant but multivariately insigniﬁcant or
even reversed eﬀects may be observed for macroeconomic variables if these have indirect eﬀects mediated through other covariates
included in the models. This is in particular the case for stock market returns.
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Figure 2.7. Cumulative regression coeﬃcients from Aalen analysis of full sample. The panels show (cumulative) estimation
results for the signiﬁcantly time-varying ﬁrm-speciﬁc covariates from an analysis based on the additive Aalen model including the
same covariate speciﬁcation as our ﬁnal Cox model (Model (7) of Table 2.5). All variables are lagged one year to allow for one-year
prediction. The dotted lines are asymptotic 95% pointwise conﬁdence bands.
signiﬁcantly time-varying eﬀects for four of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables: Allowing ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀects to be time-
varying implies that the eﬀects will to some extent vary with the macroeconomy, and this reduces the added explanatory
power of macroeconomic variables.
We now ﬁt the additive model including both the preferred ﬁrm-speciﬁc and macroeconomic variables to each
of the two subsamples containing small and large ﬁrms. Even though the macroeconomic variables did not have
much explanatory power in the additive model ﬁtted to the whole sample, an additive model, due to its linearity in
the regression coeﬃcients, still allows us to directly compare eﬀects for macroeconomic variables in each subsample.
One could perhaps imagine that some macroeconomic variables had signiﬁcant additive eﬀects in the subsample of
large ﬁrms, but not in the subsample of small ﬁrms—this would be evidence that macro-dependence diﬀers for small
and large ﬁrms, as is the working assumption in the Basel II/ III and CRD IV Accords.
Estimating the additive model in each of the two subsamples did not change the conclusions regarding which
ﬁrm-speciﬁc covariates have signiﬁcant time-varying eﬀects compared to the full sample. The estimation results for
the time-constant regression coeﬃcients in each of the two subsamples is shown in Table 2.8. We see no diﬀerence in
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Table 2.7. Constant regression coeﬃcients from Aalen analysis of full sample. The table shows the estimation results for the
time-constant regression coeﬃcients for the ﬁrm-speciﬁc and macroeconomic variables from an analysis based on the additive
Aalen model including the same covariate speciﬁcation as our ﬁnal Cox model (Model (7) of Table 2.5). All variables are lagged
one year to allow for one-year prediction. Signiﬁcance of parameters is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels.
Parameter signiﬁcance is based on robust standard errors.
Variables (all lagged 1 year) Coef Se
Intercept 0.0025 0.0407
Years active in the bank −2.05 × 10−5 *** 5.34 × 10−6
Net income to total assets −0.0140 *** 0.0017
PPE to total assets −0.0014 ** 0.0006
Dummy for negative equity 0.0078 *** 0.0012
Wholesale and retail trade, dummy 0.0005 0.0004
Manufacturing, dummy 0.0012 ** 0.0004
OMX stock market return −0.0036 ** 0.0016
OMX stock market volatility −0.0064 0.0080
Diﬀerence CIBOR - policy rate, pct. point 0.0059 0.0510
Yield curve slope 10y - 3m, pct. point 0.0110 0.0111
Growth in house prices −0.0006 0.0024
Change in consumer conﬁdence indicator −0.0105 ** 0.0047
Change in capacity utilization −0.0077 0.0085
Stoxx50 stock market return 0.0042 *** 0.0012
EU27 Real GDP growth 0.0050 0.0077
sign, and virtually no diﬀerence in signiﬁcance or magnitude for small ﬁrms compared to large ﬁrms. Hence, from the
analysis based on the additive model, we ﬁnd no evidence that the default intensities of small ﬁrms are less sensitive
to macroeconomic cyclicality.
2.4 Robustness and model check
In this section, we perform robustness checks and examine the model ﬁt of our preferred Cox model. First, we show
that the eﬀects of our variables within the subsamples of small and large ﬁrms remain largely unaltered when we use
alternative size-criteria to split the full sample. Second, we show that the eﬀects of our variables are robust to the
exclusion of certain sample periods. Third, we show that the eﬀects of our variables are robust to alternative choices
of lag lengths. Finally, we verify that our preferred Cox model gives an adequate ﬁt to the data by showing that the
model’s residual processes do not exhibit systematic trends when grouped according to sectors and size quarterlies.
2.4.1 Alternative criteria for deﬁning small and large ﬁrms
In our analysis of small and large ﬁrms in Table 2.6, the criterion deﬁning the two subsamples of small and large ﬁrms
was the median asset level of the year where a particular ﬁrm enters the sample. We now investigate alternative criteria
for deﬁning the subsamples of small and large ﬁrms and how they aﬀect the eﬀects of our variables within the two
subsamples.
Table 2.9 shows estimation results for Cox models within subsamples of small and large ﬁrms, where the subsam-
ples are using deﬁned diﬀerent, time-varying size-criteria. All the models use the covariate list corresponding to our
preferred Cox model including both ﬁrm-speciﬁc and macroeconomic variables, i.e.Model (7) in Table 2.5.
Models (A-1) and (A-2) show the estimation results when the full sample is divided into subsamples of small and a
large ﬁrms according to the following criterion: A particular ﬁrm in a particular year is classiﬁed as small (large) if the
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Table 2.8. Constant regression coeﬃcients from Aalen analysis of small and large ﬁrms. The table shows the estimation
results for the time-constant regression coeﬃcients for the ﬁrm-speciﬁc and macroeconomic variables from an analysis based on
the additive Aalen model for the two subsamples of small and large ﬁrms. All variables are lagged one year to allow for one-year
prediction. Signiﬁcance of parameters is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. Parameter signiﬁcance is based
on robust standard errors.
Small ﬁrms Large ﬁrms
Variables (all lagged 1 year) Coef Se Coef Se
Intercept 0.0597 0.1883 0.0600 0.1918
Years active in the bank −1.83 × 10−5 * 1.14 × 10−5 −1.70 × 10−5 1.18 × 10−5
Net income to total assets −0.0160 *** 0.0025 −0.0168 *** 0.0025
PPE to total assets −0.0021 ** 0.0010 −0.0021 ** 0.0010
Dummy for negative equity 0.0082 *** 0.0016 0.0085 *** 0.0016
Wholesale and retail trade, dummy 0.0003 0.0006 0.0003 0.0006
Manufacturing, dummy 0.0011 0.0007 0.0011 0.0007
OMX stock market return -0.0084 0.0066 −0.0135 * 0.0069
OMX stock market volatility 0.0192 0.0324 0.0089 0.0317
Diﬀerence CIBOR - policy rate, pct. point −0.3409 0.2317 −0.3048 0.2416
Yield curve slope 10y - 3m, pct. point 0.0003 0.0524 0.0134 0.0560
Growth in house prices 0.0136 0.0105 0.0098 0.0115
Change in consumer conﬁdence indicator −0.0324 * 0.0191 −0.0283 * 0.0196
Change in capacity utilization −0.0625 0.0402 −0.0713 * 0.0404
Stoxx50 stock market return 0.0111 ** 0.0050 0.0146 ** 0.0054
EU27 Real GDP growth 0.0049 0.0351 0.0131 0.0370
ﬁrm’s book asset value is below (above) the 25th percentile of the full sample’s book asset values. This classiﬁcation is
time-varying in the sense that the same ﬁrm can be classiﬁed as small in some years but large in other years. Similarly,
models (A-3) and (A-4) show the estimation results when a particular ﬁrm in a particular year is classiﬁed as small
(large) if the ﬁrm’s book asset value is below (above) the 50th percentile of the full sample’s book asset values. Lastly,
models models (A-5) and (A-6) show the estimation results when a particular ﬁrm in a particular year is classiﬁed as
small (large) if the ﬁrm’s book asset value is below (above) the 75th percentile of the full sample’s book asset values.
A comparison of the estimation results within the three subsamples of small ﬁrms—i.e. models (A-1), (A-3),
and (A-5)—shows that the signs, magnitudes, and signiﬁcance levels of the eﬀects of both the ﬁrm-speciﬁc and the
macroeconomic variables remain largely unaltered as the size-criterion deﬁning the subsample of small ﬁrms increases.
The only notable changes for the ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables are for the size variable itself, which looses magnitude and
signiﬁcance as the size-criterion deﬁning a small ﬁrm increases, and for the manufacturing sector dummy, which gains
magnitude and signiﬁcance. The only notable changes for the macroeconomic variables are for the slope of the yield
curve and the change in capacity utilization, which gain magnitude and signiﬁcance as the size-criterion deﬁning a
small ﬁrm increases. Furthermore, a comparison of models (A-1), (A-3), and (A-5) with the model for small ﬁrms in
our main analysis in Table 2.6 shows that using a time-varying classiﬁcation of small ﬁrms entails no material changes
to the signs, magnitudes, or signiﬁcance levels of the eﬀects of our variables within the subsamples of small ﬁrms.
Similarly, a comparison of the estimation results within Table 2.9’s three subsamples of large ﬁrms—i.e. models
(A-2), (A-4), and (A-6)—shows that the signs, magnitudes, and signiﬁcance levels of the eﬀects of both the ﬁrm-
speciﬁc and the macroeconomic variables remain largely unaltered as the size-criterion deﬁning the subsample of
small ﬁrms increases. Finally, a comparison of models (A-2), (A-4), and (A-6) with the model for large ﬁrms in our
main analysis in Table 2.6 shows that using a time-varying classiﬁcation of large ﬁrms entails no material changes to
the signs, magnitudes, or signiﬁcance levels of the eﬀects of our variables within the subsamples of large ﬁrms.
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Figure 2.8. Model check based on grouped martingale residual processes. The ﬁgure shows cumulative martingale residual
processes for the preferred Cox model including both ﬁrm-speciﬁc and macroeconomic variables (Model (7) in Table 2.5). In the
left panel, grouping corresponds to each ﬁrm’s sector, which is stationary across the sample period, while in the right panel, the
grouping is time-varying and done According to asset quartiles.
2.4.2 Independent censoring and entry-pattern
Given that data is only available from 2003 onwards, the existing stock of ﬁrms entering the sample in 2003 may
potentially be of better average quality than the ﬁrms entering at a later point in time. This bias would violate the
assumption of independent censoring. To address this issue, estimation was done on a reduced sample that excludes
ﬁrms entering the sample in 2003 (where a considerable part of these entries ties to the existing stock of the bank
clients). The results (not presented here, but available upon request) are that all estimated coeﬃcients remain sig-
niﬁcant and of the same sign as the ﬁnal model (Model (7) in Table 2.5). To address the concern that the very low
number of entries in 2005 might have an impact on the results, the ﬁnal model speciﬁcation was re-estimated using
two samples: One that exclude entries from 2005, and another that excludes all entries up until 2006. The estimates
from these model ﬁts (not presented here, but available upon request) are still all signiﬁcant and of the same sign as
the model estimated on the full sample.
2.4.3 Lag length
We have throughout chosen to focus on a lag length of one year for the covariates employed in our intensity models.
One may, however, believe that for macroeconomic variables, this is not the appropriate lag, as aggregate changes may
take longer to impact ﬁrms, since these operate with a capital buﬀer that allow them to operate though an extended
period of time before a default is observed. To address this concern, we estimated the preferred model with all macroe-
conomic variables lagged eight quarters instead of four. The results (not presented here, but available upon request)
showed that the macroeconomic variables are generally less able to explain defaults when lagged eight quarters, as
indicated by the loss in signiﬁcance for most of the coeﬃcients.
Still, this analysis does not consider the possibility that diﬀerent macroeconomic variables are operating though
diﬀerent lag periods. Considering all possible combinations of lag periods would result in an extensive number of
permutations of the model for us to check. Instead, we construct a correlation matrix for the observed default rate
and each of the macroeconomic time series lagged from zero to eight quarters. It generally shows that, while the lag
length of four quarters does not provide the highest correlation with the default rate for all macroeconomic variables,
it appears that a uniﬁed lag period of four quarters is at least a very appropriate choice.
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2.4.4 Grouped martingale residual processes
We check the ﬁt of our ﬁnal model using the martingales residual processes (2.1). Speciﬁcally, we consider to what
extent the model is systematically over or under estimating the default frequency in diﬀerent sectors and size-groups.
By deﬁnition, the martingale residual processes are the diﬀerence between the observed default frequency and the
default frequency predicted by the model. Since a single ﬁrm can at most have one default event in our estimation
setup, the ﬁrm-speciﬁc processes contain too little information. However, when grouped in suﬃciently large clusters,
the increments of the grouped processes should not be systematically positive or negative if the model ﬁt is adequate.
An increasing grouped residual process would imply that the model is under-predicting the number of defaults this
particular group, whereas a decreasing grouped residual process would imply that the model is predicting too many
defaults for this group.
The left panel of Figure 2.8 shows grouped residual processes by sector as a function of time. We see that the
residual processes ﬂuctuate around zero with both positive and negative increments for all sectors. This is support for
the model performing equally well for all sectors. However, noting that the sectors “wholesale and retail trade” and
“transportation” have the largest deviances, we re-estimated our ﬁnal model excluding ﬁrms in these two sectors – the
results (not presented here, but available upon request) do not change.
The right panel of the ﬁgure shows grouped residual processes by asset quartiles as a function of time. We again
observe no truly systematic deviations. We note, however, that the largest quarterly deviances occur in the largest and
smallest quartiles, further motivating the point that default prediction models should take ﬁrm size into account.
2.5 Concluding remarks
The Basel II and III Accords award preferential treatment to bank loans to SMEs on the basis that the default proba-
bilities of smaller ﬁrms as less sensitive to macroeconomic cyclicality compared to the default probabilities of larger
ﬁrms. This eﬀectively and signiﬁcantly lowers capital charges for lending to the SME-segment.
This paper investigates whether there is empirical support for the assumption that the default probabilities of
smaller ﬁrms are less sensitive to macroeconomic cyclicality. Using a default intensity regression framework, our
results indicate that solely discriminating with respect to ﬁrm-size, the default probabilities of small ﬁrms do in fact
exhibit less sensitivity to macroeconomic cyclicality compared to the default probabilities of large ﬁrms, in the sense
that the eﬀects of macroeconomic variables are of smaller magnitude for smaller ﬁrms. However, when we account for
diﬀerences in ﬁrm-characteristics other than size, our results indicate that the default probability of the average small
ﬁrm is as cyclical or even more cyclical than the default probability of the average large ﬁrm. The results are robust to
diﬀerent regression models and diﬀerent divisions of our sample into small and large ﬁrms.
Our ﬁndings suggest that preferential treatment of capital charges solely based on ﬁrm-size is too simplistic and
may in fact entail adverse eﬀects on the stability of European banks with a high exposure to the SME-segment.
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Chapter 3
Liquidity Risk and Distressed Equity
Job Market Paper for the 2015 Academic Job Market.
Introduction
“Cash is a bad investment over time. But you always want to have enough so that nobody else can
determine your future, essentially.” —Warren Buﬀet (CNBC, November 12, 2009)
Intuition suggests that rational investors should require higher returns for holding the equity of ﬁrms with higher
distress risk (Chan and Chen, 1991; Fama and French, 1995, 1996). Yet, empirically, higher probability of default
robustly and persistently predicts lower future returns (Dichev, 1998; Griﬀen and Lemmon, 2002; Campbell et al.,
2008). Recently, capital structure theory has been invoked to rationalize the low returns to distressed equity. Garlappi
and Yan (2011) argue that potential shareholder recovery upon resolution of distress increases the value of the default
option and lowers expected returns near the default boundary. Opp (2013) argues that faster learning about ﬁrm
solvency in aggregate downturns has the same eﬀect, while McQuade (2013) argues that distressed equity hedges
against persistent volatility risk and therefore commands lower expected returns.
In this paper, I argue that ﬁrms’ cash holdings can help rationalize the low returns to distressed equity. In contrast to
extant models of distressed equity, my model features levered ﬁrms with ﬁnancing constraints that can default because
of illiquidity or insolvency and seek to choose their cash holdings optimally. I show that an equity-maximizing ﬁrm
will hold a level of cash that allows it to avoid illiquidity. When such a ﬁrm is in high risk of insolvency, it has a large
fraction of its assets in cash and therefore a low conditional beta, which helps rationalize its low expected returns.
Using data on solvency, liquidity, and equity returns for rated US ﬁrms over the period 1970-2013, I ﬁnd empirical
evidence consistent with the model’s predictions.
The model setup is similar to Gryglewicz (2011) and Davydenko (2013). I consider a levered ﬁrm whose assets
consist of productive assets-in-place and unproductive liquid assets; namely, cash holdings. The productive assets-in-
place generate uncertain earnings. Earnings can be either positive (a proﬁt) or negative (a loss). The ﬁrm’s liabilities
consist of common equity and coupon-bearing debt. The coupon level is predetermined and stays ﬁxed during the
ﬁrm’s lifetime. Because of capital market frictions, the ﬁrm has no access to additional external ﬁnancing and can, in
particular, not issue additional equity to cover coupon payments. Positive net earnings can be distributed as dividends
or retained as cash holdings. Cash holdings can be used to cover coupon payments and dividend payouts in case
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of negative or insuﬃcient earnings.1 If the ﬁrm has has no means to cover a coupon payment, it becomes illiquid
(i.e. ﬁnancially distressed) and defaults. If the value of the ﬁrm’s equity reaches zero, the ﬁrm becomes insolvent (i.e.
economically distressed) and, acting in the interest of equity holders, defaults voluntarily. The ﬁrm chooses its policies
for holding cash, paying dividends, and triggering insolvency so as to maximize equity value.
The model solution consists of the ﬁrm’s optimal policies for holding cash, paying dividends, and triggering
insolvency. At the center of the model solution is a target cash level that allows the ﬁrm to avoid illiquidity (Proposition
1). The target cash level increases with the ﬁrm’s earnings because higher earnings mean a more solvent ﬁrm with a
higher continuation value, and such a ﬁrm is willing to cover higher earnings-shortfalls with cash holdings. I show
that before default, it is optimal (i.e. equity maximizing) for the ﬁrm to retain all positive earnings if cash is below
the target level, and, once cash has reached the target level, to pay dividends that maintain cash at the target level
(Proposition 2). For a ﬁrm with cash at the target level, I solve for the optimal insolvency trigger and show that such a
ﬁrm reaches insolvency with a large fraction of its assets in cash (Proposition 3). Consistent with the model solution,
I ﬁnd for my sample of rated US ﬁrms that solvency and (balance sheet) liquidity are positively correlated, but that the
average ﬁrm in all solvency levels holds enough liquid assets to cover short-term liabilities. Furthermore, I ﬁnd that
less solvent have a higher fraction of their total assets in liquid assets.
The model implies a conditional CAPM (capital asset pricing model) in which conditional equity beta depends
on the ﬁrm’s asset composition. For a ﬁrm with cash at the target level, I show that equity beta is higher than asset
beta when the ﬁrm is suﬃciently solvent, but, conversely, that equity beta is lower than asset beta when the ﬁrm
is suﬃciently close to insolvency (Part 1 of Proposition 4). Hence, the model implies a generally positive relation
between equity beta and solvency. The reason is that when the ﬁrm is suﬃciently solvent, its asset value is largely
comprised of the value of the productive assets-in-place. Because equity is a levered claim on the ﬁrm’s assets, the
equity of a suﬃciently solvent ﬁrm will be riskier than the productive assets-in-place, implying that equity beta is
higher than asset beta. Conversely, when the ﬁrm is suﬃciently close to insolvency, its asset value is to a larger degree
comprised of the value of cash. This implies that the equity of a ﬁrm that is suﬃciently close to insolvency, despite
being levered, is less risky than the productive assets-in-place, and therefore that equity beta is less than asset beta.
The model thus provides a novel theoretical rationale for the low returns to distressed equity: Because it is optimal
for the ﬁrm to hold a level of cash that allows it to avoid illiquidity, the ﬁrm will have a large fraction of assets in
cash when it is close to insolvency, which leads to a low equity beta and therefore low expected returns. In addition,
the model complements the insights of Garlappi and Yan (2011), Opp (2013), and McQuade (2013) by separating the
liquidity and solvency components of distress.
The model also has implications for the slope of the relation between equity beta and solvency, i.e. how changes in
solvency are related to changes in equity beta. For a ﬁrm with cash at the target level, I show that the slope is negative
when the ﬁrm is suﬃciently solvent, but that the slope is positive when the ﬁrm is suﬃciently close to insolvency (Part
2 of Proposition 4). Hence, the model implies that while the relation between equity beta and solvency is generally
positive, it is in fact non-monotonic and “hump-shaped.” To see this, note that an increase in solvency means lower
leverage, which decreases equity beta, but also a lower fraction of assets in cash, which increases equity beta. When the
ﬁrm is suﬃciently solvent, the eﬀect of lower leverage dominates, so that an increase in solvency leads to a decrease
in equity beta. However, when the ﬁrm is suﬃciently close to insolvency, the eﬀect of a lower fraction of assets in
cash dominates, so that an increase in solvency leads to an increase in equity beta.
1There is ample empirical evidence suggesting that the precautionary motive is the most important determinant of corporate
cash holdings and their secular growth since the 1980s—see, for instance, Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999), Bates,
Kahle, and Stultz (2009), Acharya et al. (2012), and references therein.
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I derive four asset pricing predictions from the model’s conditional CAPM. I ﬁrst consider the cross-sectional
relation between expected returns and probability of insolvency. For ﬁrms with cash at the target level, the model
predicts high expected returns for those with low probability of insolvency, but low expected returns for those with
high probability of insolvency. Furthermore, the model predicts that the slope of the relation between expected returns
and probability of insolvency is positive when the probability of insolvency is low, but negative when the probability of
insolvency is high (Corollary 4.1). Consistent with these predictions, I ﬁnd for my sample of rated US ﬁrm’s that more
solvent ﬁrms generally have higher average returns, but that the relation between average returns and solvency is hump-
shaped. These results hold using conditional (time-varying) ﬁrm-speciﬁc equity betas; cross-sectional regressions of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc returns on measures of solvency; and the realized returns and alphas of value-weighted portfolios formed
on measures of solvency.
Second, I consider the cross-sectional relation between expected returns and optimal liquidity, deﬁned here as
the optimal (target) cash level divided by the value of coupon liabilities. Note that optimal liquidity is bounded from
below by 1. The model predicts high expected returns for ﬁrms with high optimal liquidity, but low expected returns
for ﬁrms with low optimal liquidity (Corollary 4.2). The reason is that ﬁrms with high (low) optimal liquidity also have
a high (low) value for their productive assets-in-place, and therefore high (low) equity betas. Furthermore, the model
predicts that the slope of the relation between expected returns and optimal liquidity is positive when optimal liquidity
is high, but negative when optimal liquidity is low. To see this, note that an increase in optimal liquidity means, on the
one hand, a higher fraction of assets in cash, which decreases equity beta. On the other hand, an increase in optimal
liquidity is an endogenous response to an increase in the value of the productive assets, which will increase equity
beta. When optimal liquidity is suﬃciently high, the eﬀect of a larger fraction of assets in cash dominates, leading
to a decrease in equity beta, while when optimal liquidity is suﬃciently low, the eﬀects of a higher value for the
productive assets-in-place dominates, leading to a higher equity beta. Consistent with these predictions, I ﬁnd for my
sample that ﬁrms with higher liquidity generally have higher average returns, but that the relation between liquidity
and average returns is hump-shaped. These results hold using either conditional betas, cross-sectional regressions, or
value-weighted portfolios.
The above results can be exploited in long-short portfolio strategies that produce positive expected returns. To
this end, I derive predictions regarding the performance of two long-short portfolio strategies formed on liquidity and
solvency. First, I consider the expected returns on a higher-liquidity minus lower-liquidity (HLmLL) portfolio as a
function of the probability of insolvency. HLmLL is a portfolio strategy that goes long ﬁrms with higher optimal
liquidity and shorts ﬁrms with lower optimal liquidity. The model predicts that HLmLL has negative expected returns
for ﬁrms with a low probability of insolvency, but positive expected returns for ﬁrms with a high probability of
insolvency (Corollary 4.3). In particular, the expected return on HLmLL is a generally increasing function of the
probability of insolvency. The reason is that within the set of ﬁrms with low (high) probability of insolvency, the ones
with higher (lower) liquidity are the ones with the lower (higher) expected returns. I test this prediction using HLmLL
portfolios constructed using conditional sorts—ﬁrst on solvency and then on liquidity. Consistent with the model’s
prediction, I ﬁnd that the realized returns and alphas of HLmLL are highest among ﬁrms with low solvency.
Finally, I consider the expected returns on a higher-solvency minus lower-solvency (HSmLS) portfolio as a func-
tion of optimal liquidity. HSmLS is a portfolio strategy that goes long ﬁrms with higher solvency and shorts ﬁrms with
lower solvency. The model predicts that HSmLS has negative expected returns for ﬁrms with high optimal liquidity,
but positive expected returns for ﬁrms with low optimal liquidity (Corollary 4.4). In particular, the expected return on
HSmLS is a generally decreasing function of optimal liquidity. The reason is that within the set of ﬁrms with high
(low) optimal liquidity, the ones with higher (lower) solvency are the ones with the lower (higher) expected returns.
I test this prediction using HSmLS portfolios constructed using conditional sorts—ﬁrst on liquidity and then on sol-
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vency. Consistent with the model’s prediction, I ﬁnd that the realized returns and alphas of HSmLS are highest among
ﬁrms with low liquidity.
My results shed new light on the distress puzzle, and, more generally, on the relation between ﬁrms’ cash holdings
and expected equity returns. The theoretical results suggest that separating the solvency and liquidity components of
distress risk is central in understanding the returns that investors require for holding distressed equities. The empirical
results conﬁrm that ﬁrms’ optimal cash holdings are closely related to their solvency and, consequently, to their
realized equity returns.
Related literature
Chan and Chen (1991) were among the ﬁrst to suggest that asset pricing anomalies (relative to the CAPM) like the
size premium are due to investors requiring higher returns as compensation for holding the equities of ﬁrms with a
higher risk of default or ‘distress’. Similarly, Fama and French (1995, 1996) suggest that the value premium is due to
the fact that ﬁrms with a high risk of distress also have high book-to-market equity.
Dichev (1998) was among the ﬁrst to refute the idea that the size and value premia are compensation for distress
risk by showing that higher default probability predicts lower, not higher, average future returns. This ﬁnding is
now commonly known as the ‘distress puzzle’. In a related study, Griﬀen and Lemmon (2002) show that ﬁrms with
a high risk of failure and low book-to-market equity have particularly low average future equity returns. Vassalou
and Xing (2004) ﬁnd some evidence that lower Merton’s distance-to-default predicts higher average future equity
returns, but their results are entirely driven by small and high book-to-market ﬁrms. Campbell et al. (2008) estimate a
dynamic logistic regression model to predict defaults and use it to conﬁrm and reinforce previous evidence that higher
probability of default persistently and robustly predicts lower average future returns. Avramov et al. (2009) ﬁnd similar
results using credit ratings.
Garlappi et al. (2008) show that the empirical relation between average returns and probability of default is not
monotonically decreasing but rather hump-shaped, and they rationalize this using simulations from a model in which
shareholders can use their bargaining power to recover part of the ﬁrm’s value upon resolution of distress. Extending
these results, Garlappi and Yan (2011) show theoretically that shareholder recovery implies a hump-shaped relation
between conditional betas and probability of default, and they ﬁnd empirical support using estimated time-varying be-
tas. The models of Opp (2013) and McQuade (2013) provide further theoretical rationals for the hump-shaped relation
in models featuring shareholder learning and persistent volatility risk. I complement these theories by separating the
liquidity and solvency components of distress, and I show that in a model where ﬁrms endogenously eliminate their
liquidity risk, there is a hump-shaped relation between expected returns and probability of insolvency. Furthermore, I
provide empirical evidence in support of these and other model predictions.
My model builds on the classical time-homogenous capital structure framework of e.g. Leland (1994) and Gold-
stein, Ju, and Leland (2001), but augments this framework with a liquidity risk component similar to Gryglewicz
(2011). The latter paper extends the the classical pure-liquidity models of Jeanblanc-Picque´ and Shiryaev (1995) and
Radner and Shepp (1996) and studies the optimal capital structure of a ﬁrm facing liquidity and solvency concerns.
Davydenko (2013) uses a related framework to study whether corporate defaults are driven by insolvency or illiquid-
ity. My model deviates from Gryglewicz (2011) by specifying the ﬁrm’s cumulated earnings as a geometric Brownian
motion instead of an arithmetic Brownian motion with a randomized drift. This simpliﬁes the model’s information
structure, which in turn simpliﬁes the analysis of expected equity returns, while still maintaining an optimal insolvency
decision for equity holders. Furthermore, speciﬁcation implies that the value of the ﬁrm’s productive assets-in-place
(the expected discounted value of future earnings) is again a geometric Brownian motion, which makes my model
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consistent with the classical asset-value based models of e.g. Black and Scholes (1973), Merton (1974), Black and
Cox (1976), Leland (1994), Fan and Sundaresan (2000), Goldstein et al. (2001), Duﬃe and Lando (2001), etc.
Lastly, this paper is also related to the growing literature on the determinants and implications of corporate cash
holdings. Relevant empirical studies include Opler et al. (1999), Bates et al. (2009), Acharya et al. (2012), and
Davydenko (2013), while relevant theoretical studies include De´camps, Mariotti, Rochet, and Villenueve (2011), and
Bolton, Chen, and Wang (2011); Bolton et al. (2013).
3.1 Model
This section develops an equity valuation model for a levered ﬁrm with ﬁnancing constraints. The setup is related to
Gryglewicz (2011) and Davydenko (2013): The ﬁrm can default because of illiquidity or insolvency and chooses its
policies for holding cash, paying dividends, and triggering insolvency by maximizing equity value. In Section 3.2,
derive the optimal policies for holding cash and paying dividends, and then, for a ﬁrm following these policies, I derive
the optimal insolvency trigger and the expected equity return.
The ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrm
I consider a levered ﬁrm in a continuous-time economy with inﬁnite time-horizon, [0,∞). The ﬁrm’s assets consist of
productive assets-in-place that generate uncertain earnings (revenue net of expenses) and unproductive liquid assets,
namely cash holdings, that earn interest. Earnings can be either positive (a proﬁt) or negative (a loss). The ﬁrm’s
liabilities consist of common equity stock and consol (inﬁnite maturity) bonds with total coupon rate k > 0 per time
unit. The total coupon rate is assumed to be predetermined and remain ﬁxed throughout the ﬁrm’s life-time. Because
taxes are not essential for the paper’s results, I abstract away from them. The economy’s instantaneous risk-free
interest rate, r > 0, is assumed to be a constant.
The model’s main state variable is the ﬁrm’s earnings. For my purpose of modeling cash holdings, it is convenient
to specify the stock rather than the ﬂow of earnings. Let therefore Xt be the ﬁrm’s cumulated earnings up to time
t. I assume that the process (Xt)t≥0, under a physical probability measure, P, is a geometric Brownian motion with
dynamics
dXt = μPXtdt + σXtdBPt . (3.1)
Here, (BPt )t≥0 is a standard P-Brownian motion driving the ﬁrm’s total (idiosyncratic and systematic) earnings risk. In-
stantaneous earnings (per dt) are thus given by the increment dXt, which can be either positive or negative, depending
on the realization of the total earnings shock, dBPt .
2 The drift parameter, μP, is the P-expected growth rate of earnings
while the diﬀusion parameter, σ, is the volatility rate of earnings.3
2Modeling instantaneous earnings as the increment (rather than the level) of a stochastic process is common in models of
liquidity management and related topics. See, for instance, Jeanblanc-Picque´ and Shiryaev (1995), Radner and Shepp (1996),
Demarzo and Sannikov (2006), De´camps et al. (2011), Gryglewicz (2011), Acharya et al. (2012), and Bolton et al. (2011, 2013).
3In contrast to Gryglewicz (2011), I specify instantanous earnings in (3.1) as the increments of a geometric Brownian motion
rather than the increments of an arithmetic Brownian motion with a drift that is randomized over a known two-point distribution.
This still implies a state-dependent value for the ﬁrm’s productive assets, which ensures the existence of an insolvency trigger (see
footnote 7), but simpliﬁes the model’s information structure and the analysis of expected equity returns. Moreover, I show below
that in my model, the value of the productive assets is again a geometric Brownian motion, which makes my model consistent with
the classical capital structure models (see footnote 8).
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After coupons, the ﬁrm’s instantaneous net earnings are given by dXt−kdt. Positive net earnings can be distributed
to equity holders as dividends or retained inside the ﬁrm to increase cash holdings. Cash holdings can be used to cover
coupons and dividends in case of negative or insuﬃcient earnings. If the ﬁrm cannot or chooses not to pay a coupon,
it defaults and is immediately liquidated. Bond holders have absolute priority in default and recover the market value
of the ﬁrm’s productive assets (derived below) at the time of default. Because bankruptcy or liquidation costs are not
essential for the paper’s results, I abstract away from them.
I assume that due to capital market frictions, the ﬁrm cannot raise additional external capital.4 Coupons must
therefore be ﬁnanced through internal liquidity, namely positive earnings or cash holdings. If the ﬁrm has insuﬃcient
liquidity to cover a coupon, it is illiquid and defaults. Such a default is driven by short-term or ﬁnancial distress. If
the ﬁrm’s equity value becomes negative, the ﬁrm is insolvent and acts in the interest of equity holders by defaulting
voluntarily. Such a default is driven by long-term or economic distress.
Without ﬁnancing constraints, illiquidity never occurs because the ﬁrm ﬁnances any earnings-shortfalls by issuing
additional equity. Such an issuance is typically modeled as a negative dividend, following Black and Cox (1976) and
Leland (1994). Since negative dividends are possible as long as equity value is positive, only insolvency occurs when
there are no ﬁnancing constraints. In contrast, when external ﬁnancing is unavailable, the ﬁrm has a precautionary
motive to retain some earnings as cash that serves as a cushion against liquidity risk.
I assume that the managers of the ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrm act in the best interest of equity holders. The
managers thus determine the policies for holding cash, paying dividends, and triggering insolvency so as to maximize
equity value. To simplify the analysis, I assume that the ﬁrm’s cash holdings can be distributed to equity holders at any
time before default. This assumption is, however, not essential for the paper’s qualitative results for two reasons. First,
bond covenants that limit distributions just before default are diﬃcult to enforce because equity holders would try to
preempt them. Second, if cash cannot be distributed just before default, equity holders would never trigger insolvency
while the ﬁrm still has positive cash holdings. However, once the ﬁrm has used up its cash to make coupons, the
optimal policy for triggering insolvency becomes identical to the one derived below.
Cash holdings, dividends, and default
Let Ct be the ﬁrm’s cash holdings at time t and let Dt be its cumulated dividends up to time t. Because the ﬁrm
cannot raise additional external capital, (Ct)t≥0 is a nonnegative process and (Dt)t≥0 is a non-decreasing process.5 For
simplicity, I assume that cash holdings earn the risk-free rate, r, per time unit (for instance through investment in
short-term marketable securities), and that equity holders opt for dividends whenever they weakly prefer so.6
At each time t before default, the ﬁrm’s managers choose how to distribute net earnings between cash holdings
and dividends. Therefore, the instantaneous dividend at time t, dDt, equals the diﬀerence between net earnings and
the change in cash holdings, (dXt − k dt) − dCt, added the interest earned on current cash holdings, rCt dt:
dDt = (dXt − k dt) − dCt + rCt dt. (3.2)
4The assumption of no additional external ﬁnancing can be justiﬁed by the debt-overhang problem of Myers (1977) or the
information asymmetry problems of Leland and Pyle (1977) and Myers and Majluf (1984). The assumption can be replaced by the
milder assumption of suﬃciently high issuance costs without aﬀecting the results qualitatively as long as (i) liquidation of the ﬁrm
is costly, and (ii) only a fraction of future earnings can be pledged as collateral. See Acharya et al. (2012) for a further discussion.
5Usually, negative negative cash holdings is interpreted as the ﬁrm drawing on a credit line, while a decrease in cumulated
dividends (i.e. a negative instantaneous dividend) is interpreted as a capital injection by equity holders. Since I assume that the ﬁrm
cannot raise additional external ﬁnancing, the ﬁrm has access to neither a credit line nor equity injections.
6Other interest rates on cash would alter the amount of cash held by the ﬁrm but not qualitatively alter the theoretical results.
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Illiquidity occurs when the ﬁrm runs out of cash, i.e. at the stopping time τC = inft>0{Ct ≤ 0}. Insolvency is
triggered when earnings hit a suﬃciently low level, i.e. at the stopping time τ = inft>0{Xt ≤ X(Ct)}, which is chosen
to maximize equity value.7 Here, X(C) ≥ 0 is an insolvency trigger, which in general depends on the level of cash
holdings. Nonetheless, I show below that the insolvency trigger is independent of the level of cash when the ﬁrm’s
cash holdings are suﬃciently high.
Pricing setup and managers’ optimization problem
The managers choose the optimal policies for holding cash, paying dividends, and triggering insolvency by maximiz-
ing the market value of equity. Market values are calculated through the following pricing setup.
I assume that the economy’s stochastic discount factor, (Λt)t≥0, has P-dynamics
dΛt = −rΛtdt − λΛtdZPt . (3.3)
Here, (ZPt )t≥0 is a standard P-Brownian motion that drives systematic earnings risk and has instantaneous correlation
ρ with the ﬁrm’s total earnings risk, (BPt )t≥0, as given in (3.1). The constant λ is then the market price of systematic
earnings risk. In the appendix, I detail how (3.3) deﬁnes a risk-neutral pricing measure, Q, under which the cumulated
earnings process, (Xt)t≥0, is a geometric Brownian motion with dynamics
dXt = μQXtdt + σXtdB
Q
t , (3.4)
where μQ = μP − ρσλ is the risk-neutral growth rate of earnings and where BQt = BPt + ρλt deﬁnes a standard Q-
Brownian motion. Under the parameter restriction μQ < r − 12σ2, the time-t market value of the ﬁrm’s productive
assets (i.e. the value of the unlevered ﬁrm) becomes
U(Xt) ≡ EQt
[∫ ∞
t
e−r(u−t)dXu
]
=
μQXt
r − μQ , (3.5)
which is again a geometric Brownian motion.8 This is a Gordon growth-type valuation, where expected earnings, μQX,
are discounted by the risk-neutral expected rate of return net of the growth rate of earnings, r − μQ. In the following,
I also impose the parameter restriction μQ > 12 r to ensure that U(X) > X. Otherwise, it would be optimal for equity
holders to immediately liquidate the ﬁrm (see the discussion of “asset shifting” due to too low expected earnings in
Acharya et al. (2012)).
Given this pricing setup, the market value of the ﬁrm’s equity is the Q-expected, discounted value of future
dividends until default plus a liquidation payout of any remaining cash. The liquidation payment of cash follows from
the assumption that cash can be distributed to equity holders at any time before default. Given an insolvency policy,
7The existence of an insolvency trigger follows from the assumption that (Xt)t≥0 is a geometric Brownian motion. If (Xt)t≥0
were an arithmetic Brownian motion with constant drift, say μ, no insolvency trigger exists, as the ﬁrm would either never be
insolvent or always be insolvent, depending on the sign of the diﬀerence μ − k.
8By Itoˆ’s Formula and (3.4), U(Xt) has Q-dynamics dU(Xt) = μQU(Xt)dt + σU(Xt)dB
Q
t . This makes the speciﬁcation of
cumulated earnings in (3.4) (and, equivalently, in (3.1)) consistent with the classical capital structure models assuming that the
value of the unlevered ﬁrm is a geometric Brownian motion—e.g. Black and Scholes (1973), Merton (1974), Black and Cox
(1976), Leland (1994), Fan and Sundaresan (2000), Goldstein et al. (2001), and Duﬃe and Lando (2001). The parameter restriction
μQ < r − 12σ2 ensures that U(Xt) is well-deﬁned and given by (3.5) through an application of the Itoˆ Isometry.
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τ, the time-t market value of the ﬁrm’s equity is thus deﬁned by
E(Xt,Ct, τ) ≡ sup
(Du)u≥t
E
Q
t
[∫ τ˜
t
e−r(u−t) dDu + e−r(τ˜−t)Cτ˜
]
, (3.6)
where τ˜ = τC ∧ τ is the ﬁrm’s default time due to either illiquidity or insolvency, whichever ﬁrst occurs. The
supremum in (3.6) is taken over all dividend processes, (Dt)t≥0, which are non-decreasing, satisfy the relation in (3.2),
and are adapted to the ﬁltration generated by the cumulated earnings-process in (3.4).
3.2 Theoretical results
In this section, I solve the model by ﬁrst deriving the optimal policies for holding cash and paying dividends. I then
solve for the optimal policy for triggering insolvency for a ﬁrm that follows the optimal cash-dividend policy. Finally,
I derive the expected equity return when the ﬁrm follows the optimal policies. The main goal is to show that an equity-
maximizing ﬁrm will hold the minimal level of cash that allows it to avoid illiquidity and, consequently, that such a
ﬁrm will have a low equity beta when it is close to insolvency. These theoretical results lead to the predictions that I
test in the paper’s empirical part.
3.2.1 Optimal policies
I ﬁrst solve for the ﬁrm’s optimal policy for holding cash and paying dividends. Then, for a ﬁrm following this policy,
I derive the market value of equity and use it to solve for the optimal insolvency trigger.
Target cash level
In the model, the ﬁrm uses cash to manage its liquidity risk. In general, higher cash holdings mean lower liquidity risk.
However, too high cash holdings are ineﬃcient from equity holders’ point-of-view. It is therefore of special interest to
derive, for a given level of earnings, the minimal level of cash that allows the ﬁrm to eliminate liquidity risk—that is,
for given level of earnings, the minimal level of cash that ensures that the ﬁrm avoid illiquidity and only defaults due to
insolvency. I call this the target cash level because I later show that an equity-maximizing ﬁrm will aim for this level
of cash. The following proposition gives an expression for the target cash level. The proof relies on the assumptions
that cash holdings and instantaneous dividends satisfy (3.2) and have to remain nonnegative before default. (All proofs
are in the appendix.)
Proposition 1 (The target cash level).
(i) For each level of cumulated earnings, X, there exists a minimal level of cash, C(X), such that the ﬁrm eliminates
liquidity risk (i.e. avoids illiquidity) if its cash is at or above C(X).
(ii) When cash, C, is at or above C(X), the insolvency trigger is independent of C: X(C) = X ≥ 0.
(iii) Given the insolvency trigger, X, the cash level C(X) is given by
C(X) = X +
[
k
r − X
]
. (3.7)
The cash level C(X) increases in X, decreases in X, and is bounded from below by the present value of future
coupons: C(X) ≥ kr for all X ≥ X.
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The target cash level C(X) has several intuitive properties. The quantity X − X ensures that dividends remain
nonnegative even if an earnings-shock brings X down to X. The quantity kr ensures that the interest on the target cash
level is always at least as large as a coupon payment.9 Further, the target cash level increases in X and decreases in X
because a more solvent ﬁrm (higher X or lower X) ﬁrm has a higher continuation value and is willing to cover higher
earnings-shortfalls with cash holdings.
Optimal policy for holding cash and paying dividends
Next, I show that the optimal policy for holding cash and paying dividends is to aim for the target cash level. More
formally, I ﬁrst conjecture a dividend process, (Dt )t≥0, which aims at maintaining cash at the target level, and then
show that this dividend process solves the equity maximization problem in (3.6).
Suppose that the ﬁrm is not in default and that it aims for the target cash level. Then, if cash is below the target
level, the ﬁrm retains all earnings and pays no dividends. If cash is at the target level, the ﬁrm pays out dividends
that maintain cash at the target level. Finally, if cash is above the target level, the ﬁrm distributes excess cash. This
suggests that before default, i.e.when t < τ˜, the dividend process (Dt )t≥0 is given by
dDt =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if Ct < C(Xt)[
rC(Xt) − k
]
dt if Ct = C(Xt)
Ct −C(Xt) if Ct > C(Xt).
(3.8)
In default, equity holders receive any remaining cash. For convenience, I model this as a liquidation payment rather
than a part of the dividend process. The form of dDt when Ct = C(Xt) and t < τ˜ follows by applying Itoˆ’s Formula to
the target cash level in (3.7) and using the identity in (3.2). This case may also be written as
dDt = r(Xt − X) dt if Ct = C(Xt) and t < τ˜. (3.9)
Given (Dt )t≥0, I further conjecture, through Itoˆ’s Formula, that the corresponding time-t equity value function,
W(Xt,Ct), satisﬁes the diﬀerential equations
rW(X,C) = A(X,C)W(X,C) if 0 < C < C(X) and X > X(C)
rW(X,C) = AXW(X,C) + r(X − X) if C ≥ C(X) and X > X
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭ , (3.10)
along with the conditions
W(X,C) = C if C ≥ 0 and X ≤ X(C)
WC(X,C) ≥ 1 if C > 0 and X > X(C)
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭ . (3.11)
9An inspection of the proof of Proposition 1 reveals that the expression in (3.7) is derived independently of the assumption that
the cumulated earnings process, (Xt)t≥0, is a geometric Brownian motion (see (3.1) or (3.4)). In fact, the expression in (3.7) holds
for a general (Xt)t≥0 that is consistent with the existence of an insolvency trigger. As argued in footnote 7, this is in particular the
case when (Xt)t≥0 is a geometric Brownian motion, but not if it were an arithmetic Brownian motion with constant drift.
Moreover, an instructive way to derive (3.7) without appealing to the speciﬁc dynamics of (Xt)t≥0 is as follows. First, if C(Xt) is
to eliminate liquidity risk, it is reasonable that the interest on C(Xt) can cover a coupon: rC(Xt) dt ≥ k dt. Given this, (3.2) implies
that dDt is nonnegative if and only if dC(Xt) ≤ dXt. Combined, these two conditions imply that
C(Xt) ≥ C(X) + [Xt − X] ≥ kr + [Xt − X] .
Choosing the minimal C(Xt) that satisﬁes the last inequality gives (3.7).
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In (3.10), A(X,C) is the inﬁnitesimal generator of the two-dimensional process (Xt,Ct)t≥0 with dynamics in (3.4) and
(3.2), while AX is the inﬁnitesimal generator of the process (Xt)t≥0 with dynamics in (3.4). The conditions in (3.11)
follow from the assumption that cash holdings can be paid out at any time before default. The ﬁrst states that in default
equity holders receive any remaining cash. The second states that an extra dollar in cash is at least worth its face value
to equity holders. This is because, under an optimal dividend policy, the value of equity with C in cash must be at
least equal to the value of equity with C −  in cash plus a dividend of : W(X,C) ≥ W(X,C − ) + . Rearranging and
letting  → 0 gives WC(X,C) ≥ 1.
The following proposition proves that the function W(X,C) in (3.10)–(3.11) corresponds to the dividend policy
(Dt )t≥0 in (3.8), and that no other dividend policy provides a higher equity value.
Proposition 2 (The optimal policy for holding cash and paying dividends). The dividend process (Dt )t≥0 in (3.8)
solves the ﬁrm’s equity-maximization problem in (3.6): The function W(X,C) given in (3.10)–(3.11) satisﬁes
(i) W(Xt,Ct) = E
Q
t
[∫ τ˜
t e
−r(u−t) dDu + e−r(τ˜−t)Cτ˜
]
, and
(ii) W(Xt,Ct) ≥ EQt
[∫ τ˜
t e
−r(u−t) dDu + e−r(τ˜−t)Cτ˜
]
where (Dt)t≥0 is any adapted, non-decreasing dividend process
satisfying the relation in (3.2).
Intuitively, the cash-dividend policy in (3.8) maximizes equity value because it optimally exploits that WC(X,C) ≥
1. By (3.8), earnings are retained whenever an additional dollar in cash decreases liquidity risk, i.e. whenever
WC(X,C) > 1, while earnings are paid out whenever an additional dollar in cash no longer decreases liquidity risk, i.e.
whenever WC(X,C) = 1.
Optimal insolvency trigger
I complete the model solution by deriving the optimal insolvency trigger in the case where cash is at the target level,
C = C(X), because Proposition 2 implies that any other cash level is suboptimal. Indeed, if C  C(X), the dividend
process in (3.8) dictates that all variations in C are due to the adjustment towards C(X). Moreover, once cash reaches
the target level, the associated dividend ﬂow in (3.9) gives that cash remains at the target level until insolvency. Hence,
I focus on the case of C = C(X), which implies that the ﬁrm avoids illiquidity and allows me to derive closed-form
expressions.
Let E(X) = W(X,C(X)) be the market value of equity when C = C(X) for all X. By Proposition 2 and (3.10)-
(3.11), E(X) solves the diﬀerential equation
rE(X) = 12σ
2X2 EXX(X) + μQX EX(X) + r(X − X) for X > X, (3.12)
along with the conditions
E(X)→ C(X) + U(X) − kr for X → ∞, (3.13)
E(X) = C(X) for X ≤ X, (3.14)
EX(X) = CX(X
). (3.15)
The ﬁrst is a value matching condition stating that as the ﬁrm becomes inﬁnitely solvent, equity approaches its risk-
free value: Total assets (cash plus productive assets) minus risk-free debt. The second is a limited liability condition
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stating that at the insolvency trigger, equity consists solely of cash, which is consistent with the assumption that cash
can be distributed at any time before default. The third is a smooth-pasting condition which follows from the limited
liability condition and states that insolvency is triggered when an extra dollar in earnings increases equity value by no
more than the increase in cash.
Combining the diﬀerential equation in (3.12) with the boundary conditions in (3.13)–(3.15) gives the following
proposition.
Proposition 3 (The optimal insolvency trigger). When the ﬁrm’s cash holdings are at the target level, the following
holds:
(i) The market value of equity is given by
E(X) = C(X) + U(X) − kr +
[
k
r − U(X)
]
πQ(X), (3.16)
where πQ(X) =
(
X
X
)φ−
and where φ− = σ
2−2μQ−
√
(σ2−2μQ)2+8rσ2
2σ2 < 0.
(ii) The optimal insolvency trigger is given by
X =
k
r
r − μQ
μQ
φ−
φ− − 1 . (3.17)
(iii) When the ﬁrm is suﬃciently solvent, its productive assets have higher value than its cash holdings, while
when the ﬁrm is suﬃciently close to insolvency, its productive assets have lower value than its cash holdings.
Precisely: There exists X′ > X such that U(X) > C(X) for all X > X′, while U(X) < C(X) for all X < X′.
The ﬁrst part of Proposition 3 shows that for a ﬁrm with cash at the target level, equity is the value of total assets
(cash plus productive assets) minus future coupon liabilities plus the insolvency option. The scaling factor on the
option-value term, πQ(X), goes to 0 as X goes to inﬁnity and goes to 1 as X goes to X. It can thus, similar to Garlappi
and Yan (2011), be interpreted as a long-term Q-probability of insolvency.
The third part of Proposition 3 shows that when a ﬁrm with cash at the target level is suﬃciently solvent, its
productive assets have higher value than its cash. Conversely, when such a ﬁrm is suﬃciently close to insolvency, its
productive assets have lower value than its cash. In particular, for a ﬁrm with cash at the target level and a high risk of
insolvency, cash comprises a relatively large fraction of total assets. This, as I detail in the next subsection’s analysis
of expected returns, implies that such a ﬁrm’s conditional equity will be lower than its asset beta.
3.2.2 Expected returns under the optimal policies
This subsection derives the expected equity return for a ﬁrm that follows the model’s optimal polices for holding cash,
paying dividends, and triggering insolvency. The goal is to show that such a ﬁrm has a low conditional equity beta
when its probability of insolvency is high. This provides a theoretical rationale of low equity returns for ﬁrms that
choose their cash to avoid illiquidity but have a high risk of insolvency. To verify this rationale empirically, I derive
several cross-sectional implications, which I will test in the paper’s empirical part.
Expected returns, conditional beta, and their relation to solvency
Consider a ﬁrm whose cash at time t is at the target level, Ct = C(Xt). Then the ﬁrm’s time-t equity value, E(Xt), is
given in Proposition 3. Applying Itoˆ’s Formula and using the diﬀerential equation in (3.12), the excess return on the
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ﬁrm’s equity, under Q, is given by
dE(Xt) + dDt
E(Xt)
− rdt = Xt EX(Xt)E(Xt) σdB
Q
t .
Using the translation BQt = B
P
t + ρλt, it follows that, at time t, the conditional P-expected instantaneous excess return
on the ﬁrm’s equity may be expressed as
EPt [r
E
t+dt] − r = ΩE(Xt) ρσλ, (3.18)
where the key quantity ΩE(Xt) = Xt
EX (Xt)
E(Xt)
=
∂ log E(Xt)
∂ log Xt
is the earnings-sensitivity (or earnings-elasticity) of equity. It
measures the percentage change in equity value for a one percent change in earnings. A value ofΩE(Xt) above (below)
1 means that equity value changes more (less) than proportionally to changes in earnings, i.e. that a change in earnings
has a relatively large (small) eﬀect on equity value. The relation in (3.18) says that given the correlated earnings
volatility, ρσ, and the market price of systematic earnings risk, λ, higher earnings-sensitivity leads to higher expected
returns.
To determine the market price of systematic earnings risk, λ, I assume there exists a traded, diversiﬁed portfo-
lio with (cum-dividend) value process (Mt)t≥0, where Mt is instantaneously perfectly negatively correlated with the
stochastic discount factor, Λt, in (3.3). Its return, under P, is then given by
dMt
Mt
= rM dt + σM dZPt . (3.19)
Since ZQt = Z
P
t + λt and since the Q-expected, instantaneous return on the portfolio has to be the risk-free rate, r,
it follows that λ = r
M−r
σM
, i.e. the expected excess return on the portfolio relative to its volatility, or its Sharpe ratio.
Combining this with (3.18) gives the familiar relation
EPt [r
E
t+dt] − r = ΩE(Xt) βU︸︷︷︸
βE (Xt)
(rM − r), (3.20)
where βU = ρσ
σM
is the the correlated volatility of earnings relative to the volatility of the diversiﬁed portfolio, i.e. the
ﬁrm’s asset (or unlevered) beta. The relation in (3.20) is a conditional capital asset pricing model (CAPM), in which
the ﬁrm’s time-t conditional equity beta, βE(Xt) = ΩE(Xt)βU , equals the product of the earnings-sensitivity and the
asset beta. Clearly, higher equity beta leads to higher expected equity returns. Furthermore, expected equity returns
are high (low) relative to expected asset returns when equity beta is higher (lower) than asset beta, i.e. when ΩE(Xt) is
above (below) 1.
The following proposition provides the model’s main implications for the expected returns of a ﬁrm with cash at
the target level.
Proposition 4 (Equity beta and ﬁrm-solvency). Suppose that the ﬁrm’s cash holdings are at the target level. Then the
following holds:
(i) When the ﬁrm is suﬃciently solvent, conditional equity beta is higher than asset beta, while, when the ﬁrm
is suﬃciently close to insolvency, conditional equity beta is lower than asset beta. Precisely: There exists
X′′ > X such that ΩE(Xt) > 1 for all Xt > X′′, while ΩE(Xt) < 1 for all Xt < X′′.
(ii) When the ﬁrm is suﬃciently solvent, there is a negative relation between conditional equity beta and solvency,
while when the ﬁrm is suﬃciently close to insolvency, there is a positive relation between conditional equity
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beta and solvency. Precisely: There exists X′′′ > X such that ∂Ω
E
∂Xt
< 0 for all Xt > X′′′, while ∂Ω
E
∂Xt
> 0 for all
Xt < X′′′.
The ﬁrst part of Proposition 4 shows that when a ﬁrm with cash at the target level is suﬃciently solvent (i.e.when
Xt is above the threshold X′′) equity beta is higher than asset beta. The reason is that when the ﬁrm is suﬃciently
solvent, the value of its total assets is to a large degree comprised of the value of the productive assets-in-place (cf.
the third part of Proposition 3). Because equity is a levered claim on the ﬁrm’s total assets, the equity of a suﬃciently
solvent ﬁrm will be riskier (i.e. have higher earnings-sensitivity) than the ﬁrm’s productive assets-in-place, implying
that equity beta is higher than asset beta. Conversely, the ﬁrst part of Proposition 4 also shows that when a ﬁrm with
cash at the target level is suﬃciently close to insolvency (i.e. when Xt is below the threshold X′′), equity beta is lower
than asset beta. This is because when the ﬁrm is suﬃciently close to insolvency, the value of its total assets will to a
large degree be comprised of the cash that it holds to avoid illiquidity. This implies that equity, despite being a levered
claim on total assets, will be less risky than the productive assets-in-place, and therefore that equity beta is less than
asset beta. In sum, the ﬁrst part of Proposition 4 implies a generally positive relation between equity beta and solvency.
It therefore provides a theoretical rationale for the low returns to distressed equity: Because it is optimal for the ﬁrm
to hold a level of cash that allows it to avoid liquidity distress, the ﬁrm will have a high fraction of its assets in cash
when it is in solvency distress, which leads to a low equity beta. In addition, this result complements the insights of
Garlappi and Yan (2011), Opp (2013), and McQuade (2013) by separating the illiquidity and insolvency components
of distress.
The second part of Proposition 4 shows that when the ﬁrm is suﬃciently solvent (i.e. when Xt is above the
threshold X′′′), there is a negative relation between equity beta and solvency, while when the ﬁrm is suﬃciently close
to insolvency (i.e. when Xt is below the threshold X′′′), there is a positive relation between equity beta and solvency.
To see this, note an increase in solvency means lower leverage, which decreases equity beta, but also a lower fraction
of assets in cash, which increases equity beta. When the ﬁrm is suﬃciently solvent, the eﬀect of lower leverage
dominates, so that an increase in solvency leads to a decrease in equity beta. However, when the ﬁrm is suﬃciently
close to insolvency, the eﬀect of a lower fraction of assets in cash dominates, so that an increase in solvency leads to
an increase in equity beta. In sum, the second part of Proposition 4 implies that while the relation between equity beta
and solvency is generally positive, it is in fact non-monotonic and “hump-shaped.”
In the following subsection, I use Proposition 4 to derive testable predictions for the behavior of expected equity
returns in the cross-section.
Testable predictions for expected returns
In this subsection, I derive testable predictions from Proposition 4. First, I determine the relation between expected
returns and probability of insolvency. Second, I determine the relation between expected returns and optimal liquidity.
I ﬁrst determine the relation between expected returns and probability of insolvency. Recall, from the expression
for the equity value in Proposition 3, that the time-t, long-term Q-probability of insolvency can be proxied by πQ(Xt) =(
Xt
X
)φ−
, where φ− < 0. Hence, πQ(Xt) is monotonically decreasing in Xt. Therefore, the results of Proposition 4 can be
directly translated into results concerning the relation between expected returns and probability of insolvency.
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Corollary 4.1 (Expected returns and probability of insolvency). Under the assumptions of Proposition 4, the following
holds:
(i) When the probability of insolvency is suﬃciently close to 0, expected returns are relatively high, i.e.ΩE(Xt) > 1,
while when the probability of insolvency is suﬃciently higher than 0, expected returns are relatively low, i.e.
ΩE(Xt) < 1.
(ii) When the probability of insolvency is suﬃciently close to 0, there is a positive relation between expected earn-
ings and probability of insolvency, i.e. ∂Ω
E
∂πQ
> 0, while when the probability of insolvency is suﬃciently higher
than 0, there is a negative relation between expected returns and probability of insolvency, ∂Ω
E
∂πQ
< 0.
The ﬁrst part of Corollary 4.1 predicts that, in general, ﬁrms with low probability of insolvency have high expected
returns (and high conditional betas) relative to ﬁrms with high probability of insolvency. The second part of Corollary
4.1 predicts that the relation between expected returns and probability of insolvency (as well as the relation between
equity beta and probability of insolvency) is non-monotonic and “hump-shaped.” This follows directly from the second
part of Proposition 4 because the chain-rule gives that ∂Ω
E
∂πQ
= ∂Ω
E
∂Xt
/
∂πQ
∂Xt
while ∂π
Q
∂Xt
< 0. In the paper’s empirical part, I
test these predictions using observable ﬁrm-speciﬁc solvency measures as proxies for the probability of insolvency.
Next, I determine the relation between expected returns and optimal liquidity. In the following, I measure the
ﬁrm’s optimal time-t liquidity, which I denote L(Xt), as the ratio of the ﬁrm’s target cash level and the value of future
coupon payments, i.e.
L(Xt) =
C(Xt)
k/r
.
Recall, from Proposition 1, that the time-t target cash level is given byC(Xt) = Xt−X+ kr . It is therefore monotonically
increasing in Xt and bounded from below by the value of coupon liabilities. Hence, optimal liquidity is monotonically
increasing in Xt and bounded from below by 1. The following corollary translates the results of Proposition 4 into
results concerning the relation between expected returns and optimal liquidity.
Corollary 4.2 (Expected returns and optimal liquidity). Under the assumptions of Proposition 4, the following holds:
(i) When optimal liquidity is suﬃciently higher than 1, expected returns are relatively high, i.e. ΩE(Xt) > 1, while
when optimal liquidity is suﬃciently close to 1, expected returns are relatively low, i.e.ΩE(Xt) < 1.
(ii) When optimal liquidity is suﬃciently higher than 1, there is a negative relation between expected returns and
optimal liquidity, i.e. ∂Ω
E
∂L < 0, while when optimal liquidity is suﬃciently close to 1, there is a positive relation
between expected returns and optimal liquidity, ∂Ω
E
∂L > 0.
The ﬁrst part of Corollary 4.2 predicts that, in general, ﬁrms with high optimal liquidity have high expected returns
(and high conditional betas) relative to ﬁrms with low optimal liquidity. The second part of Corollary 4.2 predicts that
the relation between expected returns and optimal liquidity (as well as the relation between equity beta and optimal
liquidity) is non-monotonic and “hump-shaped.” Note that the second part captures the common notion that ﬁrms
with higher reserves of liquid assets should have lower equity betas and therefore lower expected returns, but makes
the notion more precise, as the result says that the negative relation between expected returns and liquid reserves only
holds for ﬁrm’s with suﬃciently high levels of liquid reserves. In the paper’s empirical part, I test these predictions
using observable ﬁrm-speciﬁc liquidity measures as proxies for optimal liquidity.
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Testable predictions for long-short portfolio strategies
The results of Corollaries 4.1 and 4.2 can be exploited in long-short portfolio strategies that produce positive expected
returns. Therefore, in this subsection, I consider the performance of two long-short portfolios formed on optimal
liquidity and probability of insolvency.
I ﬁrst consider the expected return on a higher-liquidity minus lower-liquidity (HLmLL) portfolio as a function of
the probability of insolvency. To this end, consider two identical ﬁrms with time-t optimal liquidity L(Xt). Suppose
that the ﬁrst ﬁrm experiences a positive earnings-shock ΔX > 0. Then the ﬁrst ﬁrm’s optimal liquidity will increase to
L(Xt+ΔX). Let rHLt+dt be the return of the higher-liquidity ﬁrm and let r
LL
t+dt be the return of the lower-liquidity ﬁrm. Then
the expected return-diﬀerence between the two ﬁrms can be expressed as a function of the probability of insolvency
by using the relation in (3.20) to write
EPt [r
HL
t+dt − rLLt+dt] = (ΩE(Xt + ΔX) −ΩE(Xt)) βU(rM − r)
≈ ∂Ω
E
∂πQ
∂πQ
∂Xt
ΔX β
U(rM − r).
I now deﬁne, for a given earnings-shock, ΔX , the expected return on the HLmLL portfolio as the right-hand side of
this last expression, i.e. EPt [r
HLmLL
t+dt ] =
∂ΩE
∂πQ
∂πQ
∂Xt
ΔX β
U(rM − r). The following corollary follow from the second part of
Corollary 4.1.
Corollary 4.3 (The HLmLL portfolio). Under the assumptions of Proposition 4, the following holds for the expected
return on the HLmLL portfolio:
(i) When the probability of insolvency is suﬃciently close to 0, the expected return on the HLmLL portfolio is
negative.
(ii) When the probability of insolvency is suﬃciently higher than 0, the expected return on the HLmLL portfolio is
positive.
Corollary 4.3 predicts that the expected return of the HLmLL portfolio is a generally increasing function of the
probability of insolvency and that the positive expected returns on HLmLL are concentrated among ﬁrms with high
probabilities of insolvency. In the paper’s empirical part, I test these predictions using HLmLL portfolios that are
constructed through conditional sorts—ﬁrst on solvency, and then on liquidity.
Finally, I consider the expected return on a higher-solvency minus lower-solvency (HSmLS) portfolio as a function
of optimal liquidity. Consider two identical ﬁrms with time-t insolvency probability πQ(Xt). Suppose that the ﬁrst
ﬁrm experiences a positive earnings-shock ΔX > 0. Then the ﬁrst ﬁrm’s probability of insolvency will decrease to
πQ(Xt + ΔX), i.e. it will have higher solvency. Let rHSt+dt be the return of the higher-solvency ﬁrm and let r
LS
t+dt be the
return of the lower-solvency ﬁrm. The expected return-diﬀerence between the two ﬁrms can be expressed as function
of optimal liquidity by writing
EPt [r
HL
t+dt − rLLt+dt] ≈
∂ΩE
∂L
∂L
∂Xt
ΔX β
U(rM − r),
I now deﬁne the expected return on the HSmLS portfolio as EPt [r
HSmLS
t+dt ] =
∂ΩE
∂L
∂L
∂Xt
ΔX β
U(rM − r). The following
corollary follow from the second part of Corollary 4.2.
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Figure 3.1. Asset-composition and conditional beta. This ﬁgure shows a numerical illustration of Corollary 4 and its cross-
sectional implications. Top left: Earnings-generating asset value (black curve) and target cash holdings (purple curve) as a function
of probability of insolvency with an indication of the insolvency trigger (black dashed line) and the lower boundary of cash holdings
(dashed purple line). Top right: Conditional beta as a function of the probability of insolvency with an indication of the unlevered
(asset) beta (dashed line). Bottom left: Conditional beta as a function of the probability of insolvency (from 0 to 0.4) with an
indication of the higher-liquidity minus lower-liquidity strategy (dashed purple line segments). Bottom right: Conditional beta as
a function of optimal liquidity (i.e. target cash holdings divided by the value of future coupon payments) with an indication of the
higher-solvency minus lower-solvency strategy (dashed purple line segments). The parameters are μQ = 0.04, σ = 0.15, k =
$4.5, r = 0.06, ρ = 0.33, and σM = 0.05.
Corollary 4.4 (The HSmLS portfolio). Under the assumptions of Proposition 4, the following holds for the expected
return on the HSmLS portfolio:
(i) When optimal liquidity is suﬃciently higher than 1, the expected return on the HSmLS portfolio is negative.
(ii) When optimal liquidity is suﬃciently close to 1, the expected return on the HSmLS portfolio is positive.
Corollary 4.4 predicts that the expected return of the HSmLS portfolio is a generally decreasing function of optimal
liquidity and that the positive expected returns on HSmLS are concentrated among ﬁrms with low optimal liquidity.
In the paper’s empirical part, I test these predictions using HSmLS portfolios that are constructed through conditional
sorts—ﬁrst on liquidity, and then on solvency.
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Numerical illustration
Figure 3.1 illustrates the results of Proposition 4 and its cross-sectional implications in Corollaries 4.1–4.4. I consider
a representative ﬁrm and economy given by the following parameters:
μQ = 0.04, σ = 0.15, k = $4.5,
r = 0.06, ρ = 0.33, σM = 0.05.
This choice of parameters implies that insolvency is triggered when cumulated earnings fall to X = $29.87 (corre-
sponding to U(X) = $59.75 for the value of productive assets) and that the ﬁrm’s unlevered asset beta is normalized
to βU = ρσ
σM
= 1. For instance, if the ﬁrm’s time-t level of cumulated earnings is Xt = $50.00, the value of productive
assets is U(Xt) = $100, equity value is E(Xt) = $122.15, the target cash level is C(Xt) = $95.13, the proxy for the
long-term Q-probability of insolvency is πQ(Xt) = 0.13, and, ﬁnally, conditional beta is βEt = Ω
E(Xt)βU = 1.16.
The ﬁgure’s top panels show the value of productive assets, target cash holdings, and conditional beta as functions
of the probability of insolvency. For low levels of probability of insolvency, the target cash level is high, but the value
of productive assets is higher. This is associated with a conditional beta that is above the asset beta and is upwards-
sloping in the probability of insolvency. However, as the probability of insolvency increases, the target cash level
decreases, but the value of productive assets decreases by more and ultimately fall below the value of target cash.
At the same time, conditional beta falls below the asset beta and becomes downwards-sloping in the probability of
insolvency.
The lower left panel zooms in on the conditional beta as a function of probability of insolvency and indicates
the long and short legs of the HLmLL portfolio. Because conditional beta initially increases in the probability of
insolvency, the short leg of HLmLL has higher expected returns than the long leg when the probability of insolvency
is high, so HLmLL has negative expected returns. This is, however, reversed when the probability of insolvency is
high, where the long leg of HLmLL has higher expected returns than the short leg, leading to positive expected returns
for the HLmLL portfolio.
Finally, the lower right panel shows conditional beta as a function of decreasing optimal liquidity and also in-
dicates the long and short legs of the HSmLS portfolio. Because optimal liquidity moves opposite the probability
of insolvency, conditional beta is above 1 and downward-sloping when optimal liquidity is high, but below 1 and
upwards-sloping when optimal liquidity is close to its lower boundary of 1. Therefore, the short leg of HSmLS has
higher expected returns than the long leg for high levels of optimal liquidity. The situation is, however, reversed for
low levels of optimal liquidity.
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3.3 Data and variables
This section presents the data and the variables that I use to test the model’s predictions in Section 3.4. I use ﬁrm-
level data on stock prices, accounting numbers, and credit ratings for US ﬁrms during the period 1970-2013. In the
following, I ﬁrst detail my sample construction and then deﬁne the measures of solvency and liquidity which I employ
to in the analysis of equity returns.
3.3.1 Data
I search for data in the intersection of US industrial ﬁrms with stock prices in the CRSP database, accounting funda-
mentals in the Compustat North American database, and credit ratings or default records in the Moody’s DRS (Default
Risk Service) database.
For every US debt issuer in DRS’ industrial category with an available third party identiﬁer, I search for the
corresponding security-level PERMNO-identiﬁers in the daily CRSP ﬁle and in the quarterly and yearly Compustat
ﬁles, taking name changes, mergers, accusations, and parent-subsidiary relations into account, and excluding issuers
which I cannot reliably match. I only include common stocks (CRSP’s SHRCD 10-11) and I exclude utilities and
ﬁnancial ﬁrms (CRSP’s SIC codes 4900-4999 and 6000-6999). The ﬁnal sample has 3,947 unique ﬁrms, spanning
720,371 ﬁrm-months, and covers January 1970 to December 2013.
Because distress may ultimately result in a default or bankruptcy, I track these events for the ﬁrms in the sample.
I identify a default- or bankruptcy event if it is recorded in DRS, or in CRSP (DLSTCD 400-490 or 574, or SECSTAT
‘Q’), or in Compustat (DLRSN 2-3 or STALTQ ‘TL’), and I count multiple events for the same ﬁrm occurring within a
month as a single event. This results in a total of 874 events incurred by 683 ﬁrms, of which 529 events were identiﬁed
solely through DRS, 134 solely through CRSP, and 137 solely through Compustat—the remaining 87 events were
identiﬁed simultaneously by two or more sources.
I use the daily stock data to calculate market equity values, ME (the product of CRSP’s PRC and SHROUT, both
adjusted by their cumulative adjustment factors), and I accumulate daily log-returns (ln of 1 plus CRSP’s simple return,
RET) over a 21 trading day rolling window to obtain monthly returns at a daily frequency. I require at least 10 trading
days to calculate a monthly return and I use delisting returns (CRSP’s DLRET) whenever possible.
I use the quarterly accounting data to calculate balance-sheet based measures of ﬁrm solvency and liquidity as
well as regression controls (to be detailed below). When possible, I substitute yearly accounting numbers for missing
quarterly accounting numbers. I align the quarterly accounting data and the daily stock data as follows: On a given
trading day, the corresponding accounting numbers are the latest ones available prior to that day. Except for returns, all
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile to remove the inﬂuence of divisions by near-zero denominators,
recording errors, and statistical outliers.
3.3.2 Measuring solvency and liquidity
The model argues that because it is optimal for a ﬁrm to hold a level of cash that allows it to avoid liquidity distress,
such a ﬁrm will have a high fraction of its assets in cash when it is in high risk of solvency distress, and this leads
to a low conditional beta and therefore low expected returns. I now present the variables which I employ to measure
solvency and liquidity. These will constitute the ‘sorting’ or ‘explanatory’ variables in the analysis of conditional betas
and expected returns in Section 3.4.
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Solvency measures
Solvency is a ﬁrm’s ability to honor its long-term debt obligations. To measure solvency, I primarily use Moody’s
senior unsecured long-term credit ratings. However, for robustness, and because numeric variables are better suited
for regressions, I also use two balance-sheet based variables: Leverage and interest coverage.
The long-term credit rating is a categorical measure of solvency, giving Moody’s relative assessment of a ﬁrm’s
ability to honor its ﬁnancial obligations with an original maturity of one year or more (Moody’s Investors Service,
2014). Credit ratings incorporate not only ﬁrms’ economic and ﬁnancial characteristics, but also industry conditions
and ‘soft’ information like experts’ outlook. Moody’s assigns 9 long-term credit ratings: Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B, Caa,
Ca, and C. Firms rated above Baa are considered ‘investment grade,’ while ﬁrms rated Baa and below are considered
‘speculative grade.’ Within speculative-grade ﬁrms, a rating of Caa or below corresponds to ‘distressed,’ with C-rated
ﬁrms typically being in default. In some cases, I augment Moody’s original rating categories with a D-category,
corresponding to an identiﬁed default or bankruptcy.
I measure leverage using the (quasi) market leverage ratio, LT/(LT + ME) (Compustat’s total liabilities, LTQ,
divided by the sum of total liabilities and market equity), but other leverage ratios produce similar results. This is a
‘stock’ variable measuring the ﬁrm’s total liabilities as a fraction of its total market value. The closer the ratio is to 1,
the higher the risk of ‘accounting insolvency.’ Although this does not automatically trigger default, a ﬁrm in solvency
distress will likely be forced by its debt holders to take actions in response to its deteriorated solvency—this could be
a restructuring of its operations, a renegotiation of its debt obligations, or even an involuntary bankruptcy ﬁling.
As a ﬁnal measure of solvency, I use the interest coverage ratio, OI/IX (Compustat’s operating income or EBITDA
variable, OIBDPQ, divided by interest expense, XINTQ). This is a ‘ﬂow’ variable measuring the ﬁrm’s ability to
generate earnings in excess of its interest expense on a quarter-by-quarter basis. If interest coverage is below 1, the
ﬁrm is currently not generating enough earnings to cover its interest expense, and a cash-ﬂow based assessment of its
asset value may thus indicate solvency distress. Because ﬁrms with negative operating income do not have meaningful
interest coverage ratios, I set interest coverage to zero whenever operating income is negative.
Liquidity measures
Liquidity is, in this paper, a ﬁrm’s ability to honor its short-term debt obligations. To measure liquidity, I use three
balance-sheet based variables that compare a ﬁrm’s stock of liquid assets (including cash and marketable securities) to
its short-term liabilities (due within one year): The current ratio, the quick ratio, and the working capital ratio.
The current ratio, CA/CL (Compustat’s current assets, ACTQ, divided by current liabilities, LCTQ), measures a
ﬁrm’s total stock of liquid assets relative to its short-term liabilities. A current ratio below 1 means that the ﬁrm’s total
stock of liquid assets is insuﬃcient to meet its short-term liabilities. This is an indication of liquidity distress, since
the ﬁrm will default in the short-term if it cannot generate suﬃcient earnings or obtain external ﬁnancing to cover its
liquidity short-fall.
The quick ratio, QA/CL (Compustat’s current assets, ACTQ, minus inventories, INVTQ, the diﬀerence divided
by current liabilities, LCTQ), measures a ﬁrm’s assets that can ‘quickly’ be converted into cash at near book value in
order to pay oﬀ short-term liabilities. The current- and quick ratios are similar, but the quick ratio does not regard
inventories as ‘quick’ assets, and is thus more conservative. Like the current ratio, a quick ratio below 1 is an indication
of liquidity distress.
Finally, the working capital ratio (Compustat’s current assets, ACTQ, minus current liabilities, LCTQ, the diﬀer-
ence divided by total assets, ATQ) measures a ﬁrm’s net liquid assets as a percentage of its total book assets. It is thus
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Figure 3.2. Even the least solvent ﬁrms hold liquid assets that can cover their short-term liabilities. This ﬁgure shows the
current ratio, CA/CL, plotted against the three solvency measures (Moody’s long-term credit rating, deciles of market leverage,
LT/(LT + ME), and deciles of interest coverage, OI/IX). Solid lines indicate means within groups while dashed lines indicate
medians. In all panels, a horizontal move to the right corresponds to lower solvency, while a vertical move downwards corresponds
to lower liquidity.
the dollar-amount of total liquid assets in excess of current liabilities relative to total book assets. Therefore, a negative
working capital ratio is an indication of liquidity distress.
Liquidity vs. solvency
Figure 3.2 shows how liquidity varies with solvency in the sample. For brevity, I focus on the current ratio as the
measure of liquidity, although the results are very similar for the quick ratio and the working capital ratio. The
leftmost column shows the current ratio across credit ratings (the ‘total’ measure of solvency); the middle column
shows the current ratio against market leverage (the ‘stock’ measure of solvency); and the rightmost column shows the
current ratio against interest coverage (the ‘ﬂow’ measure of solvency). Two observations are important.
First, liquidity generally decreases as solvency decreases. More precisely, average and median liquidity levels are
hump-shaped in decreasing credit ratings (increasing up to Ba but decreasing thereafter) and almost monotonically
decreasing in increasing leverage and decreasing interest coverage. Note, however, that investment grade ﬁrms (rated
Aaa-A) generally have higher average and median liquidity levels than do distressed and defaulted ﬁrms (rated Caa-C
and D). The relatively modest reserves of liquid assets for investment grade ﬁrms is probably due to their high ratings,
which means that they need to worry less about ﬁnancing constraints.
Second, even the least solvent ﬁrms hold levels of liquid assets that can cover their short-term liabilities. The
average and median distressed ﬁrm (rated Caa-C and D) is still liquid and the same is true for the average and median
ﬁrm in the highest leverage decile and the lowest interest coverage decile.
In sum, Figure 3.2 shows that the distribution of liquidity across solvency within the sample closely resembles
the model’s optimal policy for holding cash: Less solvent ﬁrms are less willing to cover earnings-shortfalls with cash
holdings and thus hold less cash, but even the least solvent ﬁrms hold cash levels that allow them to service short-term
liabilities (Proposition 1–2).
Liquid assets as a fraction of total assets vs. solvency
Figure 3.3 shows liquid assets, as a fraction of the (quasi) market value of total assets, plotted against solvency. In
the ﬁgure, I measure liquid assets as the ﬁrm’s current assets, CA, and the (quasi) market value of total assets is the
book value of total liabilities added the market value of equity, LT +ME. The ﬁgure is, however, very similar if liquid
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Figure 3.3. Less solvent ﬁrms have a higher fraction of their total assets in liquid assets. This ﬁgure shows current assets, CA,
as a fraction of the (quasi) market value of total assets, ME + LT , plotted against the three solvency measures (Moody’s long-term
credit rating, deciles of market leverage, LT/(LT +ME), and deciles of interest coverage, OI/IX). Solid lines indicate means within
groups while dashed lines indicate medians.
assets are measured as quick assets, QA (i.e. current assets less inventories), or if the book value of total assets is used
in the denominator.
The ﬁgure shows that less solvent have a higher fraction of their total assets in liquid assets. For instance, while
the average Aaa-rated ﬁrm has around 25% of its total assets in liquid assets, the fraction is over 35% for the average
distressed ﬁrm (rated Caa-C or D). Similar relations hold when solvency is measured as leverage or interest coverage.
These results are consistent with the model’s prediction that ﬁrms with a suﬃciently high probability of insolvency
have a large fraction of their assets in cash (part (iii) of Proposition 3).
3.4 Empirical results
This section tests the model’s predictions for expected returns. The model’s predictions are derived for a ﬁrm that
follows the optimal policy for holdings cash and thus avoid illiquidity. Hence, one could argue that the model’s
predictions should be tested in the subsample of ﬁrm-observations where liquid assets meet or exceed current liabilities.
However, since Figure 3.2 suggests that even the least solvent ﬁrms in the sample are on average still liquid, I test the
model’s predictions using the entire sample. This biases my analysis against ﬁnding support for the model’s rationale
of the distress puzzle. At the same time, it increases the available number of observations and alleviates concerns
regarding data-mining.
First, the model predicts that, in general, ﬁrms with high solvency have high expected returns (and high conditional
betas) relative to ﬁrms with low solvency. Also, the relation between expected returns and solvency (as well as between
conditional betas and solvency) is non-monotonic and “hump-shaped” (Corollary 4.1). Second, the model predicts that,
in general, ﬁrms with high liquidity have high expected returns (and high conditional betas) relative to ﬁrms with low
liquidity. Also, the relation between expected returns and liquidity (as well as between conditional betas and liquidity)
is non-monotonic and “hump-shaped” (Corollary 4.2). In the model, there is a one-to-one correspondence between
conditional betas and expected returns (cf. relation (3.20)). However, in practice, the relation may not be as clearcut:
Conditional betas are subject to estimation noise and there is mixed evidence regarding the performance of conditional
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betas in asset pricing tests.10 Therefore, I test these predictions separately for conditional betas and expected returns:
First for conditional betas in the cross-section of solvency and liquidity-levels, and then for expected returns using 1)
cross-sectional regressions of ﬁrm-level returns on the solvency and liquidity measures, and 2) returns and alphas for
portfolios formed on solvency and liquidity.
Third, the model predicts that a higher-liquidity minus lower-liquidity (HLmLL) portfolio has negative expected
returns for ﬁrms with high solvency, but positive expected returns for ﬁrms with low solvency (Corollary 4.3). I test
this predictions using the returns and alphas of HLmLL portfolios in the cross-section of solvency levels.
Finally, the model predicts that a higher-solvency minus lower-solvency (HSmLS) portfolio has negative expected
returns for ﬁrms with high liquidity, but positive expected returns for ﬁrms with low liquidity (Corollary 4.3). I test
this predictions using the returns and alphas of HSmLS portfolios in the cross-section of liquidity levels.
3.4.1 Conditional betas
To test the predictions of Corollary 4.1 and Corollary 4.2 for conditional betas, Figure 3.4 plots estimated conditional
betas across the solvency and liquidity measures.
The conditional betas are estimated at the ﬁrm-level at a monthly frequency by regressing daily excess returns
on the daily excess returns of the CRSP value-weighted “market” index (available in the CRSP ﬁle or on prof. Ken
French’s website as the MKT-factor). The risk-free rate is proxied by the 1-month US T-bill rate. I account for
nonsynchronous trading data as in Dimson (1979) using an estimation window of 3 days. Speciﬁcally, I estimate
frazﬁrm i’s monthly beta at month t as βit =
∑1
k=−1 βit,d+k from the time-series regression
rEit,d − r ft,d = αit +
1∑
k=−1
βit,d+k(rMt,d+k − r ft,d+k) + it,d,
where rEit,d is ﬁrm i’s equity return, r
f
t,d is the risk-free rate, and r
M
t,d is the market return on day d of month t, while
it,d is a mean-zero error term. I require a minimum of 5 trading days to estimate a monthly beta and, to reduce the
inﬂuence of outliers, I exclude each ﬁrm’s lowest and highest monthly beta.
Figure 3.4 shows strong evidence in favor of the model’s predictions that conditional betas are generally positively
related to solvency and liquidity. The most solvent ﬁrms (high credit rating, low leverage, or high interest coverage)
have average monthly betas between 0.9 and 1.2, while the least solvent ﬁrms have average monthly betas between 0.6
and 0.8. Similarly, the ﬁrms with highest liquidity also have monthly betas close to 1, while the ﬁrms with the lowest
liquidity have monthly betas around 0.8. If higher conditional beta is associated with higher expected returns—at least
on average—then this is also in favor of the model’s predictions that higher-solvency ﬁrms outperform lower-solvency
ﬁrm and that higher-liquidity ﬁrms outperform lower-liquidity ﬁrms.
On the other hand, the ﬁgure shows mixed evidence for the model’s prediction that conditional betas are hump-
shaped in solvency and liquidity, i.e. that conditional betas are initially upwards-sloping but eventually downwards-
sloping as both solvency and liquidity decrease. For the solvency measures, the monthly betas are hump-shaped
as credit ratings deteriorate, but are almost monotonically decreasing as leverage increases and as interest coverage
decreases. For the liquidity measures, the monthly betas are almost monotonically decreasing as all three liquidity
measures decrease.
10For instance, Lewellen and Nagel (2006) refute the early results of Jagannathan and Wang (1996) and others that conditional
betas can explain asset-pricing anomalies. On the other hand, recent studies by Adrian and Franzoni (2009) and Bali, Engle,
and Tang (2014) ﬁnd that conditional betas do have have explanatory power in asset-pricing tests using more reﬁned estimation
procedures and tests.
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Figure 3.4. Conditional betas are positively related to solvency and liquidity. This ﬁgure shows conditional (time-varying)
betas plotted against the three solvency measures (top panels: Moody’s credit rating, deciles of market leverage, LT/(LT + ME),
and deciles of interest coverage, OI/IX) and the three liquidity measures (bottom panels: Deciles of current ratio, CA/CL, quick
ratio, QA/CL, and working capital, WC/AT ). Conditional betas are estimated at the ﬁrm-level at a monthly frequency by regressing
daily excess returns on the daily excess returns of the CRSP value-weighted “market” index. The risk-free rate is proxied by daily
values for the 1-month US T-bill rate. Beta estimates are adjusted for nonsynchronous trading data as in Dimson (1979) using an
estimation window of 3 days. Each monthly beta is estimated using a minimum of 15 trading days, and, to remove the inﬂuence of
outliers, each ﬁrm’s beta estimates are winsorized at a 5% level. Solid lines indicate means while dashed lines indicate medians. In
the top (bottom) panels, a horizontal move to the right corresponds to lower solvency (liquidity).
To summarize, Figure 3.4 strongly conﬁrms the model’s predictions that conditional betas are positively related to
solvency and liquidity. This extends the ﬁndings of Garlappi and Yan (2011), in that the decrease in conditional betas
is prevalent in both the insolvency and illiquidity dimensions of default risk. On the other hand, the ﬁgure shows mixed
evidence for the predicted “hump-shaped” relations. In the following subsection, I use cross-sectional regressions of
ﬁrm-level returns to further investigate these predictions.
3.4.2 Fama-MacBeth regressions
I now test the predictions of Corollary 4.1 and Corollary 4.2 for expected returns using predictive cross-sectional
regressions of ﬁrm-level returns on solvency and liquidity. In the following, I consider both linear and linear-quadratic
regression speciﬁcations. A linear speciﬁcation allows me to test whether the correlation between expected returns
and a given solvency or liquidity measure is as predicted by the model. A linear-quadratic speciﬁcation allows me to
conduct a simple but direct test of a “hump-shaped” relation by testing whether the coeﬃcient on the quadratic term
is negative.
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Speciﬁcally, I consider linear and linear-quadratic regression speciﬁcations of the forms
Linear: rEit = γ0 + γ1Vi,t−1 + controls + it,
Linear-Quadratic: rEit = γ˜0 + γ˜1Vi,t−1 + γ˜2V
2
i,t−1 + controls + ˜it.
Here, rEit is ﬁrm i’s 1-month return at month t, Vi,t−1 is a given measure of the ﬁrm’s solvency or liquidity at month t−1,
while it and ˜it are mean-zero error terms. In the linear speciﬁcation, the parameter γ1 estimates the marginal eﬀect
of V on expected (next-month) returns. In the linear-quadratic speciﬁcation, the parameter γ˜1 estimates the marginal
eﬀect of V when V is close to zero, while the parameter γ˜2 estimates the curvature of the relation between expected
returns and V . Hence, a hump-shaped relation between expected returns and V can be tested by testing whether γ˜2 < 0.
Table 3.1 shows results from monthly Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of ﬁrm-level 1-month returns on
lagged values for the two numeric solvency measures and the three liquidity measures. I log-transform nonnegative
variables that do not have a naturally bounded distribution. All speciﬁcations include 1-month lagged controls for ﬁrm
size (log(ME)) and book-to-market equity (log(BE/ME)), as well as the ﬁrm’s return from 2 months ago until a month
ago (rt−2, t−1, a control for short-term-reversal) and the ﬁrm’s return from 12 months ago until 2 months ago (rt−12, t−2,
a control for momentum).11 The table reports average monthly slope-coeﬃcients with t-statistics based on standard
errors that are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation as in Newey and West (1987) using a lag length of
12 months.
Speciﬁcation (1) shows that higher market leverage (i.e. lower solvency measured in ‘stock’ terms) is associated
with signiﬁcantly lower expected returns. Speciﬁcation (2) shows that the curvature of the relation between expected
returns and market leverage is signiﬁcantly negative—that is, if the relation between expected returns and market
leverage can be reasonably approximated by a linear-quadratic function, then this function has a signiﬁcantly negative
second derivative. That market leverage has a positive but insigniﬁcant linear-eﬀect in the linear-quadratic speciﬁcation
means that when market leverage is close to zero, an increase in market leverage is associated with a positive but
insigniﬁcant increase in expected returns.
Speciﬁcation (3) shows that higher interest coverage (i.e. higher solvency measured in ‘ﬂow’ terms) is associated
with signiﬁcantly higher expected returns. Interestingly, the t-statistic on the eﬀect of interest coverage is 12 standard
deviations away from zero and over twice as large as the t-statistic on the eﬀect of book-to-market equity from the
same speciﬁcation. Speciﬁcation (4) shows that the curvature of the relation between expected returns and interest
coverage is signiﬁcantly negative, and that, when interest coverage is close to zero, an increase in interest coverage is
associated with signiﬁcantly higher expected returns.
11Book-to-market equity is book equity, BE, divided by market equity, ME. Similar to Fama and French (1993), I calculate
quarterly book equity as stockholders’ equity (Compustat’s SEQQ) plus deferred taxes and investment tax credit (Compustat’s
TXDITCQ) minus preferred stock (Compustat’s PSTKQ). I exclude negative BE-values and, following Novy-Marx (2013), I use
6-month lagged ME to avoid taking unintentional positions in momentum. The return from 2 months ago until a month ago, rt−2, t−1,
is calculated by compounding daily log-returns, and similarly for the return from 12 months ago until 2 months ago, rt−12, t−2.
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Figure 3.5. Hump-shaped relations between expected returns and the measures of solvency and liquidity. This ﬁgure shows
the estimated relations from the linear-quadratic regressions of ﬁrm-level returns on the solvency and liquidity measures in Table
3.1. Left panel: Estimated relation between 1-month expected returns and lagged market leverage from speciﬁcation (2). Middle
panel: Estimated relation between 1-month expected returns and lagged (log) interest coverage from speciﬁcation (4). Right panel:
Estimated relation between 1-month expected returns and lagged (log) quick ratio from speciﬁcation (8). In all panels, the control
variables from the regression speciﬁcations are ﬁxed at their sample means and the range of the horizontal axis is the observed
range in the sample.
Speciﬁcation (5) shows that higher current ratio (i.e. higher liquidity) is associated with signiﬁcantly higher ex-
pected returns, while speciﬁcation (6) shows that the curvature of the relation between expected returns and current
ratio is signiﬁcantly negative. The same is true for the quick ratio in speciﬁcations (7) and (8), and for the working
capital ratio in speciﬁcation (9) and (10).
To summarize, the the linear speciﬁcations provide strong support for the model’s predictions that ﬁrms with
higher solvency (i.e. lower leverage or higher interest coverage) and ﬁrms with higher cash (i.e. higher values for the
liquidity measures) have higher expected returns. Furthermore, the linear-quadratic speciﬁcations show support for
a hump-shaped relation between expected returns and the measures of solvency and liquidity. As an illustration of
the latter point, Figure 3.5 shows the estimated relations from the linear-quadratic regressions of returns on market
leverage in speciﬁcation (2); returns on interest coverage in speciﬁcation (4); and returns on quick ratio in speciﬁcation
(8) [the corresponding plots for the current ratio and the working capital ratio are very similar to the one for the quick
ratio, and are omitted here for brevity]. The estimated relations are seen to be the empirical counterparts of the model’s
implied relations in the lower panels of Figure 3.1.
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3.4.3 Portfolio returns and alphas
The tests of the two previous subsections were based on estimated conditional betas and Fama-MacBeth regression
coeﬃcients. Since both are potentially sensitive to estimation noise, misspeciﬁed parametric forms, and an over-
weighting of small ﬁrms, I now test Corollary 4.1 and Corollary 4.2 non-parametrically using the realized returns and
alphas of value-weighted portfolios.
Table 3.2 shows average excess returns and 1-4 factor alphas (i.e. ‘risk-adjusted’ returns) as well as Sharpe and
Information ratios for portfolios formed on the three solvency measures, while Table 3.3 shows the same for portfolios
formed on the three liquidity measures.
At the beginning of each calendar month, I sort ﬁrms into portfolios according to their solvency or liquidity levels
for the previous month. The portfolios are value-weighted, refreshed every calendar month, and rebalanced every
calendar month to maintain value-weighting. Following Asness, Moskowitz, and Pedersen (2013) and Frazzini and
Pedersen (2014), I construct the portfolio weights using ranks—in this case ranks of the previous month’s market
equity values. Using ranks instead of raw market equity values mitigates the extremely skewed distribution of market
equity values in the cross-section (which over-weights large ﬁrms) and implies a much higher degree of diversiﬁcation,
since more ﬁrms are given a nonzero weight and the weights are less extreme. Speciﬁcally, the weight of ﬁrm i at
month t in portfolio J(t) is given by
wJit =
rank(MEit) · 1(i∈J(t))∑
i∈J(t) rank(MEit)
.
The tables report time-series averages of monthly portfolio returns in excess of the 1-month US T-bill rate. To
reduce the inﬂuence of outliers, I exclude each portfolio’s highest and lowest realized return. The corresponding
alphas are the intercepts from monthly time-series regressions of excess returns on the “market” factor (MKT); the
size (SMB) and value (HML) factors of Fama and French (1993); and the momentum factor (UMD) of Carhart (1997).
Finally, each reported Sharpe (Information) ratio is calculated as the annualized average excess return (annualized 4-
factor alpha) divided by the annualized volatility of excess returns (annualized residual standard error from the 4-factor
time-series regression).
Panel A of Table 3.2 shows the results for the portfolios formed on credit ratings. Consistent with the model’s
prediction that high-solvency ﬁrms outperform low-solvency ﬁrms, it is seen that investment grade ﬁrms (ratings
above Baa) have positive and signiﬁcant excess returns and alphas, while speculative grade and distressed ﬁrms have
insigniﬁcant and even signiﬁcantly negative excess returns and alphas. The Sharpe and Information ratios are also
clearly higher for investment grade ﬁrms compared to speculative grade and distressed ﬁrms. Furthermore, and con-
sistent with the model’s prediction that expected returns are hump-shaped in solvency, it is seen that excess returns,
alphas, and Sharpe/Information ratios slightly increase as ratings deteriorate from Aaa to Aa, and then decreasing
monotonically as ratings deteriorate from Aa to C.
Panels B and C of Table 3.2 show the results for the portfolios formed on deciles of market leverage and interest
coverage. Once again, high-solvency ﬁrms (low leverage deciles or high interest coverage deciles) outperform low-
solvency ﬁrms. For the portfolios formed on market leverage, the outperformance is strongest in excess returns and
Sharpe ratios because the alphas are mostly insigniﬁcant, but the magnitudes of the alphas and Information ratios
follow the same pattern as the magnitudes of the excess returns and Sharpe ratios. For the portfolios formed on interest
coverage, the outperformance is, however, prevalent in excess returns, alphas, and Sharpe/Information ratios. Finally,
it is seen that the performance-measures are hump-shaped in leverage and interest coverage—the only exception is
the Information ratio for the portfolios formed on interest coverage, which is monotonically decreasing as interest
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coverage decreases.
Table 3.3 shows the results for the portfolios formed on the deciles of the three liquidity measures. Consistent
with the model’s prediction that higher-liquidity ﬁrms outperform lower-liquidity ﬁrms, it is seen that ﬁrms in the
highest deciles outperform ﬁrms in the lowest deciles for all three liquidity measures. The outperformance is strongest
in excess returns and Sharpe ratios because the alphas are mostly insigniﬁcant, but the magnitudes of the alphas and
Information ratios follow the same pattern as the magnitudes of the excess returns and Sharpe ratios. Furthermore, and
consistent with the model’s prediction that expected returns are hum-shaped in liquidity, it is seen that excess returns,
alphas, and Sharpe/Information ratios increase as liquidity decreases from high to mid-levels, but decrease as liquidity
decreases from mid to low-levels.
To summarize, the tests based on portfolio returns and alphas conﬁrm the previous tests based on conditional betas
and cross-sectional regressions and show strong support for the predictions of Corollary 4.1 and Corollary 4.2.
A note on unconditional betas
For completeness, Tables 3.2 and 3.3 also report each portfolio’s realized CAPM-beta with a t-statistic for a null value
of 1.
For the portfolios formed on the solvency measures, the unconditional betas are either U-shaped or monotonically
increasing as solvency levels decrease. Similarly, for the portfolios formed on the liquidity measures, the uncondi-
tional betas are decreasing or slightly U-shaped as liquidity levels decrease. This is in stark contrast to the generally
decreasing betas shown in Figure 3.4. Because the conditional betas more precisely reﬂect ﬁrms’ capital structure,
this discrepancy between conditional and unconditional betas suggests that the unconditional betas are only capturing
the part of the exposure to systematic risk that is due to the higher levels of leverage associated with lower solvency
and lower liquidity (cf. the middle column of Figure 3.2). Importantly, the unconditional betas seem to ignore other
important aspects of ﬁrms’ capital structure—in particular, the presence of cash held to avoid illiquidity.
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3.4.4 Long-short portfolios
In this subsection, I test the model’s predictions for the higher-liquidity minus lower-liquidity (HLmLL) portfolio and
the higher-solvency minus lower-solvency (HSmLS) portfolio.
Higher-liquidity minus lower-liquidity as a function of solvency
The model predicts that a higher-liquidity minus lower-liquidity (HLmLL) portfolio has negative expected returns
for ﬁrms with high solvency, but positive expected returns for ﬁrms with low solvency (Corollary 4.3). In particular,
the expected return on HLmLL increases as ﬁrms become less solvent and the positive expected returns on HLmLL
are concentrated among ﬁrms with low solvency. I now test this predictions using the returns and alphas of HLmLL
portfolios in the cross-section of solvency levels.
Table 3.4 shows the performance of HLmLL portfolios across credit ratings. To ensure a suﬃcient number of ﬁrms
in each portfolio, I re-code the original 9 credit ratings into the following three groups: Aaa-A, Baa-B, and Caa-C.
Similar to the construction of long-short portfolios in e.g.Fama and French (1993), I form the HLmLL portfolios using
conditional sorts: First into the three credit rating portfolios, and then into three liquidity portfolios, where the liquidity
breakpoints are the 30th and the 70th percentile. I then calculate the return-spread for each credit rating group as the
diﬀerence between the value-weighted returns of the top 30% “higher-liquidity” ﬁrms and the bottom 30% “lower-
liquidity” ﬁrms. As in Subsection 3.4.3, I use the ranks of the market equity values to construct the portfolio weights,
and, to reduce the inﬂuence of outliers, I exclude the highest and lowest realized return for each portfolio. The results
for HLmLL portfolios formed using market leverage or interest coverage as the measure of solvency produce very
similar results and are omitted here for brevity.
Consistent with the model’s prediction, the HLmLL portfolios have monotonically increasing average returns, 1-4
factor alphas, and Sharpe/Information ratios as credit ratings deteriorate. For ﬁrms rated Aaa-A, the HLmLL portfolios
have insigniﬁcant average returns between −0.09% and −0.07% on a monthly basis, insigniﬁcant alphas in the same
range, and low annualized Sharpe/Information ratios between −0.13 and 0.06. As the credit ratings deteriorate into
Baa-B, the returns and alphas increase somewhat but remain insigniﬁcant. Finally, for the riskiest ﬁrms rated Caa-C,
the HLmLL portfolios have large and signiﬁcantly positive average returns between 1.84% and 2.81% on a monthly
basis, signiﬁcant alphas in the same range, and fairly large annualized Sharpe/Information ratios between 0.58 and
0.86.
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Table 3.4. Higher-liquidity minus lower-liquidity portfolios within credit rating groups. This table shows returns, alphas,
and related quantities for higher-liquidity minus lower-liquidity (HLmLL) portfolios within credit rating groups. At the beginning
of each calendar month, I assign ﬁrms into 3 portfolios according to their credit rating (Aaa-A, Baa-B, and Caa-C) and then into
three portfolios according to the 30th and 70th percentile of current ratio (Panel A), quick ratio (Panel B), or working capital ratio
(Panel C). The portfolios are value-weighted using the ranks of the previous calendar month’s market equity values, refreshed
every calendar month, and rebalanced every calendar month to maintain value-weighting. The highest and lowest realized return
is excluded for each portfolio. Return is the time-series average of the monthly returns on “higher liquidity” ﬁrms minus “lower
liquidity” ﬁrms. CAPM alpha and CAPM beta (unconditional) are the intercept and slope estimates from a time-series regression of
monthly excess returns on the excess returns of the value-weighted CRSP “market” index (MKT). Three- and four-factor alphas are
the intercepts from time-series regressions of monthly excess returns on the three Fama and French (1993) factors (MKT, SMB, and
HML) or these three factors and the Carhart (1997) factor (UMD). Sharpe ratio is the annualized average excess return divided by
the annualized volatility of the excess returns. Information ratio is the annualized 4-factor alpha divided by the annualized residual
standard error from the 4-factor time-series regression. Parentheses in subscript give t-statistics for a null value of zero. Statistical
signiﬁcance at the 5% level is indicated in bold.
Panel A: Current Ratio
Aaa-A Baa-B Caa-C
Higher-liq. minus lower-liq. Higher-liq. minus lower-liq. Higher-liq. minus lower-liq.
Return (avg.mon.%) −0.07(−0.56) 0.15(1.20) 2.81(5.02)
CAPM alpha (mon. %) −0.14(−1.08) 0.07(0.57) 2.81(4.99)
Three-factor alpha (mon. %) −0.05(−0.38) 0.19(1.79) 2.85(5.01)
Four-factor alpha (mon. %) 0.05(0.41) 0.23(2.13) 2.74(4.72)
Sharpe Ratio (ann.) −0.09 0.18 0.86
Information Ratio (ann.) 0.06 0.34 0.84
CAPM beta (unconditional) 0.15(5.47) 0.18(6.97) −0.01(−0.07)
Months 504 505 405
Panel B: Quick Ratio
Aaa-A Baa-B Caa-C
Higher-liq. minus lower-liq. Higher-liq. minus lower-liq. Higher-liq. minus lower-liq.
Return (avg.mon.%) −0.09(−0.82) 0.09(0.76) 1.84(3.39)
CAPM alpha (mon. %) −0.13(−1.28) 0.01(0.10) 1.73(3.18)
Three-factor alpha (mon. %) −0.02(−0.17) 0.20(1.98) 2.07(3.86)
Four-factor alpha (mon. %) −0.01(−0.13) 0.18(1.71) 2.19(4.02)
Sharpe Ratio (ann.) −0.13 0.12 0.58
Information Ratio (ann.) −0.02 0.27 0.72
CAPM beta (unconditional) 0.11(5.07) 0.19(7.54) 0.19(1.58)
Months 503 504 404
Panel C: Working Capital Ratio
Aaa-A Baa-B Caa-C
Higher-liq. minus lower-liq. Higher-liq. minus lower-liq. Higher-liq. minus lower-liq.
Return (avg.mon.%) −0.07(−0.56) 0.15(1.20) 2.81(5.02)
CAPM alpha (mon. %) −0.14(−1.08) 0.07(0.57) 2.81(4.99)
Three-factor alpha (mon. %) −0.05(−0.38) 0.19(1.79) 2.85(5.01)
Four-factor alpha (mon. %) 0.05(0.41) 0.23(2.13) 2.74(4.72)
Sharpe Ratio (ann.) −0.09 0.18 0.86
Information Ratio (ann.) 0.06 0.34 0.84
CAPM beta (unconditional) 0.15(5.47) 0.18(6.97) −0.01(−0.07)
Months 504 505 405
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High-solvency minus low-solvency as a function of liquidity
Finally, the model predicts that a higher-solvency minus lower-solvency (HSmLS) portfolio has negative expected
returns for ﬁrms with high liquidity, but positive expected returns for ﬁrms with low liquidity (Corollary 4.4). In
particular, the expected returns on HSmLS increase as ﬁrms’ liquidity decreases and the positive expected returns on
HSmLS are concentrated among ﬁrms with low liquidity. I now test this prediction using the returns and alphas of
HSmLS portfolios in the cross-section of liquidity levels.
Table 3.5 shows the performance of HSmLS portfolios implemented using credit ratings across the liquidity mea-
sures. The credit ratings are again re-coded into the three (Aaa-A, Baa-B, and Caa-C), and the HSmLS portfolios are
again formed using conditional sorts: First into into three liquidity portfolios, where the liquidity breakpoints are the
30th and the 70th percentile, and then into the three credit rating portfolios. I then calculate the return-spread for each
liquidity group as the diﬀerence between the value-weighted returns on the Aaa-A rated “higher-solvency” ﬁrms and
the Caa-C rated “lower-solvency” ﬁrms. I again use the ranks of the market equity values to construct the portfolio
weights and, to reduce the inﬂuence of outliers, I exclude the highest and lowest realized return for each portfolio. The
results for HSmLS portfolios formed using market leverage or interest coverage as the measure of solvency produce
very similar results and are omitted here for brevity.
Consistent with the model’s prediction, the HSmLS portfolios have generally increasing average returns, 1-4 fac-
tor alphas, and Sharpe/Information ratios as the liquidity measures decrease. For ﬁrms with the highest liquidity
levels, the HSmLS portfolios have high and signiﬁcant average returns between 1.26% and 1.99% on a monthly ba-
sis, even higher alphas, and annualized Sharpe/Information ratios between 0.50 and 0.93. While this performance
is relatively strong, it is in fact dwarfed by the performance of the HSmLS portfolio for ﬁrms with the lowest liq-
uidity levels, where average returns are between 3.56% and 3.63% on a monthly basis, alphas are even higher, and
annualized Sharpe/Information ratios are between 1.09 and 1.62. Furthermore, the increase in returns, alphas, and
Sharpe/Information ratios is monotonic for the quick ratio and the working capital ratio.
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Table 3.5. Higher-solvency minus lower-solvency across liquidity measures. This table shows returns, alphas, and related
quantities for higher-solvency minus lower-solvency (HSmLS) portfolios that are long ﬁrms rated Aaa-A and short ﬁrms rated
Caa-C within liquidity groups. At the beginning of each calendar month, I assign ﬁrms into 3 portfolios according to the 30th
and 70th percentile of current ratio (Panel A), quick ratio (Panel B), or working capital ratio (Panel C), and then into three groups
according to credit ratings (Aaa-A, Baa-B, and Caa-C). The portfolios are value-weighted using the ranks of the previous calendar
month’s market equity values, refreshed every calendar month, and rebalanced every calendar month to maintain value-weighting.
The highest and lowest realized return is excluded for each portfolio. Return is the time-series average of the monthly returns of
Aaa-A rated ﬁrms and Caa-C rated ﬁrms. CAPM alpha and CAPM beta (unconditional) are the intercept and slope estimates from a
time-series regression of monthly excess returns on the excess returns of the value-weighted CRSP “market” index (MKT). Three-
and four-factor alphas are the intercepts from time-series regressions of monthly excess returns on the three Fama and French
(1993) factors (MKT, SMB, and HML) or these three factors and the Carhart (1997) factor (UMD). Sharpe ratio is the annualized
average excess return divided by the annualized volatility of the excess returns. Information ratio is the annualized 4-factor alpha
divided by the annualized residual standard error from the 4-factor time-series regression. Parentheses in subscript give t-statistics
for a null value of zero. Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level is indicated in bold.
Panel A: Current Ratio
High liquidity Medium liquidity Low liquidity
Aaa-A minus Caa-C Aaa-A minus Caa-C Aaa-A minus Caa-C
Return (avg.mon.%) 1.99(4.18) 0.96(2.16) 3.56(6.37)
CAPM alpha (mon. %) 2.31(4.98) 1.37(3.27) 4.03(7.49)
Three-factor alpha (mon. %) 2.46(5.68) 1.52(3.84) 4.28(8.87)
Four-factor alpha (mon. %) 2.23(5.09) 1.11(2.84) 3.79(7.89)
Sharpe Ratio (ann.) 0.74 0.37 1.09
Information Ratio (ann.) 0.93 0.51 1.41
CAPM beta (unconditional) −0.54(−5.31) −0.69(−7.48) −0.77(−6.41)
Months 388 401 413
Panel B: Quick Ratio
High liquidity Medium liquidity Low liquidity
Aaa-A minus Caa-C Aaa-A minus Caa-C Aaa-A minus Caa-C
Return (avg.mon.%) 1.69(3.65) 1.88(3.83) 3.62(6.80)
CAPM alpha (mon. %) 2.15(4.89) 2.28(4.82) 4.04(7.85)
Three-factor alpha (mon. %) 2.29(5.54) 2.27(5.14) 4.38(9.83)
Four-factor alpha (mon. %) 2.01(4.83) 1.81(4.13) 4.07(9.09)
Sharpe Ratio (ann.) 0.64 0.68 1.16
Information Ratio (ann.) 0.87 0.77 1.62
CAPM beta (unconditional) −0.70(−7.23) −0.65(−6.36) −0.70(−5.98)
Months 397 379 412
Panel C: Working Capital Ratio
High liquidity Medium liquidity Low liquidity
Aaa-A minus Caa-C Aaa-A minus Caa-C Aaa-A minus Caa-C
Return (avg.mon.%) 1.26(2.86) 1.49(3.22) 3.63(6.31)
CAPM alpha (mon. %) 1.57(3.68) 2.01(4.65) 4.06(7.26)
Three-factor alpha (mon. %) 1.75(4.40) 2.15(5.30) 4.24(8.47)
Four-factor alpha (mon. %) 1.59(3.93) 1.82(4.49) 3.78(7.56)
Sharpe Ratio (ann.) 0.50 0.56 1.10
Information Ratio (ann.) 0.71 0.81 1.37
CAPM beta (unconditional) −0.53(−5.58) −0.81(−8.50) −0.71(−5.66)
Months 399 400 398
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3.5 Concluding remarks
To conclude, this paper has shown, theoretically and empirically, that ﬁrms’ cash holdings can help rationalize low
returns to distressed equity.
I presented a model in which levered ﬁrms with ﬁnancing constraints can default because of illiquidity or insol-
vency and seek to choose their cash holdings optimally. I show that an equity-maximizing ﬁrm optimally holds a level
of cash that allows it to avoid illiquidity. When such a ﬁrm is in high risk of insolvency, it has a high fraction of its
assets in cash and therefore a low conditional beta, which helps rationalize its low expected returns.
Using data on solvency, liquidity, and equity returns for rated US ﬁrms over the period 1970-2013, I found em-
pirical evidence consistent with the model’s predictions. First, solvency and liquidity are positively related, but, in all
solvency levels, the average ﬁrm holds enough liquid assets to cover short-term liabilities. Second, ﬁrms with lower
solvency have a higher fraction of their total assets in liquid assets. Third, ﬁrms with suﬃciently high solvency have
high expected returns relative to ﬁrms with suﬃciently low solvency, but the relation between expected returns and
solvency is hump-shaped. Fourth, ﬁrms with suﬃciently high liquidity have high expected returns relative to ﬁrms
with suﬃciently low liquidity, but the relation between expected returns and liquidity is hump-shaped. Fifth, the prof-
itability of long-short liquidity strategies is concentrated among ﬁrms with low solvency. And, ﬁnally, the proﬁtability
of long-short solvency strategies is concentrated among ﬁrms with low liquidity.
My results shed new light on the distress puzzle, and, more generally, on the relation between ﬁrms’ cash holdings
and expected equity returns. The theoretical results suggest that separating the solvency and liquidity components of
distress risk is central in understanding the returns that investors require for holding distressed equities. The empirical
results conﬁrm that ﬁrms’ cash holdings are closely related to their solvency and, consequently, to their realized equity
returns.
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A Additional details and proofs
This appendix gives additional details of the model’s development as well as the proofs of the paper’s propositions.
A.1 Change of measure
The ﬁrm’s cumulated earnings, (Xt)t≥0 and the economy’s stochastic discount factor, (Λt)t≥0, are deﬁned by the P-
dynamics in (3.1) and (3.3), i.e.
dXt = μPXtdt + σXtdBPt
and
dΛt = −rΛtdt − λΛtdZPt .
Here, (BPt )t≥0 and (ZPt )t≥0 are standard P-Brownian motions with instantaneous correlation ρ. Therefore, there exists a
standard P-Brownian motion, (Z˜Pt )t≥0, independent of (ZPt )t≥0, such that
BPt = ρZ
P
t +
√
1 − ρ2 Z˜Pt .
Now, suppose Λ0 = 1, let Lt = ertΛt for each t, and note that Lt may be written as
Lt = exp
(
− 12λ′λ t − λ′ ZPt
)
,
where λ = (λ, 0)′ and ZPt = (ZPt , Z˜Pt )′. Fix T and deﬁne a risk-neutral pricing measure Q by
dQ
dP = LT . Girsanov’s
Theorem then gives that the two-dimensional process (ZQt )t≥0 deﬁned by
ZQt = (Z
Q
t , Z˜
Q
t ) = Z
P
t + λt
is a standard Q-Brownian motion.
Finally, let BQt = ρZ
Q
t +
√
1 − ρ2 Z˜Qt for each t, and note that (BQt )t≥0 is standard Q-Brownian motion which may
be written as
BQt = ρ
(
ZPt + λt
)
+
√
1 − ρ2 Z˜Pt = BPt + ρλt.
It thus follows that the Q-dynamics of the ﬁrm’s cumulated earnings process may be written as
dXt = μQXtdt + σXtdB
Q
t ,
where μQ = μP − ρσλ, exactly as in (3.4).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof of Part (i)
The task is to show that for each X, there exists a minimal level of cash, C(X), such that the ﬁrm avoids illiquidity if its
cash holdings are at or above C(X). Suppose ﬁrst that C(X) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable in X. It then follows
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by Itoˆ’s Formula along with the accounting identity in (3.2) and the Q-dynamics of (Xt)t≥0 in (3.4) that
dDt =
[
rC(Xt) + (μQXt − k) −CX(Xt)μQXt − 12CXX(Xt)σ2X2t
]
dt
+
[
σXt −CX(Xt)σXt
]
dBQt , (21)
where subscripts denote partial derivatives. Since the ﬁrm has no access to external ﬁnancing, it can, in particular, not
issue additional equity. This implies that the cumulated dividend process, (Dt)t≥0, has to be non-decreasing for all t.
This is satisﬁed if and only if i) the drift-term in (21) is nonnegative and ii) the volatility-term in (21) is zero.
The requirement that the volatility-term in (21) is zero implies the diﬀerential equation CX(X) = 1, which has the
general solution
C(X) = X + L (22)
for some constant L. Plugging this solution into the drift-term in (21), and imposing the requirement that the drift is
nonnegative, it follows that the solution in (22) has to satisfy
C(X) ≥ kr > 0 (23)
for all X. Hence, if for a given X the ﬁrm’s cash holdings are at or above the level C(X), cash holdings are strictly pos-
itive and the interest on the ﬁrm’s cash holdings is enough to cover a coupon, implying that the ﬁrm avoids illiquidity.
The remaining part of the proof of part (i) is to assert that the cash level C(X) must be twice continuously diﬀeren-
tiable in X. If X′ is a discontinuity point for C(X), then C(X) must jump downwards at X′, because an upwards jump
would mean an injection of external capital. However, even a downwards jump at X′ would imply that C(X) is not the
minimal cash level that allows the ﬁrm to avoid illiquidity an instance before X′. Hence, C(X) must be continuous in
X.
On the other hand, if C(X) is continuous but non-diﬀerentiable at some X′′, then C(X) would still satisfy the
diﬀerential equation in (21) except at X′′. However, this diﬀerential equation and the associated inequalities imply a
solution that is twice continuously diﬀerentiable in X.
Proof of Part (ii)
If C = C(X), then X fully determines the level of cash, implying that X(C) = X(C(X)) is only a function of X. If
C > C(X), then, because cash holdings by assumption can be paid out to equity holders at any time before default, the
positive diﬀerence C−C(X) can be distributed immediately to equity holders. This would bring C back down to C(X),
implying again that the insolvency decision is only a function of X.
Proof of Part (iii)
From the proof of part (i), the cash level C(X) takes the general form in (22) subject to the lower bound in (23). To
solve for the constant L, note that since CX(X) > 0, the target cash level is increasing in X. As X
 is a lower bound for
X, it follows that C(X) ≥ C(X) ≥ kr for all X. Hence, the constant L must satisfy
L ≥ −X + kr =
[
−X + kr
]
.
130
By choosing L as low as possible (i.e. the value where the inequality is binding), the expression for C(X) given in
Proposition 1 follows. 
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof of Part (i)
The task is to show that the function W(X,C) conjectured in (3.10)–(3.11) satisﬁes
W(Xt,Ct) = E
Q
t
[∫ τ˜
t
e−r(u−t) dDu + e
−r(τ˜−t)Cτ˜
]
,
where (Dt )t≥0 is the dividend policy conjectured in (3.8).
For future reference, note that for any twice continuously diﬀerentiable function f (X,C), it follows by Itoˆ’s For-
mula that the inﬁnitesimal generator of the two-dimensional process (Xt,Ct)t≥0 with dynamics in (3.4) and (3.2) is
given by
A(X,C) f (X,C) = μQX fX(X,C) + 12σ2X2 fXX(X,C)
+
[
rC + (μQX − k)
]
fC(X,C) + 12σ
2X2 fCC(X,C)
+ σ2X2 fXC(X,C).
Similarly, for any twice continuously diﬀerentiable g(X), the inﬁnitesimal generator of the process (Xt)t≥0 with dy-
namics in (3.4) is given by
AXg(X) = μQXgX(X) + 12σ2X2gXX(X).
Deﬁne the process (Gt)t≥0 by
Gt = e−rtW(Xt,Ct) +
∫ t
0
e−rsdDs ,
where the function W(X,C) satisﬁes (3.10)–(3.11) and (Dt )t≥0 is given in (3.8). Note that while (Dt )t≥0 is non-
continuous, it may for all t < τ˜ be decomposed into the sum of its purely continuous part and its jumps: Dt =
Dct +
∑
s≤t(Ds − Ds−). By (3.2), the jumps of the cash process are given by Ct − Ct− = −(Dt − Dt−) for all t < τ˜.
Using this along with the generalized Itoˆ’s Formula and the dynamics of (Xt,Ct)t≥0 in (3.2) and (3.4), it follows that
dGt = e−rt
[−rW(Xt,Ct−) +A(X,C)W(Xt,Ct−)] dt + e−rt [1 −WC(Xt,Ct−)] dDt
+ e−rtσXt [WX(Xt,Ct−) +WC(Xt,Ct−)] dBQt
+ e−rt [W(Xt,Ct) −W(Xt,Ct−) −WC(Xt,Ct−) (Ct −Ct−)] . (24)
Suppose ﬁrst that 0 < C < C(X) and X > X(C). Then dDt = 0 by (3.8), which deﬁnes a continuous process, and
−rW(X,C) +A(X,C)W(X,C) = 0 by (3.10). Hence, (24) becomes
d(e−rtW(Xt,Ct)) = e−rtσXt [WX(Xt,Ct) +WC(Xt,Ct)] dBQt .
Assuming that the derivatives of W(X,C) are suﬃciently integrable, it follows by integrating this expression between
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t and v ∧ τ˜ for any v ≥ t and taking expectations that
e−rtW(Xt,Ct) = EQt
[
e−r(v∧τ˜)W(Xv∧τ˜,Cv∧τ˜)
]
.
Since v was arbitrary, it follows by letting v→ ∞ and applying the ﬁrst condition in (3.11) that
W(Xt,Ct) = E
Q
t
[
e−r(τ˜−t)Cτ˜
]
,
which proves part (i) in this case.
Next, suppose that C = C(X) and X ≥ X. Then dDt = r(Xt−X) dt by (3.8), which deﬁnes a continuous process,
and, by (3.10),
−rW(X,C) +A(X,C)W(X,C) = −rW(X,C(X)) +AXW(X,C(X)) = −r(X − X).
Furthermore, Proposition 3 and its proof (Section A.4 of this appendix) give that WC(X,C(X)) = 1. Hence, (24)
implies for any v ≥ t that
W(Xt,Ct) = E
Q
t
[∫ v∧τ˜
t
e−r(u−t)dDu + e
−r((v∧τ˜)−t)W(Xv∧τ˜,Cv∧τ˜)
]
.
Letting v→ ∞ and applying the ﬁrst condition in (3.11) thus proves part (i) for this case.
Finally, suppose that C > C(X) and X ≥ X. Then dDt = Ct −C(Xt) by (3.8), which deﬁnes a pure jump-process.
However, this case occurs if and only if Ct− = C(Xt), which implies W(Xt,Ct−) = W(Xt,C(Xt)). Therefore, (3.10)
gives
−rW(Xt,Ct−) +A(X,C)E(Xt,Ct−) = −rW(Xt,C(Xt)) +AXW(Xt,C(Xt)) = −r(Xt − X).
Furthermore, Proposition 3 and its proof give that WC(X,C(X)) = 1, which implies both
W(Xt,Ct) −W(Xt,Ct−) = Ct −C(Xt)
and
WC(Xt,Ct−) = WC(Xt,C(Xt)) = 1.
These two results imply that the jump-term in (24) becomes
W(Xt,Ct) −W(Xt,Ct−) −WC(Xt,Ct−) (Ct −Ct−) = Ct −C(Xt) − 1 × (Ct −C(Xt)) = 0.
Using the implied form of (24) and repeating the steps of the proof in the second case thus proves part (i) in this ﬁnal
case.
Proof of Part (ii)
The task is to show that
W(Xt,Ct) ≥ EQt
[∫ τ˜
t
e−r(u−t) dDu + e−r(τ˜−t)Cτ˜
]
,
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where (Dt)t≥0 is any adapted, non-decreasing dividend process satisfying the relation in (3.2).
Let (Dt)t≥0 be such a dividend process and deﬁne the process (Ht)t≥0 by
Ht = e−rtW(Xt,Ct) +
∫ t
0
e−rsdDs,
where the function W(X,C) satisﬁes (3.10)–(3.11). By the generalized Itoˆ’s formula,
dHt = e−rt
[−rW(Xt,Ct−) +A(X,C)W(Xt,Ct−)] dt + e−rt [1 −WC(Xt,Ct−)] dDt
+ e−rtσXt [WX(Xt,Ct−) +WC(Xt,Ct−)] dBQt
+ e−rt [W(Xt,Ct) −W(Xt,Ct−) −WC(Xt,Ct−) (Ct −Ct−)] , (25)
where Ct − Ct− = −(Dt − Dt−) for all t < τ˜, using the decomposition Dt = Dct +
∑
s≤t(Ds − Ds−) and (3.2). Hence,
rearranging (25), it follows for all v ≥ t that
W(Xt,Ct) = e−r(v∧τ˜−t)W(Xv∧τ˜,Cv∧τ˜) −
∫ v∧τ˜
t
e−r(u−t)
[−rW(Xu,Cu−) +A(X,C)W(Xu,Cu−)] du
+
∫ v∧τ˜
t
e−r(u−t) [1 −WC(Xu,Cu−)] dDcu
+
∫ v∧τ˜
t
e−r(u−t)σXu [WX(Xu,Cu−) +WC(Xu,Cu−)] dBQu
−
∑
t≤u≤v∧τ˜
e−r(u−t) [W(Xu,Cu) −W(Xu,Cu−)] . (26)
By (3.10), it holds that −rW(X,C) + A(X,C)W(X,C) = 0 for 0 < C < C(X) and X > X(C), while −rW(X,C(X)) +
AXW(X,C(X)) = −r(X − X) < 0 for C ≥ C(X) and X > X. Combined, these relations imply the following lower
bound:
−
∫ v∧τ˜
t
e−r(u−t)
[−rW(Xu,Cu−) +A(X,C)W(Xu,Cu−)] du ≥ 0.
Furthermore, by (3.11), it holds that WC(X,C) ≥ 1 for C > 0 and X > X(C), while Ct − Ct− = −(Dt − Dt−) ≤ 0.
Combined, these relations imply the following lower bound:
−
∑
t≤u≤v∧τ˜
e−r(u−t) [W(Xu,Cu) −W(Xu,Cu−)] ≥
∑
t≤u≤v∧τ˜
e−r(u−t)(Du − Du−).
Assuming that the derivatives of W(X,C) are suﬃciently integrable, it follows by using these lower bounds with (26)
and taking expectations that
W(Xt,Ct) ≥ EQt
[
e−r((v∧τ˜)−t)W(Xv∧τ˜,Cv∧τ˜)
]
+ E
Q
t
[∫ v∧τ˜
t
e−r(u−t)dDcu
]
+ E
Q
t
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣ ∑
t≤u≤v∧τ˜
e−r(u−t)(Du − Du−)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
= E
Q
t
[∫ v∧τ˜
t
e−r(u−t)dDu
]
+ E
Q
t
[
e−r((v∧τ˜)−t)W(Xv∧τ˜,Cv∧τ˜)
]
,
where the last equality uses the decomposition Dt = Dct +
∑
s≤t(Ds − Ds−). Letting v → ∞ and applying the second
condition in (3.11) thus proves part (ii), which completes the proof. 
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof of Part (i)
The ODE (3.12) has the general solution
E(X) = r
[
X
r−μQ −
X
r
]
+ M1Xφ
+
+ M2Xφ
−
= C(X) + U(X) − kr + M1Xφ
+
+ M2Xφ
−
,
where the second equality follows from the form of the target cash level, C(X), in (3.7), and the value of productive
assets, U(X), in (3.5). Here, M1 and M2 are real-valued constants to be determined by boundary conditions, while the
exponents φ+ > 1 and φ− < 0 are given by
φ± =
σ2 − 2μ ± √(σ2 − 2μ)2 + 8rσ2
2σ2
.
Since φ+ > 1, the value matching condition (3.13) implies M1 = 0. Given this, the limited liability condition (3.14)
implies
M2 = (X)−φ
− [ k
r − U(X)
]
.
By plugging the constants into the general solution, and deﬁning πQ(X) = (X/X)φ
−
, the expression for E(X) in the
proposition follows.
Proof of Parts (ii) and (iii)
The expression for X given in (3.17) easily follows by solving the smoothing pasting condition in (3.15). To proof
part (iii), suppose ﬁrst that Xt → ∞. Then the expressions for C(Xt) in (3.7) and U(Xt) in (3.5) give that
lim
Xt→∞
C(Xt) = lim
Xt→∞
U(Xt) = ∞,
while
lim
Xt→∞
∂C(Xt)
∂Xt
∂U(Xt)
∂Xt
=
r − μQ
μQ
< 1,
since r > μQ > 12 r by assumption. Therefore, by l’Hoˆpital’s rule,
lim
Xt→∞
C(Xt)
U(Xt)
< 1.
Conversely, suppose that Xt → X. Then
lim
Xt→X
C(Xt)
U(Xt)
=
k
r
μQX
r−μQ
=
φ− − 1
φ−
> 1,
by the expression for X in (3.17). Combining these two cases, it follows that there exists X′ > X such that U(X) >
C(X) for all X > X′, while U(X) < C(X) for all X < X′. This completes the proof. 
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A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
The proofs of parts (i) and (ii) will make use of the following results about the earnings-sensitivity, ΩE(Xt). First,
using the expression for C(X) in (3.7), the sensitivity can be compactly written as
ΩE(Xt) = 1 +
X − (1 − φ−) M πQ(Xt)
E(Xt)
, (27)
where M =
[
k
r − U(X)
]
. Second, by diﬀerentiating the form of ΩE(Xt) in (27) with respect to Xt, it follows that
∂ΩE(Xt)
∂Xt
= −
(1 − φ−) M φ−πQ(Xt)Xt
E(Xt)
−
EX(Xt)
[
X − (1 − φ−) M πQ(Xt)
]
E2(Xt)
= −
(1 − φ−)M φ−πQ(Xt)Xt
E(Xt)
− Ω
E(Xt)(ΩE(Xt) − 1)
Xt
, (28)
where the last equality uses the deﬁnition ΩE(Xt) = Xt
EX (Xt)
E(Xt)
as well as (27).
Proof of Part (i)
Suppose ﬁrst that Xt → ∞. Since φ− < 0, Proposition 3 gives that πQ(X) approaches zero faster than E(X) approaches
inﬁnity. Combined with the form of ΩE(Xt) in (27), it thus follows that
lim
Xt→∞
ΩE(Xt) > 1. (29)
Conversely, suppose that Xt → X. By the limited liability condition (3.14) and the expression for C(X) in (3.7), it
follows that
lim
Xt→X
ΩE(Xt) = 1 +
X − (1 − φ−) M
C(X)
=
r − μQ
μQ
φ−
φ− − 1 < 1, (30)
because the assumption μQ > 12 r implies
r−μQ
μQ
< 1 and φ− < 0 implies φ
−
φ−−1 ∈ (0, 1). Note that μQ > 12 r is a suﬃcient
but not necessary condition for (30) to hold. Combining these two cases, it follows that there exists X′′ > X such that
ΩE(Xt) > 1 for all Xt > X′′, while ΩE(Xt) < 1 for all Xt < X′′
Proof of Part (ii)
Consider the expression in (28) and suppose ﬁrst that Xt → ∞. Because E(Xt) → ∞, it follows that the ﬁrst term
vanishes. By (29), the numerator of the second term is asymptotically positive. The second term is therefore as a
whole asymptotically negative, implying in total that
lim
Xt→∞
dΩE(Xt)
dXt
< 0.
Conversely, suppose that Xt → X. Because E(Xt) → C(X) by the limited liability condition in (3.14), and since
φ− < 0, the ﬁrst term as a whole is asymptotically positive. By (30), the numerator of the second term will be
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asymptotically negative. The second term is therefore as a whole asymptotically positive, implying in total that
lim
Xt→X
dΩE(Xt)
dXt
> 0.
Combining these two cases, it follows that there exists X′′′ > X such that ∂Ω
E
∂Xt
< 0 for all Xt > X′′′, while ∂Ω
E
∂Xt
> 0 for
all Xt < X′′′. This completes the proof. 
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